351st Bomb Group

1. 1. TARGETS: 
   2. Visual Primary: Gelsenkirchen – Synthetic Oil Plant
   3. PFF Primary: None
   4. Munster M/Y: [Marshalling Yard]
   5. PFF Secondary: Munster M/Y [Marshalling Yard]
   6. Last Resort: Any military objective not prohibited by existing instructions.
   
   

2. TIMINGS:
   Zero Hour:	- 1030
   Stations:	- 0855
   Start Engines:	- 0905
   Taxi:	- 0915
   Take Off:	- 1930
   Target Time:	- 1308 - 06
   ETR [Estimated Time    of Return]:	- 1446

   
     Gasoline 2,200 Gallons
   
   

3. LOADING:
   Lead -	18 x 250 G.P. [General Purpose] 1/10 – 1/40 [Fuses]
   High -	Same
   Low -	Same (M-900 [Carrying] Delay Action [Bombs])
   Composite -	___

   
   
4. Intervalometer Settings: Visual – Salvo. P.F.F. – 100 FT.
   
   
5. Chaff: Release chaff 10 mins. before target & continue for 15 mins. Each A/C – 360 units.
   
   
6. Division Formation:

   Disposition of Forces	[Bomb Group]	Target	Time of Departure
   “A” Gp. in 94 CBW [Combat Bomb Wing]	401	Gelsenkirchen	1125
   “B” Gp. in 94 CBW	457	Gelsenkirchen	1127
   “C” Gp. in 94 CBW	351	Gelsenkirchen	1129
   1 Div. Lead	379	Gelsenkirchen
   2nd CBW	384	Gelsenkirchen
   3rd CBW	303	Gelsenkirchen
   4th CBW	91	Gelsenkirchen
   2nd Div.	9 Grps.	Hamburg
   3rd Div.	12 Grps.	Merseburg

   
   RAF @ 1200 to Koln [Cologne] & 6 Mossies [De Haviland Mosquito] to Mannheim.
   15th to Czeck @ 1130.
   PFF A/C to fly as: Lead & Deputy Lead and High Squadron Lead.
   
   REMARKS: ____
    Interval between Groups – 2 minutes.
    Leaders will make every effort to bomb at briefed altitude and keep interval between squadrons to a minimum on the bombing
    run.
   
   
7. Fighter Cover: Two Gps. of P-47’s Close Support
   
   
8. Other Forces: ____
   
   
9. Assembly:

   Lead at	16,000'	feet on	Kings Cliffe	Buncher
   High at	17,000'	feet on	Kings Cliffe	Buncher
   Low at	15,000'	feet on	Kings Cliffe	Buncher
   401st at	16,000'	feet on	Cottesmore	Buncher
   457th at	17,000'	feet on	Glatton	Buncher
   Composite at	____	feet on	____	Buncher

   Combat Wing Assembly Line: Watton - Colchester
   Division Assembly Line: Clacton to 52°37’N-04°37’E [Egmond aan Zee, Netherlands]
   
   
10. Navigator - _____
    
    
11. S-2 - _____
    
    
12. Weather - _____
    
    
13. Special Instructions:
    a. Type of Bombing Formation -
    b. Bombardier and Navigator of the #3 A/C of each sqdn. report to Photo Lab.
    c. They are: Lead - Cramer High - Johnson Low - Whittaker G.
    d. Spares to turn back at 03° East.
    e. REMARKS: Division formation to be flown at 26,500’ & 28,000’.
     The High Grps. will fly directly over & guide on Low Grps.
     On bomb run, the High Groups will fly slightly in trail of their respective Low Grps.
     If the Primary Target is attacked the Low Groups should turn sharp left after bombing to allow the High Groups as much
     unimpeded bomb run as possible.
    
      BREAK!!  PILOT’S STAY!
    
