351st Bomb Group

1. Target
   1. Name – LeRhone Engine Works
   2. Location – LeMans [France]
   3. Name of Secondary – [RR] Marshalling Yards
   4. Location of Secondary – LeMans
   5. Name of Last Resort – None
   6. Location of Last Resort – None - No indiscriminate bombing
2. General Information On Formation
   1. Wing formation – 101st C.W. [Combat Wing], 103rd C.W., High Squadron stack right
   2. Order of Groups in formation and altitude of each – 91 - 22,000', 351 - 23,000', 381 - 21,000'
   3. Our formation for bombing – Group Defensive
3. Pursuit Coverage - 8 Squadrons of P-47's - 3 groups each will rendezvous with the bombers 15 mi. N.E. of Cape Barfleur - area cover to Mortain [4839N0056W]. 5 wings (2 squadrons each) of Spit [Spitfire] IX's provide withdrawal from Argentan to the coast.
4. Diversions - Fourth Wing to LaPallice at 1000
   B-26's Orfordness to Dover to Dungess to Dover at 0 + 30 [minutes]. Diversion at Tricqueville at Zero [Hour] [Zero Hour 1140 DST].
   102 C.W. will echelon right go South
5. Navigator -
6. Stations – 0835
   Start Engines – 0935
   Taxi – 0945
   Take off – 1000
   
7. Don't leave gun stations until Over England.
8. Weather -
9. S-2 [Intelligence] –
10. 1. Bomb Load is – 10 x 500
    2. IAS [Indicated Air Speed] for bombing is – 155
    3. IP Signals are:
       1. Red Flare
       2. Voice on 5165 and VHF "C"
       3. Aldis Lamp
    4. Open Doors - on Group Leader
11. Special Briefing for all Officers of lead crews in Group S-2 [Intelligence]
12. Special instruction to all personnel: No indiscriminate bombing.
    
    Gunners, Radio operators, Navigators and Bombardiers leave the briefing room.
13. Comments to improve the formation and improve evasive action: Wing men stacked down.
14. Climb at 150 IAS. [Indicated Air Speed] 400 feet per minute
    Cruise at 160 IAS
    Reform after attack at 155 IAS
    Descend at 170 IAS and 500 feet per minute.
15. Any questions on who takes over the lead at anytime?
16. Special instructions in case of bad weather. Form on top [of clouds] - Everyone understand letdown - Splasher No.11 for letdown.
17. Call signs:
    

    101 C.W. [Combat Wing]	Windbag 1		_____ Group	______
    103 C.W.	Windbag 2		_____ Group	______
    102 C.W.	Windbag 3		_____ Group	______

18. Identification colors:
    

    101 C.W.	RR [Red Red]		_____ Group	______
    102 C.W.	YY		_____ Group	______
    103 C.W.	GG		_____ Group	______

19. Bomber to Bomber freq. 5165 kc [kilocycles].
20. VHF Channel (Bomber to Fighter) - C
21. Bomber to Fighter Call Signs:
    1. Bombers - Windbag
    2. Fighters - None - Use Petro for fighters
    3. Ground - Petro
    4. Collective Call - Nature
    5. Recall - _____
    6. Abandon Ops - Midnight
22. Turn on VHF [Very High Frequency Radio] at English Coast
23. Colors of the day:

    Time	Color	Ident.	Challenge
    0800 - 1400	RY	_____	____
    1400 - 2000	RG	_____	____
    2000 - 0200	GY	_____	____

24. Taxi Plan.
25. Spare Ship Plane
26. Any questions?

1. Eighteen aircraft took off on the mission as scheduled. The lead airplane, 42-29863, was piloted by Captain Clinton F. Ball. Lt. Harvey B. Wallace, was the lead Bombardier.
2. The assembly and rendezvous was made without incident. The P-47's failed to appear.
3. Some enemy aircraft attacked without determination on the approach to the target. The flak was light and inaccurate.
4. The bomb run was made manually. The MPI [Mean Point of Impact] was the factory itself, and the results were excellent. The pattern covered the entrance to the [railroad] Marshalling Yards, the factory, and part of the airfield.
5. The Spitfire escort was on time and provided very good cover.
6. The return to the English Coast was uneventful. All of our aircraft returned and there were no abortives. The formation was exceptionally good for the entire trip.

