351st Bomb Group

1. 1. Roll Call and Assign Aircraft.
   2. Stations  –1030
   3. Start Engines –1130
   4. Taxi  –1140
   5. Take off –1155
   6. Depart Base –1305
2. Target for today: Sub [Submarine] pens - Bremen (10% total Sub production last year)
   Secondary - Center of town.
   Loading: 12 - 500 lb. bombs
3. S-2 [Intelligence] –
4. Navigator:
   1. Wing Rendezvous:
   2. Altitude and time on Oxygen:
   3. Route in, I.P. [Initial Point of Bomb Run], Return:
   4. C.W. [Combat Wing] dispersal point:
   5. Emergency Fields
5. Weather -
6. Operations -
   1. Wing Formation - Lead 91st, High 351st, Low 381st
      1st C.W. [Combat Wing] - lead, Air Commander - Col. Wurzback
   2. Diversions and other efforts -
      3rd Division same target 15 to 25 minutes after [us].
      2nd Division to Vegesack [Vegesack is a northern district of the city of Bremen] 35 to 40 minutes after [us].
   3. Fighter Cover -
      1. Type and No. - 1 Group of P-47's
         Rendezvous - Workum [Netherlands] (Coast in to extent of range)
         Duration and Departure
      2. Type and No. - 1 Group of P-47's
         Rendezvous - Haselunne [Germany] (turn point)
         Duration and Departure - Extent of range.
      3. Type and No. - 1 Group of P-47's
         Rendezvous - Meppel [Netherlands] (turn point)
         Duration and Departure - Extent of range.
   4. Special Instructions - Only Group leader will call fighters (exception - in emergency). The Mag. [Magnetic Compass] heading will be called on VHF by H-2-S [Pathfinder] ship - Leader clear Low Group
7. C.O's [Commanding Officer's] Comment -
8. Dismissal of all but Pilots and Co-Pilots

9. 	Call Sign		Letter	Flares
   1st C.W. [Combat Wing]	Phonebox One		RR [Red Red]
   91st Group	Goonchild Red	A
   351 Group	Goonchild White	J
   381st Group	Goonchild Blue	L
   1st C.W. Command Post	Top Dog
   Air Commander	Top Dog
   40th C.W.	Bullpen
   41st C.W.	Fatgal

   
   

   Spits [Spitfires] -			Bombers -		Ground Sector -
   P-47's -		Haybank	Bombers -		Ground Sector -	Warm Sun

   
   

   VHF Channels		Channel		Ships Monitor	[Who Monitors]
   1st C.W.		A		A - B - D
   Air Commander		A & B		A - B - D	O'Mohundro & Strouse (B)
   Spits
   P-47's		D		D plus their own in action	Both Harris'

10. Colors of the day:

    Time	Color	Ident.	Challenge
    0700 - 1300	YY [Yellow Yellow]	H	Z
    1300 - 1900	RR	X	M
    1900 - 2400	RG	T	J

11. Flying Control - A. Taxi Plan, B. Runways and Taxi Strips, C. Spares
12. Conclusion -

1. Twenty-one aircraft of the 351st Group took off at 1155, climbed to 15,000 feet over the field, and departed at 1305. Rendezvous was made as scheduled with the 351st in the high box of the 1st Combat Wing.
2. Seven aircraft returned early; six because of engine failure and one because of misunderstanding when the leader of the high squadron aborted.
3. Fighter opposition was mediocre and the attacks were not pressed home. However, about one hundred planes were observed by the group. Most of these were JU-88's, ME 110's, and ME 210's which followed the group shooting 20 MM's and rockets from 500 to 1,000 yards behind. Our fighter support was good and none of our ships were lost. Battle damage likewise was slight.
4. Owing to difficulty with the A.F.C.E. [Automatic Flight Control Equipment - Autopilot] and misunderstanding on the interphone, the run on the Primary was missed. Another run on the Secondary was impossible because of the approach of the 2nd A. T. F. Therefore, a target of opportunity, the hangars at Quakenbruck, was bombed. No pictures are available, but synchronization was on at the time of release.
5. The low squadron dropped while the run was being attempted on the Primary. This occurred because the Lead Bombardier of the low squadron was sighting for range and did not realize until too late that the course was off.

1. The Group took-off and made rendezvous as briefed. The briefed route and time schedule was maintained throughout the mission.
2. The 351st Bomb Group lead ship had a faulty bomb-sight, and our lead squadron did not drop bombs on the primary target. The lead ship dropped their bombs on the aerodrome at Quakenbruck.
3. We returned to England and base as ordered.

