351st Bomb Group

1. 1. Roll Call and Assign Aircraft.
   2. Stations  –1030
   3. Start Engines –1130
   4. Taxi  –1140
   5. Take off –1155
   6. Return Base –1707
2. Target for today: City of Münster, secondary city of Hamm, last resorts - Emerick, Osnabruck, Bevergen, any industrial.
   Loading: 40 American I.B. [Incendiary Bomb] 4,000# + 2 x 1000# G.P. [General Purpose] on external rack.
3. S-2 [Intelligence] –
4. Navigator:
   1. Wing Rendezvous:
   2. Altitude and time on Oxygen:
   3. Route in, I.P. [Initial Point of Bomb Run], Return:
   4. C.W. [Combat Wing] dispersal point:
   5. Emergency Fields
5. Weather -
6. Operations -
   1. Wing Formation - Lead 381st - 7 a/c [aircraft], High 91st - 13 a/c, Low 351st
      1st C.W.[Combat Wing] 2nd, Air Commander - Col. Terry
7. Diversions and other efforts -
   2nd division to Heligoland then to pinpoint at 1410.
   Mediums in Amsterdam area at 1430.
   3rd Division will attack same target at 1400.
   40th C.W. ahead 41st behind at approx. 1415.
   
8. Fighter Cover -
   1. IN
      Type and No. - 1 Group of P-47's from Geesenburg [Netherlands] to limit of range.
      
   2. Type and No. - 1 Group of P-47's from Haltern [Germany] through target area.
      
   3. OUT
      Type and No. - 2 Groups of P-47's from 5214-0450 [Ochtrup, Germany] to Mid Channel.
      
   4. Type and No. - 5 Squadrons Spits [Spitfires] IX's from 5214-0450 [Amstelhoek, Netherlands] to Mid Channel.
      
9. Special Instructions - C.W.'s will cross fighters in line abreast, 1 C.W. on right.
   Navigators & Bombardiers will attend Bombardier briefing in Coffee Shop.
   Bomb bay doors will open at I.P. [Initial Point of Bomb Run]. VHF [radio transmission] will be used to designate I.P. Externals will drop 10 seconds before incendiaries.
10. C.O's [Commanding Officer's] Comment -
11. Dismissal of all but Pilots and Co-Pilots

12. 	Call Sign		Letter	Flares
    1st C.W. [Combat Wing]	Goonchild		RR [Red Red]
    91st Group	Goonchild Red	A
    351 Group	Goonchild White	J
    381st Group	Goonchild Blue	L
    1st C.W. Command Post	Figleaf
    Air Commander	Top Dog
    40th C.W.	Bullpen		YY
    41st C.W.	Fatgal		GG

    
    

    Spits [Spitfires] -			Bombers - Buckshot 5		Ground Sector - Spice Cake
    P-47's -	Haybank		Bombers - Phonebox 5		Ground Sector - Warm Sun

    
    

    VHF Channels		Channel		Ships Monitor
    1st C.W.		A		All Ships
    Air Commander		B		Peck and Fuller
    Spits		C		Higgins and Crismon
    P-47's		D		Crismon and Higgins

13. Colors of the day:

    Time	Color	Ident.	Challenge
    0700 - 1300	GY [Green Yellow]	J	M
    1300 - 1900	RY	B	X
    1900 - 0100	YY	N	P

14. Flying Control - A. Taxi Plan, B. Runways and Taxi Strips, C. Spares
15. Conclusion -

1. Seventeen (17) aircraft took off as scheduled for the Mission of 10 October, 1943. One (1) aircraft, 42-29835, failed to take off because of a defective tail wheel shimmy damper. The Combat Wing rendezvous was made at Cambridge, as briefed.
2. Due to the rate of climb and the added weight and drag of the external bombs, six (6) aircraft were forced to return to Base after becoming low on fuel. Three (3) other aircraft turned back before reaching the target because of mechanical failures.
3. It was necessary to jettison the external bombs into the Channel in order to decrease the high rate of fuel consumption caused by their drag.
4. As there were but eight (8) aircraft remaining in the Group formation, the primary target was bombed on the Lead Group. The Lead Bombardier sighted for range only. Photographs indicate good bombing results.
5. Accurate and intense flak was encountered in the target area. About twenty-five (25) enemy aircraft were encountered.
6. The route back was followed as briefed. The Group formation dispersed just off the English Coast and five (5) aircraft landed at other fields because of fuel shortages.
7. Aircraft 42-29851 was unable to land because of lack of fuel and unfavorable weather. It was necessary to have the crew bail out and set the plane’s course back over the Channel.
8. No aircraft were lost through enemy action.