[Signed] Theodore R. Milton, Major, Air Corps, Operations Officer.

1. The 351st Bomb Group departed from base as briefed and made all rendezvous points as stated in the Field Order.
2. The group departed from the English Coast at 1140 as scheduled.
3. An altitude of 23,000' was attained before leaving the English coast at Selsey Bill.
4. The Primary Target was clearly visible and the Bomb Run was made as prescribed in the Field Order.
5. All bombs were dropped on the primary target.
6. Continued from target to rally points and back to England, crossing coast at Brighton.
7. Let-down on #10 Splasher Beacon.
8. Proceeded from #10 Splasher to wing dispersal point at Suton.
9. Group proceeded from Suton to Base, arriving at base at 1420.

[Signed] Charles M. Swan, 1st Lt, Air Corps, Lead Navigator.

1. The Group reached the I.P. [Initial Point of Bomb Run] (Noyen), at 1238. It was necessary to slide to the right in order to get clear of the 381st Group for satisfactory bombing.
2. The target was very clear and only slight corrections were necessary. The approach was flown manually and synchronization was on at bombs away, (1241).
3. The true altitude above the target was 23,700 feet. One hundred sixty six (166) bombs were dropped, ten (10) were brought back, and four (4) were jettisoned due to mechanical difficulty.
4. Bombing results are considered very good, the target being the MPI [Mean Point of Impact]. Large columns of reddish dust were seen in the smoke bursts.

[Signed] Harvey H. Wallace. 1st Lt. Air Corps, Group Bombardier.

Bombardier - H.H. Wallace, 1st Lt.   Pilot - C.F. Ball, Capt   Navigator - C.M. Shaw, 1st Lt.
Aircraft #42-29863   Take-off - 1000   Landed - 1432
Objective - Le Rhone Motor Works, Le Mans, France    Aiming Point - Gnome and Rhone A/C Engine Factory
Initial Point - Noyen   Method of Attack - Group   Number of Planes in Unit - 18
Number of Planes in Each Unit Performing Sighting Operations- 1   Time of Attack - 1241
Approx. Length of Straight Approach - 15 Sec.   Synchronization - On
Information at Release Point -
Altitude, True Above Target -    Calculated Indicated Air Speed -
True Air Speed -    Wind Direction -    Wind Velocity -
True Heading -    Drift -   True Track -
D.S. -    Trail -    ATF -    Tan. D.A. -    Type of Release - Train
Point of Impact If Seen - Target
Winds - Altitude -   Direction -   Velocity -   Temp -0°C.

1. Because of fuzzy prints, due to unsteady cameras, it was impossible to estimate accurately the exact damage done by bombing. By orientation with other photographs it is possible to follow the general outline of the bombing.
   1. Print A shows bombs in flight and the target. Clearly visible are the craters from the raid of June 29.
   2. Print B shows the target area covered by what appears to be bomb bursts. Several bursts are seen between the target and the river. There are some bursts that appear to be on the choke points of the [Railroad] marshalling yard to the west of the target.
   3. Print C shows the target area covered with bursts and more bursts on the railroad marshalling yard.
2. The target appears to have been hit, with the greatest number of hits at the northern end of the main building. The marshalling yards received some hits. The main body of the aerodrome, across the middle part, is well covered with bomb bursts.

[Signed] Thomas L. Cooper, 1st Lt., AC, Group Photo Intelligence Officer.