1. The 351st Bomb Group flying in the high box of the 1st Combat Wing Defensive Formation reached the ordered I.P.[Initial Point of Bomb Run] at 1502. Interval for bombing was taken and target area identified. The Bombardier took the control of the ship at the I.P. but found that only very slight corrections could be made.
2. Upon discovering this malfunction in the A.F.C.E.[Automatic Flight Control Equipment - Autopilot], the Lead Bombardier immediately informed the Pilot that an attempt would be made to bomb the Secondary, the center of the city. The Pilot apparently misunderstood the Bombardier to mean that the Target Area was obscured by smoke and that an approach was impossible. The result was that the Pilot turned off the course for the Target, making it impossible for the Bombardier to bomb the Primary or the Secondary.
3. The Bombardier leading the Low Squadron sighted for range and was unaware that the course was erratic. Result was that he released upon his sighting and the Low Squadron released with him. After turning, the Bombardier explained that the Secondary could be bombed and preparation was made for the second approach. Upon assimilating an I.P., it was noted that the Group had a collision course with the 2nd A.T.F. Therefore the second approach was abandoned and the decision to bomb the target of opportunity was decided.
4. The Lead Bombardier located and identified the Aerodrome at Quackenbruck. A minimum approach was made and bombs were released at 1523. Synchronization was on at bomb release.

1. This Group took off on time and assembled over the field at 2,000 feet. After assembly, we climbed to 15,000 feet over the field and departed exactly on time. The assembly with the other Groups was as scheduled and we departed the English Coast on time.
2. The fighter rendezvous was on time and they took us up to the IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run]. From the IP, I took about a 1,000 yard interval between the lead group and myself. The functioning of the AFCE [Automatic Flight Control Equipment - Autopilot] was very erratic, so we decided to bomb manually. The Bombardier reported that the target was completely obscured and that we would make a run on the secondary target.
3. However, the leader of the low squadron sighted for range only as we went over the part of town near the primary target and dropped his bombs. Many of the other Bombardiers dropped on him. As we were on a direct collision course with the Wing behind us and when I saw we would have collided, I turned left and headed for the rally point. After we rallied, I told the Bombardier to pick out a target of opportunity. We bombed Quakenbruck, also the other few planes that had not bombed previously dropped on me.
4. The flak was the usual “Bremen Barrage,” and there were many night fighters and JU-88’s. They gave us a hard fight in the vicinity of the target, but did not follow us out very far. After reaching the coast of England, the Wing dispersed and we came to base and landed.

Bombardier -1st Lt. Archer M. Baird  Pilot - Major Elzia Ledoux Navigator - Capt. J.R. Danby
Aircraft # 42-29863  Take-off - 1155  Landed - 1723
Objective - Target of Opportunity Quackenbruck A/D [Aerodrome]
Aiming Point - Hangar area at Quackenbruck
Initial Point - Diepholz
Method of Attack - Group
Number of Planes in Unit - 14
Number of Planes in Each Unit Performing Sighting Operations - 3
Time of Attack -  Time of Release - 1523
Approx. Length of Straight Approach - 10 seconds
Synchronization - On
Information at Release Point:
Altitude, True Above Target - 25,930
Calculated Indicated Air Speed - 150 M.P.H.
True Air Speed - 229 M.P.H.
Wind Direction - 342° True
Wind Velocity - 36 M.P.H.
True Heading - 272°
Drift - 8° Left
True Track - 264°
D.S. - 126.2  Trail - 61   ATF - 42.99   Ten. D.A. - .51
Type of Release - Train
Point of Impact If Seen - Unobserved
Winds - Altitude - 25,000 Ft.  Direction - Est. 300° Actual 342°  Velocity - Est. 20 Actual 36  Temp C. - Est. -35° C. Actual -30° C.

1. The target was the sub pens at Bremen, Germany. Photo coverage was very poor due to an effective smoke screen in the area of the city. Photos were obtained by ship No. 499, flying on right wing of Group leader. Cameras in ships No. 851 and 868 did not operate due to freezing up.
2. Photo No. 1 shows bombs away, at the SE end of the city of Bremen, 7 miles to the SE of the intended target.
   1. A bomb pattern of another Group is shown along the river approximately two miles from the center of the city.
3. Photo No. 9 shows the first two bursts in the Weser river, two miles below Bremen and just above the bridge.
   1. This pattern develops in later photographs and twenty-two bursts are shown.
   2. A second pattern develops a mile below the first in the vicinity of the small settlement of Dreye.
   1. There is a direct hit on a small bridge in this area.
   2. There are eight hits in the residential district.
4. Bombs continue to fall at scattered intervals, mainly in cultivated fields.