    
14. CALL SIGNS:

    	CALL SIGN	FLARES	NAME
    351st	Woodcraft Charlie Leader	RG [Red Green]	Major Davey
    401st	Woodcraft Able Leader	RY	Major McCree
    457th	Woodcraft Baker Leader	RY	Lt. Colonel Francis
    1st Div. Air Commander	Cowboy Able Leader	GG	Lt. Colonel Rohr
    94th CBW Air Commander	Woodcraft Able Leader	RY	Major McCree

    
    

    Fighters	Balance 3-1, 3-2	Buckeye Red
    Bombers	Vinegrove 3-9	Sun Hat Leader
    Grnd. Control	Mohair

    
    

    Control Points:		Fighter Reference Points:
    C.P. 1 - Clacton – 1125 hrs.		O - Zwolle
    C.P. 2 - 52°37’N-04°37’E - 1216 hrs.		W - Dummer Lake
    [Egmond aan Zee, Netherlands]		N - Kassel
    _____		E - Meiningen
    _____		R - Merseburg
    _____		S - Muhlhausen
    _____		H - Frankfurt
    _____		I - Hamburg
    _____		P - Gladbeck

    
    Remarks: Reference Altitude: 23,000’
    
    

15. Colors of the Day
    Time	Color	Letter	Challenge
    0700 – 1300	RY	Q	W
    1300 – 1900	RR	Y	V

    
    
16. Ships To Monitor [Radio Channels A, B, C & D]
    1. Channel “A” - All monitor except the following:
    2. Channel “B” - N-665, P-676, M-964
    3. Channel “C” - 67th F.W.[Fighter Wing] T-461 (Monitoring)
    4. Channel “C” - 8th A.F., G-862
    5. Channel “D” - All available except V-079, B-701
    
    
17. FLYING CONTROL:
    1. Runway on Take Off. 07 [Runway heading 070°]
    2. Expected Runway on return.  07
    3. Emergency Airfields on Continent.  Brussels & Villacoublay
       

1. Date of Mission - 30 October, 1944
   1. Target Attacked: Munster, Germany (Secondary) by PFF methods.
   2. Force: 94th “C” Group. Thirty-eight aircraft, including two flying spares and three PFF ships, were dispatched.
   3. Position: Briefed to fly as ninth in the Division formation. Believed to have flown as eighth or ninth, due to the fact that the 94th “A” Group was not seen throughout the mission.
   4. Lead Teams

      	Group Lead
      	Air Commander:	Major Kenneth W. Davey
      	Pilot:	Captain James M. Gibbons
      	Navigator:	1st Lt. Benton F. Love, Jr.
      	Bombardier:	1st Lt. Frederick S. Ralph

      
      

      	High Squadron
      	Leader:	1st Lt. Duane S. Anderson
      	Pilot:	2nd Lt. Donald L. Fish
      	Navigator:	2nd Lt. Milton J. Morisette
      	Bombardier:	2nd Lt. Gerald E. Traczewitz

      
      

      	Low Squadron
      	Leader:	1st Lt. Vernon R. Weatherman
      	Pilot:	2nd Lt. John R. Coulam
      	Navigator:	1st Lt. Thomas C. Kyser
      	Bombardier:	1st Lt. Arnold Schiffman