1. The target for the mission July 4, 1943 was the Gnome-Rhone A/C Engine Factory, Le Mans, France. Interrogation shows all crews were certain that the bomb patterns and concentration were excellent. Large columns of smoke, mingled with a reddish dust, resulted in the entire area later being obliterated from view. Bombardiers reported that the target and MPI [Mean Point of Impact] was positively identified. One (1) A/C brought its bombs back and another Jettisoned four (4) due to mechanical failure.
2. Eighteen (18) A/C were dispatched with none failing to take off and none returning early. This Group was high Group behind the 91st; 381st Group being low. All A/C returned safely.
3. E/A [Enemy Aircraft] encountered averaged 10 – 15, and while these stayed at great distance for the large part, nose attacks were apparent mostly at the lower Group. Our claims are: three (3) destroyed; one (1) probable, and none damaged. There were no casualties.
4. Scattered red and black bursts were seen at the target area and at Le Havre on return. Bursts were 2,000 low and trailing evidently directed at lower Group.
5. Weather at target area was CAVU [Ceiling And Visibility Unlimited].
6. There were no crew observations of importance reported.

[Signed] John L. Scott, Major, AC, Group S-2.

• A/C #749;   Time 1257;   Height 22,000 ft.;   Place where attacked – Argentan
  Story of the attack – Just before we [unreadable] spitz an FW 190 came in at 5 o:clock and from above. I fired at 900 yards and at about 600 he went out of sight, badly hit. Bombardier says he kept parallel with us for a second then went into steep dive and crashed near Argentan.
  Our gun position firing on A/C - S/Sgt. R. Gelsleichter - Top Turret Gunner
  Corroborated by – 2nd Lt. G. Wylie – Bombardier
  Other A/C firing at the same time – [Nothing Written]
  Comments of the interrogator – I am positive it crashed.

• A/C #9812;   Time 1300;   Height 23,000 ft.;   Place where attacked – 10 minutes after target
  Story of the attack – An FW 190 crossed on my right. I picked him up at 500 yards and fired continuously for about 80 rounds. Tracers were hitting him. The ship exploded in air.
  Our gun positions firing on E/A – S/Sgt. R.C. Stuart - Tail Gunner
  Corroborated by – unobserved
  Other A/C firing at the same time – None
  Comments of the interrogator – Reasonable claim - from the line of flight of E/A [Enemy Aircraft] no one else in plane could see it.

• A/C #9812;   Time 1245;   Height ft.;   Place where attacked – On turn after target
  Story of the attack – An FW 190 made a pass at us - turned and came in from below at six o'clock. I started firing at approximately 1100 yards and continued to fire until he was 800 yards. - tracers were going into him and smoke started pouring out. He rolled over and went straight down out of control.
  Our gun positions firing on E/A – S/Sgt. R.C. Stuart - Tail Gunner
  Corroborated by – S/Sgt. O. Diltz - Ball Turret Gunner
  Other A/C firing at the same time – None
  Comments of the interrogator – Very good claim.

• A/C #877;   Time 1246;   Height 22,700 ft.;   Place where attacked – Just after Target
  Story of the attack – An FW 190, 600 yards away came in at 8 o'clock, high, and fired 45 rounds. At 500 yards it was obvious he was going after Group below. I fired and he started smoking. He disintegrated in air. [Three word sentence unreadable.]
  Our gun positions firing on E/A – S/Sgt. L.N. Shenk - Left Waist Gunner
  Corroborated by – (Check with 381st or Low Squadron)
  Other A/C firing at the same time – None
  Comments of the interrogator – [None Written]