1. The target for 8 October, 1043 was the submarine slip and dock area at Bremen, Germany. Bombing results were generally unobserved and an effective smoke screen over the primary target made it difficult to determine the effectiveness of our bombing. Photographs indicate that some of the bombs of this group fell to the SE of the target area. Four (4) of our A/C bombed Quackenbruck aerodrome with unobserved results.
2. Twenty-one (21) A/C took off from this field at 1155 hours. Two A/C returned before crossing English Coast. A/C 824 returned from 52°20'N-01°30'W at 1255 hours. Reason: No. 2 engine burned out. A/C 831 returned from Cambridge. Reason: Turbo charger went out. A/C 849 returned from point 15 minutes from Dutch Coast on course at 1510 hours. Reason: No. 1 engine developed excessive cylinder head temperature. A/C 835 followed A/C 849, the squadron leader, back due to a misunderstanding of the maneuver. A/C 823 returned from 52°58'N-04°00'E at 1412 hours. Reason: No. 2 supercharger went out. A/C 120 turned back 31 miles out from the English Coast on course at 1354. Reason: Bad oil leak in No. 4 engine. The remaining 14 A/C proceeded on course and bombed primary and secondary at 1513 and target of opportunity at 1523 as outlined in Section 1, returning to this base at 1736. This group suffered no losses.
3. Fighter opposition was mediocre although approximately 100 E/A [Enemy Aircraft] were seen by this Group. Most of the FW 190's, ME 109's, and JU 88's of the enemy attacked the low group of the C.W.[Combat Wing] Most of the opposition encountered by this group as high group of the C.W. was from JU 88's, ME 110's, and ME 210's which tailed our planes from 500 to 1000 yards range and fired rocket guns and 20 mm's from level. Most attacks took place from the IP to the point where fighter escort again picked up the formation after the target. Attacks were not pressed home closely and rocket guns were fired profusely from the rear. Fighter support was very good. One DO 217 [Dornier 217] was observed firing large cannon from outside the range of our guns. Our gunners claim five (5) E/A destroyed, two (2) probably destroyed, and two (2) damaged. One of our gunners suffered a fractured arm.
4. Flak was first encountered by our formation flying at 26,000 feet over Teasel Island at 1505; flak here was black, meager, and fairly accurate. At the target, beginning at Delmenhorst and continuing over the target area, from 1505 – 1510 hours; flak was accurate and intense, particularly over the SE section of the city. Black, white, and red bursts were observed. Flak was again encountered over Tessel Island on the way out at 1609; it was meager and inaccurate and black.
5. Weather over the target was clear except for a very few scattered clouds and with a slight ground haze.
6. Considerable shipping activity was observed in the Zuider Zee.

1. In compliance with Co-ordination Memorandum No. 3, 19 July, 1943, the following data on the Mission of 17 August is submitted.
   1. 1. No. of Aircraft Assigned: 21
         No. Failed to Take-off: 0
         No. of Abortives: 7
         No. Missing: 0
   2. 1. The 351st Bomb Group flew the High Combat Box in the 1st Bomb Wing Formation.
      2. The bombing altitude was 26,200 feet (True altitude above Target).

Given an indicated altitude, determine the true altitude.

Target - Bremen, Germany
1. Route followed. - Over S. tip of Tessel Island – 2 ½ miles S. of Makkum – 5 miles S. of Assen – Cloppenburg – Target – Vilsen – Rehden – Haselünne – 1 mile S. of Meppel – across center of Tessel Island.
2. Visibility at Target. - Light cumulus clouds; considerable haze. Con-trails clearly visible.
3. No. of A/C over Target: 14
4. General Axis of attack. - Heading into target 79 degrees. Formation then flew over city and back on a heading of 170 degrees true.
5. How long did formation fly straight and level before bombing? - 30 seconds.
6. Turn after bombing. - 81 degree right turn after first attack on target.
7. Position of Group in relation to other Groups: High Group, with 91 Group in lead, and 381 Group low.
8. What evasive action was taken? - Right and left turns of 5 degrees.
9. A short description of Flak en route. - Our formation flying at 26,000 ft. received a few fairly accurate bursts while crossing over Tessel Island at 1419. No other flak was encountered until reaching the target at 1505. Here the flak was intense and accurate, particularly over the SE section of the city. Crews reported that flak was bursting all around them, and in some places seemed “almost solid”. Some of the bursts were below our formation, and some white bursts appeared about 1000 feet above. A few red bursts were also observed. On the return trip a few inaccurate bursts were fired from Tessel Island at 1609.
10. Any other comments, phenomena, etc. - Several twin-engine A/C firing rockets from under wings were observed in target area.