1. This group made instrument take-off climbing through 1400 feet of fog and our rendezvous was accomplished as briefed. We arrived at Cambridge on time and made a 360° turn to the left to allow the 381st Group to overtake us and assume the lead, departing Cambridge nine minutes late. We cut corners during the rest of the Air Division rendezvous, departing Felixstowe on time, but without having reached bombing altitude.
2. The excessive rate of climb and cruising speed from this point to the IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run], and the attendant excessive gas consumption was responsible for ten abortives from our group. This was necessary in order to try to catch the lead group in our wing, which we overtook just short of the IP. We were forced to drop our external bombs before reaching the coast of Holland, on account of gas consumption.
3. Intense and accurate flak was encountered near the IP owing to our going over the northeast Ruhr defenses. We bombed the primary with apparent good results. Flak was accurate here also.
4. P-47 cover was quite active from the target on, which was our salvation. Twin-engined fighters were active in large numbers and one formation of twelve was noted, just out of range of our guns at 6 o’clock, lobbing rocket and cannon shells into our formation. Several were destroyed and the remainder dispersed by P-47’s.
5. The route out was as briefed, and our group dispersed just short of the English Coast, each heading for the nearest airport, due to gas shortage. None of the group was able to make the field without refueling and one crew was forced to bail out over the English coast because of the undercast and gas shortage.
6. I know I am expressing the sentiments of the entire group when I say the P-47’s are doing a wonderful job and we would like to have someone give them a well deserved pat on the back. They are really putting out.

1. The 351st Bombardment Group (H) reached the I.P. [Initial Point of Bomb Run] with only eight (8) ships in the Group formation. The Group Leader decided that to leave the Combat Wing for an approach by the Group with only eight (8) ships would be futile. Therefore the Lead Bombardier sighted for range only.

1. The 351st Group took off as scheduled and assembled over a 1300 foot ground fog. We then proceeded on course and made the 1st Combat Bomb Wing rendezvous over Cambridge.
2. The rate of climb with the external bombs used an excessive amount of gasoline, and aircraft 42-29749, 42-3542, 42-29812, 42-3532, 42-29852, and 42-3136 aborted because of gasoline shortage.
3. Aircraft 42-29654 and 42-3523 returned early due to mechanical failure. They were allowed abortive sorties.
4. Due to the excessive gasoline consumption caused by their drag, the external bombs were dropped in the Channel.
5. Having but eight aircraft in the group, we bombed the Primary Target as a squadron on the Lead Group.
6. No aircraft were lost due to enemy action. Aircraft 42-29851 ran out of gasoline and the crew bailed out safely. Six aircraft landed at Butley, Horham, Great Ashfield, Bundgay, Marham, and Kelstern due to weather and gasoline shortage.

Bombardier - 1st Lt. Ernest L. Watts  Pilot - Capt. James T. Stewart Navigator - 1st Lt. Charles L. Maze
Aircraft # 42-29863  Take-off - 1143  Landed -
Objective - Munster, Germany
Aiming Point - Center of Town
Initial Point -
Method of Attack - Wing
Number of Planes in Unit - 8
Number of Planes in Each Unit Performing Sighting Operations - 1
Time of Attack - 1518  Time of Release -
Approx. Length of Straight Approach - 50 seconds
Synchronization - On
Information at Release Point:
Altitude, True Above Target - 24,650 Feet
Calculated Indicated Air Speed - 150 M.P.H.
True Air Speed - 224 M.P.H.
Wind Direction - 180° True
Wind Velocity - 21 M.P.H.
True Heading - 125°
Drift - 5° Left
True Track - 112°
D.S. - 129.8  Trail - 43   ATF - 40.70   Ten. D.A. - .53
Type of Release - Train
Point of Impact If Seen - Target Area
Winds - Altitude - 24,000 Ft.  Direction - Est. 180° Actual 180°  Velocity - Est. 21mph Actual 21mph  Temp C. - Est. -25° C. Actual -25° C.
All eight ships in the 351 Bomb Group dropped on leader.