Target - Le Mans, Gnome-Rhome Works
1. Route followed. - Selsey Bill - 15 me NE of C Barfleur - St. Lo - Laval - Noyen - Target - Mintford - St. Cosme - Argentan - Shoreham
2. Visibility at Target. - Good. Slight ground haze. No trails [Contrails] observed.
3. No. of A/C over Target: 18
4. General Axis of attack. - 60° Magnetic
5. How long did formation fly straight and level before bombing? - 15 sec.
6. Turn after bombing. - Right turn 10°
7. Position of Group in relation to other Groups: High Group, behind 91st Group, with 381st Group Low.
8. What evasive action was taken? Slight right and left turns, no loss of Altitude.
9. A short description of Flak en route. - One black burst was reported by one of our A/C flying on course at 23,000 feet 5 minutes in from the French coast. Half way between I.P. and Point of bomb release, meager inaccurate flak was encountered, evidently aimed at the low group - Bursts were seen below and to the left of our Group, which was flying at 23,000 feet. One of our A/C reported meager inaccurate flak on course 15 minutes before reaching the target. One of our A/C flying at 23,000 feet observed five red bursts East of Caen at 1310 hours. Meager inaccurate flak, including about 8 red bursts, was observed at Le Havre at 1315 hours. One A/C reported red bursts 10 miles west of Le Havre, apparently from a flak ship.
10. Any other comments, phenomena, etc. - Enemy fighters and anti-aircraft bursts appeared simultaneously about half way between the I.P. and the point of Bomb Release, both apparently aimed at the low Group. Fighters appeared to fly through the flak bursts.

On the mission of 4 July 1943, the following items of hot news were reported:

1. Crew members of our A/C 948 flying at 23,000 feet and just past target (approximately 3 minutes) reported a B-17 blew up at 15,000. Ten minutes past target, they reported 10 parachutes were seen from a B-17 and plane circling without crew at 10,000 feet. On course home just 3 minutes before fighter support was met a B-17 went down into clouds under control.
2. Crew members of our A/C 835 flying at 23,000 feet over target, reported two B-17s at 20,000 feet being attacked by fighters with #3 engine of one on fire and both going down in long circles. They were 45° to the left of our Group.
3. Crew members of our A/C 684 flying at 20,000 feet on course on way back at approximately 1400 hrs. reported a B-17 at 5,000 feet headed straight up channel at 90° angle to their course. No evidence of distress. Our A/C 877 saw this same B-17 return safely to English coast.
4. Crew members of our A/C 046, flying at 23,000 feet at 1235 hrs. and just before approaching target, reported two B-17s in distress. One caught fire and six parachutes were seen. The other caught fire and was jumped by fighters and went down past vision.
5. Crew members of our A/C 835 flying at 23,000 feet sighted a B-17 at 5 minutes past target in flames and followed by fighters. Seven parachutes were seen.
6. Crew members of our A/C 852 flying at 22,500 feet over mid-channel on course on way back sighted a B-17, seemingly out of control, falling from formation from above and to the rear of our Group. Went down through Clouds and made turn off North. Just after leaving target they sighted four B-17s at 21,000 feet in distress. All had dropped their bombs - #1 pulled out of dive, several chutes seen. #2 – Ship under control but smoking, six parachutes seen. #3 – going down in slow slope, followed by fighters. #4 also going down in slow slope and followed by fighters.

All of the above items were reported to A-2 Duty Officer, 1st Bomb Wing, immediately upon receipt.
[Signed] John L. Scott, Major, AC, Group S-2 [Intelligence Officer]

The pilot of an aircraft having information relative to aircraft or personnel going into the sea will report immediately after landing to the flying control officer on duty at the station of landing. He will give the control officer as accurately as possible the position and time of the ditching with other information pertinent to rescue.

Subject: Use of Emergency Dinghy Radio.
If a distressed crew uses a dinghy radio the distressed crew should identify themselves, by making transmissions (at intervals of approximately fifteen minutes) with the transmitter switched to the "hand" or "manual" position, and should transmit the following signal "S.O.S. S.O.S. S.O.S." - 15 second dash - terminated by the aircraft's identification letter. Such transmissions to be additional to those made with the transmitter switched to the 'Auto' position.