1. The following comments were made by crew members at interrogation after the mission of this date.
A/C 532 Crew had nothing to eat. - Whole crew.
A/C 499 Breakfast could not be had after 0800. – Whole crew.
A/C 868 Bad wing leadership. Some more smooth evasive action needed. – Lt. Peck.
A/C 863 Should test bomb sight before reaching target. – Capt. Danby.
A/C 858 Suggest better maintenance of bomb bombs [bays?] on this ship. – Lt. Hull.
A/C 851 Need Group practice missions as formation is very poor. – Capt. Argiropulos.
A/C 877 This ship is so slow it is almost impossible to keep in formation. - F/O Warring.
 Seat type chute is no good for waist gunners; they get in each other’s way. – Sgt. Bonnett.

[Signed] John L. Scott, Major, Air Corps, Group S-2 [Intelligence]

1. Following is a summary of the hot news as determined by interrogation after the mission of today.
   1. A/C U-509 [42-29812] reports 3 B-17s in distress over the target area at 1515. From one – 3 parachutes, from a second – 6 parachutes, and from the third – 1 parachute were seen. E/A were attacking.
   2. A/C P-509 [42-3140] saw a B-17 in distress over the target area with 5 chutes in air. The A/C, under attack, was going down in flames.

1. Abortives.
   1. Airplane No. 42-5823, 508th Squadron, returned early because of rough and detonating #4 engine, according to the pilot. The aircraft was flown immediately and at altitude and checked out perfectly.
   2. Airplane No. 42-3120, 509th Squadron, returned early because of an oil leak in #4 engine.
   3. Airplane No. 42-29831, 510th Squadron, returned early because the #2 supercharger malfunctioned. #2 engine boost was low due to malfunction of #2 supercharger regulator.
   4. Airplane No. 42-30867, 510th Squadron, returned early because of #2 supercharger failure.
   5. Airplane No. 42-29849, 511th Squadron, returned early because of #1 cylinder head temperature, according to the pilot. The airplane checked out all right on the ground, and temperature might have been caused by copper washer which was not removed from spark plug. However, washer was on plug for three flights and high temperature was not reported.
   6. Airplane No. 42-29835, 511th Squadron, returned early because according to the pilot, the aircraft followed 42-29849 out of the formation and was unable to regain it.
   7. Airplane No. 42-5824, 511th Squadron, returned early because #2 engine ran rough. Investigation disclosed valves blown in the engine.
2. Battle Damage.
   1. Airplane No. 42-29868, 508th Squadron. .30 cal. Hole through wing (left). .30 cal. bullet damaged lens of landing light, and landing light mount.
   2. Airplane No. 42-29851, 508th Squadron. Small flak hole through fabric of right aileron. Small flak hole rear of #2 Engine nacelle.
   3. Airplane No. 42-3141, 508th Squadron. Shell casing punctured leading edge of left stabilizer. Small flak hole in upper surface of left wing. Two small flak holes in skin of left wing underside.
   4. Airplane No. 42-29858, 508th Squadron. Small tear in skin below co-pilot’s windshield caused by shell casing.
   5. Airplane No. 42-3532, 511th Squadron. One flak hole right bomb bay door.

1. Following are the malfunctions as determined by interrogation of the mission of this date:
   1. A/C 863: Bomb sight would not work. [Hand written: Autopilot incorrectly set up.] – Lt. Baird.
   2. A/C 499: Ball Turret would not turn in azimuth. – S/Sgt. Mokol.
   3. A/C 141: Left center nose adapter malfunctioned. – Lt. Silverman.
   4. A/C 868: Broken ejector in right tail. – S/Sgt. Skarzynski. Weak firing pin on Right waist. – S/Sgt. Newth.
   5. A/C 096: Left Waist gun had ruptured case. – S/Sgt. Miller. Right tail had tight head space. – S/Sgt. Osborn.
   6. A/C 851: Top turret won’t work on elevation. – T/Sgt. Hulse. Intervalometer wouldn’t work. – Lt. Tynan.
   7. A/C 780: Both tail guns went out. [Hand written: Adapter binding.] – S/Sgt. Kucsmas
   8. A/C 877: Upper turret heating equipment is on floor, and cannot be used while turret is in action. – S/Sgt. Schmitt.