1. The target was the city and marshalling yards at Munster, Germany. Photo coverage was not complete as only one camera, ship 850, returned to base. Photos were of good quality, but there is a great deal of smoke in the target area.
2. Photos No. 1 and 2 show bombs in flight approximately 2 miles from target. Only incendiary bombs are seen.
3. Photo No. 7, 48 seconds after bombs away, shows bomb bursts in two sections. There are two bursts just on the outskirts of the city, and thirteen bursts just short of the marshalling yard. These bursts are about 100 yds. apart and send up a thin column of smoke.
4. Photos 8, 9, and 10 show more bursts in the same area and further development of the pattern. The full pattern measures 2,647 feet by 2,989 feet.
5. The bomb pattern covers a thickly congested business and residential section and warehouses along the marshalling yard. Because of the possibility of immediate fire from incendiaries, it is difficult to determine whether the bursts are incendiaries or high explosive bombs.

1. The target for this mission of this date was Munster, Germany. Photos show that bombing was good, bombs dropping in the center of the city, 336 IB and 1 x 1000 GP were dropped by this Group.
2. Seventeen A/C [Aircraft] were dispatched. Nine returned early, seven turning back at mid-Channel due to gas shortage. A/C 523 turned back 46 miles within enemy territory due to gas shortage, and A/C 654 70 miles within enemy territory because the No. 1 supercharger went out trying to keep up with formation at 185 MPH. No A/C of this Group was lost, in enemy territory, but A/C 851 was abandoned by crew over England; the crew is safe.
3. About 25 E/A were seen. This Group claims one probable. We suffered three wounded. Friendly fighter support was good.
4. Several meager flak points were encountered on route in; these however were generally inaccurate. At the target flak was intense and good for both height and deflection. Very little flak was met on the route out.
5. Weather over the target was good. Ground haze at this Station forced several A/C to land at other British bases.

1. In compliance with Co-ordination Memorandum No. 3, 19 July, 1943, the following data on the Mission of 17 August is submitted.
   1. 1. No. of Aircraft Assigned:18
         No. Failed to Take-off: 1
         No. of Abortives: 9
         No. Missing: 0
      2. One A/C could not land because of heavy fog. It was put on AFCE [Autopilot] and headed out to sea after the crew bailed out.
   2. 1. The 351st Group flew the Low Combat Box of the 1st Combat Bomb Wing Formation.
      2. The bombing altitude was 24,650 feet (True altitude above Target).

Target - Munster, Germany
1. Route followed. - Over N end of Overflakkee – Haltern – Target – Tecklenburg – Noordwijk aan Zee.
2. Visibility at Target. - Vertical visibility good. No clouds, but heavy haze. No contrails at bombing altitude, but contrails made by fighters at estimated 30,000 feet.
3. No. of A/C over Target: 8
4. General Axis of attack. - 54° True
5. How long did formation fly straight and level before bombing? - 1 minute
6. Turn after bombing. - 25° left turn
7. Position of Group in relation to other Groups: Low Group, with composite 381 Group and 91 Group in
8. What evasive action was taken? - Right and left turns of about 5°
9. A short description of Flak en route. - 10. Our formation, flying at 25,000 feet, first encountered flak just S. of Rotterdam, where there were about 23 inaccurate bursts. NE of Hertogenbosch there were 4 bursts, low and inaccurate for deflection. At Borken moderate black flak was encountered, inaccurate for height and deflection, being well to the left of our formation. Intense flak was observed over the Ruhr Valley; it was fairly accurate for height but well to the right of our formation. At the target, at 1518, intense accurate flak was encountered, both black and red bursts being observed. At Luden, meager black and red bursts were observed, accurate for height but only fairly accurate for deflection.
10. Any other comments, phenomena, etc. -

1. At the interrogation of crews present after the mission of today the following comments were made:
A/C 509 “I need a partition at the tail wheel!” - Sgt. M. D. Miles.
“Why were we left alone? – There were only 8 ships in the entire group. A 24-ship combat wing is no good. Good leading by Capt. Stewart.” - Lt. E.P. Harris.
[Signed] John L. Scott, Major, Air Corps, Group S-2 [Intelligence]