1. A/C 835 - Interphones were functioning none too good.
2. A/C 948 - Bombardier complained that his parachute opened in the plane and prefers chest parachute to seat parachute.
3. A/C 272 - Right Waist Gunner reported that his suit heated ineffectively.
4. A/C 630 - Rear Gunner reports that his heated suit caught afire.
5. A/C 824 - Crew complained that the heated gloves and boots did not operate properly. S/Sgt. Happold stated that flying boots are too bulky for operator of ball turret.
6. A/C 749 - S/Sgt. Nelson, operating Ball Turret, reported that his heated gloves and boots did not operate properly.
7. A/C 841 - 2nd Lt. Marquardt, navigator, stated that his heated gloves and boots operated properly for only one or two minutes during the mission.
8. There were no physical disabilities.

[Signed] John L. Scott, Major, Air Corps, Group S-2.

1. A/C 835 - Trouble reported to Communications Officer.
2. A/C 948 - Bombardier's complaint of seat type parachute opening is due to sitting on the pack carelessly. At the present time it impossible to procure any Chest Type parachutes, although we have been allotted fifty (50) more by 1st Bombardment Wing, and will receive same as soon as they are available.
3. AC 272 - Right Waist Gunner's complaint that his suit heated ineffectively shows that he was wearing excessive clothing underneath his electrically heated equipment. This does not allow the heat to be present next to the body where it is needed. At this time we have established a method for plugging in electrically heated equipment in the 510th and 511th Crew Rooms so that it can be tested prior to missions.
4. A/C 630 - The Rear Gunner reported that his heated suit caught afire, this is caused by negligence, first, suits should have been tested prior to take-off, either in crew rooms or airplane, second, careless handling of electrical equipment will cause a short circuit.
5. A/C 824 - Crew complained that the heated gloves and boots did not heat properly. S/Sgt Happold stated that flying boots are too bulky for Ball Turret. In talking to this crew I find that the men in this crew have been wearing clothing underneath electrically heated equipment, in doing this they have robbed themselves of the proper heating. In regards to the flying boots being too bulky, at the present time, there is no alternative because warm clothing is needed in the Ball Turret.
6. A/C 749 - S/Sgt Nelson, operating Ball Turret reported that his heated gloves and boots did not operate properly. Once again this shows that clothing being worn under electrically heated clothing, will cut down the heating element.
7. A/C 841 - 2nd Lt Marquardt, navigator, stated that his heated gloves and boots operated properly for only one (1) or two (2) minutes during the mission. In this case, it is apparent that one connection was loose. Being that both gloves and boots are connected to the heated suit is parallel, when one connection fails, loss of both gloves and boots are the results.

Summary:
  It is very apparent that the crews need coaching on use of electrically heated clothing. A schedule of lectures should be started immediately so as to convey care and use of clothing to the Combat Crews. It is thereby recommended that the Operations Training Section set up a schedule at the earliest possible time so that this program may be carried out.
[Signed] Herbert L. Fleischer, 2nd Lt., Air Corps, Group Equipment Officer.

1. A/C 835 - Intervalometer toggle switch on bomb release mechanism failed to function.
2. A/C 948 - Gun jammed on left nose.
3. A/C 841 - Top Turret mechanism malfunctioned.
4. A/C 749 - Right center nose gun adapter pin malfunctioned. Left Waist Gun did not operate properly.
5. A/C 5812 - Left nose gun did not feed properly.
6. A/C 863 - Front nose gun sticks; never good.
7. A/C 864 - Ball Turret solenoid not working.
8. A/C 9812 - Incendiary shells exploding in barrel of tail gun.

[Signed] John L. Scott, Major, Air Corps, Group S-2.