1. The following malfunctions were reported upon the completion of the Mission of 8 October, 1943:
   1. A/C 42-29863 – Automatic Pilot incorrectly set up.
   2. A/C 42-3141 – Left center nose adapter malfunction.
   3. A/C 42-29868 – Ejector in right tail gun broke. Weak firing pin spring on right waist gun.
   4. A/C 42-6096 – Left waist gun had ruptured case. Right tail gun had tight head space.
   5. A/C 42-30780 – Both tail guns, adapter binding.
2. The proper repairs and adjustments have been made.

1. The Station Ordinance Officer has submitted the following expenditure of ammunition for the mission of 8 October, 1943.

   508th Squadron		Rounds Expended		509th Squadron		Rounds Expended
   42-3141		1925		42-3120		(Aborted)
   42-29851		2430		42-29860		2200
   42-5823		90		42-3140		2110
   42-29868		1375		42-30780		789
   42-29858		530		42-30499		2310
   				42-29812		510
   				42-29863		120
   Squadron Total			6,350	Squadron Total			8,039
   510th Squadron		Rounds Expended		511th Squadron		Rounds Expended
   42-30867		(Aborted)		42-29835		(Aborted) 170
   42-29831		(Aborted)		42-3532		2350
   42-3093		3700		42-6096		855
   42-30857		2900		42-29849		(Aborted) 160
   				42-5824		(Aborted)
   Squadron Total			6,600	Squadron Total			3,535
   GROUP TOTAL							24,524

1. Following are the deficiencies and disabilities as determined by interrogation:
A/C 868: Heated gloves burned out. – S/Sgt. Skarzynski & S/Sgt. Newth.
A/C 141: Oxygen mask froze. – Sgt. Hammond.
A/C 858: Suit burned out. – Sgt. Goble.
A/C 140: Boots and gloves failed to work. – S/Sgt. Lucyk.
A/C 860: Oxygen system out in radio room. – Sgt. Von Flotow.
A/C 851: Heated gloves out. – T/Sgt. Pedri.
A/C 877: Plug torn out of right boot. – Sgt. Bonnett. Possible frost bite. – Sgt. Bonnett and Lt. Polin. Seat will not turn because ammo. box is fastened to back of it. – radio room. - S/Sgt. Klimp.
A/C 868: Frost bite of both hands. – S/Sgt. Skarzynski.
[Signed] John L. Scott, Major, Air Corps, Intelligence Group S-2

Aircraft No. 831 Squadron 510th   Pilot - Smith, R. E.
Time of Abortive - 1345  Location when Aborted - Cambridge
Reason - Turbo failure
Enemy Opposition Encountered - None
[Signed] R. E. Smith, 1st Lt., Air Corps

Aircraft No. 835 Squadron 511th   Pilot - Wilson
Time of Abortive - ?  Location when Aborted - 10 mi Enemy Coast
Reason - Did not know Leader was aborting – followed him out of formation – realized mistake – dropped bombs and tried to catch formation – Unable to do so by time of enemy coast – turned back.
Enemy Opposition Encountered - No
[Signed] C. W. Wilson, 1st. Lt., Air Corps

Aircraft No. 867 Squadron 510th   Pilot - L.A. Christman
Time of Abortive - 1412  Location when Aborted - 52°58'N-4°E
Reason - Interphone and command cut out. No. 2 supercharger out – Leader of Squadron aborted and the entire squadron followed. We were No. 2 second element High Squadron
Enemy Opposition Encountered - None
[Signed] L. A. Christman, 1st. Lt., Air Corps

Aircraft No. 849 Squadron 511th   Pilot - Lt. D. M. Norris
Time of Abortive - 1510  Location when Aborted - Approaching Dutch Coast
Reason - No. 1 engine excessive cylinder head temperature (240°)
Enemy Opposition Encountered - None
[Signed] D. M. Norris, 1st. Lt., Air Corps