1. The following is a summary of the hot news as it was reported at interrogation of the mission of 10 October:
A/C K-511 [There was no tail letter K for any squadron this mission. The formation chart shows Holsapple flying in 096 K. The J form shows A/C 6096 W, with the W written over another letter that may be a K. In the 351st Book A/C 42-6096-W is assigned to the 511th Squadron.] Reported seeing three B-17’s being forced down by about 75 enemy aircraft at 1524 hours, near Künsebeck. Wheels of the three ships were down and they were at an altitude of 7000 feet. Four chutes were observed from one A/C.
[Signed] John L. Scott, Major, Air Corps, Group S-2 [Intelligence]

1. Aircraft which failed to take-off:
   1. Airplane No. 42-29835, 511th Squadron, failed to take-off because of a defective Tail Wheel shimmy damper.
2. Abortives:
   1. Airplane No. 42-3141, 508th Squadron, returned early because the Pilot claimed the oil pressure was low on #1 Engine. Investigation revealed no deficiencies whatsoever on the Engine.
   2. Airplane No. 42-29749, 509th Squadron, returned early because the Airplane was low on fuel.
   3. Airplane No. 42-3542, 509th Squadron, returned early because the Airplane was low on fuel.
   4. Airplane No. 42-29812, 509th Squadron, returned early because the Airplane was low on fuel.
   5. Airplane No. 42-3532, 511th Squadron, returned early because the Airplane was low on fuel.
   6. Airplane No. 42-29852, 511th Squadron, returned early because the Airplane was low on fuel.
   7. Airplane No. 42-3136, 511th Squadron, returned early because the Airplane was low on fuel.
3. Abortive-Sorties:
   1. Airplane No. 42-29654, 508th Squadron, returned before reaching target because #1 and #4 Superchargers were malfunctioning. Investigation revealed that both superchargers had thrown buckets from the turbo wheel.
   2. Airplane No. 42-3523, 510th Squadron, returned before reaching target because the tail guns became inoperative. This condition was caused by oversize barrel bushings.
4. Battle Damage:
   1. Airplane No. 42-29863, 509th Squadron. One flak hole right flap. One hole in left bomb bay door (20 mm.)
   2. Airplane No. 42-3509, 511th Squadron. Rudder damaged by flak. Left stabilizer and elevator, and aileron, damaged by .50 cal. machine gun fire from waist gun.

1. The following malfunctions were reported by the A/C present for interrogation after the mission of this date.
   1. A/C 509 Navigator’s DR compass and radio compass needs checking.
   2. A/C 523 Tail guns wouldn’t operate. Couldn’t hand-charge them. They’re brand new guns. (Handwritten changed to: Tail guns inoperative. Barrel bushings oversize-new guns)
   [Signed] John L. Scott, Major, Air Corps, Group S-2 [Intelligence]

1. The following armament failure was reported upon the conclusion of the Mission of 10 October, 1943:
   1. A/C 42-3523 – Tail guns inoperative. Barrel bushings oversize. New guns.
2. The necessary repairs and adjustments have been made.

1. Due to the fact that all aircraft participating in the Mission of 10 October, 1043, have not yet returned to base, the data on ammunition expended is not complete.
2. The present known expenditure is 13,885 rounds. This figure includes 9,000 rounds for A/C 42-29851 which could not land because of heavy fog. It was put on AFCE and headed out to sea after the crew bailed out.
[Signed] Robert B. Stratton, 1st Lt., Air Corps, Statistical Officer

1. At the interrogation of crews present after the mission of this date, the following deficiency was reported:
A/C 136 [42-3136] Heating outlets for radio man and tail gun position are out.
[Signed] John L. Scott, Major, Air Corps, Group S-2 [Intelligence]

Aircraft No. 749  Squadron 509   Pilot - O'Mohundro, J.H., Captain
Time of Abortive - 1415  Location when Aborted - About 30 miles off English Coast
Reason - Low on gas
Enemy Opposition Encountered -
[Signed] Jack H. O’Mohundro, Captain, Air Corps

Aircraft No. H-3141 Squadron 508   Pilot - Lt. Higgins
Time of Abortive - 1411  Location when Aborted - 51°48'N-02°02'E
Reason - #1 oil pressure dropped
Enemy Opposition Encountered - None
[Signed] Malcolm H. Higgins

Aircraft No. 9812 Squadron 509   Pilot - Maginnis
Time of Abortive - 1417  Location when Aborted - Mid-Channel
Reason - Low on gas due to climbing and descending to find Group above overcast and flying second element High Squadron with external racks
Enemy Opposition Encountered -
[Signed] J. Maginnis