1. Abortives.
   1. 351st Bomb Group (H).
      1. None
2. Other Equipment and Personnel Failures.
   1. The following Engineering failures were reported with the number of cases in parenthesis:
      Oil cooler (2); Cracked air scoop (1); Supercharger lag (2).
   2. The following Armament failures were reported, with the number of cases in parenthesis:
      Solenoid Failure (1); Adapter pin failure (1).
   3. The following failures other than Engineering and Armament were reported with the number of cases in parenthesis:
      Interphone out (1); Heated suit failure (2); Heated Gloves failure (2); Heated Boots failure (2).
3. The following battle damage was received.
   Total no. of A/C – 3
   Minor Damage – 3
   Major Damage – 0
   By Flak – 0
   By Fighter – 0
   By Friend – 3
   

1. There were no aircraft malfunctions.
2. No aircraft failed to take-off as scheduled.
3. No abortives on this mission.
4. Battle Damage.
   1. Airplane No. 42-29630, 509th Squadron, right horizontal stabilizer damaged by right waist gunner. Tear in stabilizer two feet in size.
   2. Airplane No. 42-29861, 509th Squadron, tear in tight inboard wing one foot from the leading edge caused by spent shell casing.
   3. Airplane No. 42-29852, 511th Squadron, tear in left inboard wing near #1 engine nacelle caused by spent shell casings.

1. Total No. A/C in each Squadron and Letters of each:

   Sqdn 508th A/C:	(0)
   Sqdn 509th A/C: 863 – Y, 630 – S, 841 – V, 9812 – U, 684 – T, 861 – X, 749 – Z,	(7)
   Sqdn 510th A/C: 925 – L, 839 – C, 831 – H, 272 – M, 046 –X, 942 – B,	(6)
   Sqdn 511th A/C: 5812 – O, 835 – Y, 852 – V, 824 – S, 877 –X,	(5)

2. Target: Primary: Z-444 MPI - 2408 Secondary: Z-444 MPI 4647
   
3. Station call sign and Operational call sign respectively of each Squadron

   Squadron	508 Ops:	ZM7		Squadron	510 Ops:	U9V
   	Sta:	Wild Cheer			Sta:	Worm Track
   Squadron	509 Ops	ZM7		Squadron	511 Ops:	U9V
   	Sta:	Knitwell			Sta:	Shudder

4. Taxi Time – 1st A/C 0945;     Take-Off Time 1st A/C 1000;     E.T.D. Over Field 1030

5. Time:	Height:	Place of crossing English Coast OUT:
   1140	23,000 Ft	Selsey Bill

6. Time:	Height:	Place of Recrossing Enemy Coast:
   1312	23,000 Ft	Cabourg

7. Time:	Height:	Place of crossing English Coast IN:
   1338	23,000 Ft	Shoreham

8. E.T.R.(Estimated Time of Return): 1417 Hours
9. MF/DF [Medium Frequency/Direction Finder] Section: N
10. Bomb load of Each A/C:
    Squadron: 508 10–500 pound, Fuse - 1/10 Nose, 1/100 Tail
    Squadron: 509 10–500 pound, Fuse - 1/10 Nose, 1/100 Tail
    Squadron: 510 10–500 pound, Fuse - 1/10 Nose, 1/100 Tail
    Squadron: 511 10–500 pound, Fuse - 1/10 Nose, 1/100 Tail
11. Fuel Load of each A/C: 1700 Gals
12. Actual Times Off and Return by Squadrons and A/C Letters:

    Squadron	A/C Letter	A.T.O.	A.T.R.	Squadron	A/C Letter	A.T.O.	A.T.R.
    509	863–Y	1000	1432	510	925–L	1004	1436
    	630–S	1009	1443		839–C	1005	1438
    	841–V	1008	1442		831–A	1004½	1437
    	9812–U	1007	1441		272–M	1005½	1439½
    	684 T	1010	1446½		046–X	1006½	1443½
    	861 X	1011	1449		948–B	1006	1439
    	749 Z	1010½	1451
    511	5812–O	1001	1433½
    	835–Y	1000½	1433
    	852–V	1001½	1434
    	824–S	1007½	1455
    	877–X	1002	1435

    Report Compiled By Paul Hancock, S/Sgt.