Aircraft No. 120 Squadron 509th   Pilot - Douglas L. Harris, 1st Lt., Air Corps
Time of Abortive - 1354  Location when Aborted - 31 Naut. Miles from English Coast
Reason - Bad oil leak in No. 4 engine
Enemy Opposition Encountered - None
[Signed] Douglas L. Harris, 1st Lt., Air Corps

Aircraft No. 42-5824 Squadron 511th   Pilot - Elmer J. Nardi
Time of Abortive - 1255  Location when Aborted - 52°20'N-1°30'W, 15,000 ft.
Reason - #2 Engine valves burned out
Enemy Opposition Encountered - None
[Signed] Elmer J. Nardi, 1st Lt., Air Corps, Pilot

1. Total No. A/C in each Squadron and Letters of each:

   Sqdn 508th A/C: 9851–J, 9858–J, 5823–C, 9868–K, 3141–H	(5)
   Sqdn 509th A/C: 9863–Y, 0499–G, 9812–U, 0780–T, 3140–P, 3120–O, 9860–W	(7)
   Sqdn 510th A/C: 9831–H, 0867–N, 0857–J	(3)
   Sqdn 511th A/C: 9849–U, 5824–S, 6096–W, 3532–O, 9835–Y, 9877–X	(6)

2. Target: gr-3586
   
3. Station call sign and Operational call sign respectively of each Squadron

   Squadron	508 Ops:	NFK		Squadron	510 Ops:	KBY
   	Sta:	Disclose			Sta:	Cupping
   Squadron	509 Ops	PSV		Squadron	511 Ops:	LHQ
   	Sta:	Seagreen			Sta:	Ranger

4. Taxi Time – 1st A/C 1140;     Take-Off Time 1st A/C 1155;     E.T.D. Over Field 1305

5. Time:	Height:	Place of crossing English Coast OUT:
   1344	21,000 Ft	Cromer

6. Time:	Height:	Place of Recrossing Enemy Coast:
   1605	26,000 Ft	52°50'N-04°40'E [At the coast 9 miles S of Den Helder, Netherlands]

7. Time:	Height:	Place of crossing English Coast IN:
   644	13,000 Ft	Cromer

8. E.T.R.(Estimated Time of Return): 1712 Hours
9. MF/DF [Medium Frequency/Direction Finder] Section: "G"
10. Bomb load of Each A/C:
    Squadron: 508 12 x 500# - 1/10 Nose x 1/100 Tail [Fuses]
    Squadron: 509 12 x 500# - 1/10 Nose x 1/100 Tail [Fuses]
    Squadron: 510 12 x 500# - 1/10 Nose x 1/100 Tail [Fuses]
    Squadron: 511 12 x 500# - 1/10 Nose x 1/100 Tail [Fuses]
11. Fuel Load of each A/C: 1700 Gallons
12. [Group Leader] Major Elzia LeDoux - 509th - 9863-Y
13. Actual Times Off and Return by Squadrons and A/C Letters:

    Squadron	A/C Letter	A.T.O.	A.T.R.	Squadron	A/C Letter	A.T.O.	A.T.R.
    508	9851–J	1205	1719	509	9863–Y	1155	1723
    	9858–G	1207	1728		0499–Q	1155½	1723½
    	5823–C	1206½	1518		9812–U	1156	1725
    	9868–K	1208½	1734		0780–T	1157	1736
    	3141–H	1202½	1717		3140–P	1157½	0934
    					3120–O	1158	1430
    					9860–W	1208	1729
    510	9831–H	1204½	1415	511	9849–U	1159	5100
    	0867–N	1204	1504		5824–S	1200	1322
    	0857–J	1203	1731		6096–W	1200½	1732
    	093–K	1206	1727		3532–O	1201	1730
    					9835– Y	1202	1514

    Report Compiled By C.A. Blanchard, M/Sgt.
    

    Sqdn.	A/C Letter	Designation	Remarks
    511	5824–S	Abortive	#2 Eng Rough - Valves Burnt Out.
    510	9831–H	Abortive	Turbo Failure #2 Engine.
    510	0867–N	Abortive	#2 Supercharger - Interphone & Command Set Out.
    511	9849–U	Abortive	#1 Engine Excessive Cylinder Head Temperature.
    509	3120–O	Abortive	Excessive Oil Leak #4 Engine.
    508	5823–C	Abortive	#3 & #4 Engines Very Rough.
    511	9835–Y	Abortive	Aborted with Leader - Saw Mistake - Couldn't Catch Formation.