Aircraft No. 42-29852 Squadron 509   Pilot - Capt. Richard E. Hathaway
Time of Abortive - 1405  Location when Aborted - Felixstowe
Reason - Excessive gas consumption. Landed after jettisoning bombs plus another hour and a half of flight with 300 gals. Operating in auto. lean 1900 RPM 28" M.P. [Manifold Pressure]
Enemy Opposition Encountered - None
[Signed] Richard E. Hathaway, Capt., Air Corps

Aircraft No. 42-3523 Squadron 510   Pilot - Lynch, Nicholas M.
Time of Abortive -   Location when Aborted - Over enemy territory about 50 mi.
Reason - Had less than 100 gallons of gas per tank left upon reaching enemy coast. Decided it was not enough to make it to target & return to English Coast
Enemy Opposition Encountered - No fighters, very light flak
[Signed] Nicholas M. Lynch, 1st Lt., Air Corps

1. Total No. A/C in each Squadron and Letters of each:

   Sqdn 508th A/C: 7731–A, 9882–L, 9851–J, 3141–H, 3517–O, 9654–B	(6)
   Sqdn 509th A/C: 9863–Y, 9749–Z, 3542–V, 9812–U	(4)
   Sqdn 510th A/C: 9850–G, 3523–M	(2)
   Sqdn 511th A/C: 6096–W, 9852–V, 3136–P, 3509–Z, 9835–Y, 3532–O	(6)

2. Target: GH-472
   
3. Station call sign and Operational call sign respectively of each Squadron

   Squadron	508 Ops:	Disclose		Squadron	510 Ops:	Cupping
   	Sta:	NFR			Sta:	UDD
   Squadron	509 Ops	Seagreen		Squadron	511 Ops:	Ranger
   	Sta:	MGP			Sta:	SHF

4. Taxi Time – 1st A/C 1130;     Take-Off Time 1st A/C 1145;     E.T.D. Over Field 1255

5. Time:	Height:	Place of crossing English Coast OUT:
   1403	24,000 Ft	Felixstowe

6. Time:	Height:	Place of Recrossing Enemy Coast:
   1558	24,000 Ft	52°14'N-04°25'E

7. Time:	Height:	Place of crossing English Coast IN:
   1628	15,000 Ft	Southwald

8. E.T.R.(Estimated Time of Return): 1658 Hours
9. MF/DF [Medium Frequency/Direction Finder] Section: G
10. Bomb load of Each A/C:
    Squadron: 508 M-47-A1's plus 2x1000 lb. External Bombs, Fuse - 1/10 Nose, 1/40 Tail
    Squadron: 509 M-47-A1's plus 2x1000 lb. External Bombs, Fuse - 1/10 Nose, 1/40 Tail
    Squadron: 510 M-47-A1's plus 2x1000 lb. External Bombs, Fuse - 1/10 Nose, 1/40 Tail
    Squadron: 511 M-47-A1's plus 2x1000 lb. External Bombs, Fuse - 1/10 Nose, 1/40 Tail
11. Fuel Load of each A/C: 1700 Gallons
12. Actual Times Off and Return by Squadrons and A/C Letters:

    Squadron	A/C Letter	A.T.O.	A.T.R.	Squadron	A/C Letter	A.T.O.	A.T.R.
    508	7731–A	1146		509	9863–Y	1145
    	9882–L	1147			9749–Z	1153	1525
    	9851–J	1147½			3542–V	1154	1531
    	3141–H	1148½	1508		9812–U	1155
    	3517–O	1158
    	9654–B	1159½
    510	9850–G	1155½		511	6096–W	1149
    	3523–M	1158½			9852–V	1150
    					3136–P	1151
    					3509–Z	1152
    					9835–Y	[F.T.O.]
    					3532–O	1200
    F.T.O.	Failed Take	Off

    Report Compiled By Dean DaVault, Sgt.
    

    Sqdn.	A/C Letter	Designation	Remarks
    508	3141–H	Abortive	Low on Gas.
    509	9749–Z	Abortive	Low on Gas.
    509	3542–V	Abortive	Low on Gas.
    510	3523–M	Abortive	Low on Gas.
    508	9654–B	Abortive	Supercharger Out.
    509	9812–U	Abortive	Low on Gas.

    
    [A/C 42-29851-J was abandoned over Norfolk, England because of low fuel and bad weather, which kept them from locating a suitable runway.]