2. Narrative.
   1.  Squadron and Group Assembly: Carried out without difficulty at the Kings Cliffe buncher at the briefed altitude of 16,000 feet.
   2.  Route Over England: Departure from the assembly point was made one minute late (1049). It was possible to get in trail behind one of the groups scheduled to precede the 94th “C” Group shortly after leaving the assembly area. The minor divergencies [sic] from course are a result of following the preceding formations. Control points were reached as planned, and departure from the English coast was made at 1129 at 21,000 feet, 500 feet above the briefed altitude and at the briefed time.
   3.  Division Assembly Line: The briefed Division Assembly Line was flown. As previously indicated, the 94th “C” Group flew as either eighth or ninth in the formation, directly above the 41st “C” Group as briefed. Shortly before the enemy coast was reached, the 94th “C” Group found it necessary to fly to the left of course in order to keep out of the prop wash of preceding formations. As a result, the enemy coast was crossed at 1216, four minutes early, north of the briefed point at 29,000 feet, 1,000 feet above the briefed altitude.
   4.  Flight to Target: The 94th “C” Group maintained its position to the left of the briefed course until after the Zuider Zee had been crossed. Shortly before the turn south to the briefed IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run] was to be made, the Scouting Force reported that the secondary target, Munster, should be attacked. As a result, the route flown from that point to the secondary target did not coincide with the briefed course as indicated on the Track Chart. The planned route for attacking the secondary target, however, was flown.
   5.  Description of Bombing Run: The secondary target was the marshalling yards at Munster, Germany. Bombing was done by PFF methods. The Lead Squadron made its own sighting operations and the Low Squadron bombed on the Lead Squadron. The target area was completely covered by cloud. The equipment of the Lead PFF Aircraft malfunctioned before the IP, and the Deputy Lead PFF Aircraft took over the lead. The Lead Squadron experienced some crowding from an unidentified wing on the bomb run, and is doubtful about the bombing results. (There was not enough time for the pilot to set up the C-1 Pilot [Autopilot] in the Deputy Lead Aircraft when it took over the lead.) The High Squadron performed its own sighting operation. It encountered no interference on the bomb run. The C-1 Pilot functioned satisfactorily.
   6.  Flight From Target: After attacking the target, the 94th “C” Group followed the preceding formations on the withdrawal. The leader took over the formation after bombing. The briefed route was contacted east of the Zuider Zee and was closely followed for the remainder of the mission. The enemy coast was departed at 1355 – seven minutes late, at 25,000 feet, 1,000 feet below the briefed altitude. The English coast was crossed at Orford Ness at an altitude of 16,000 feet at 1426, six minutes late. Return to base was flown without further incident. A normal let-down procedure was followed.
   7.  Fighter Support: As briefed.
   8.  Comments: No aircraft were lost. No enemy aircraft were encountered. Flak at the target was meager, scattered, and inaccurate. The Scouting Force furnished accurate weather information as to the condition at the primary and secondary targets. The 94th “C” Group Leader, Major Kenneth W. Davey, reported favorably upon the staggering of groups at altitude, and feels that such formation flying should be satisfactory if the low groups will fly at their briefed altitudes and inform the higher groups of any change in altitude – particularly while climbing. High cirrus clouds ranging from 23,000 feet to above 30,000 feet were encountered about midway across the Zuider Zee, and the mission from this point to the target and back to the Zuider Zee was flown in this thick cirrus. This made flying very difficult, as much of the time it was impossible to see any other formations.
   9.  Aircraft Not Attacking: Aircraft 42-97252, pilot Lt. Lawson, and Aircraft 44-6082, pilot Lt. Dinning, returned to base with mechanical trouble. Both of these aircraft were in the Lead Squadron and were replaced by the two flying spares. Aircraft 43-38585, pilot Lt. Hadley, and Aircraft 43-38592, pilot Lt. Robinson, failed to attack when over the target. These aircraft are being ground and flight checked to determine the cause of the failures.

1. Type of Bombing (Visual, PFF or Combined)?  PFF
2. Did Squadron perform own sighting operation, bomb on smoke marker, or was bombing done in Group Formation? Lead Squadron made own sighting operation and the Low Squadron bombed on the Lead Squadron on a magnetic heading of 136°.
3. Was turn made at briefed I.P.? Yes
4. Cloud coverage and visibility. 10/10 cloud cover.
5. If Visual, when was MPI identified? If not actually seen, how was it located? PFF
6. Any Interference on Bomb Run? A group cut us off just as bombs went away.
7. Did C-1 [Autopilot] function satisfactory? Pilot did not have time to set C-1 pilot up as we were flying Deputy and had to take over the lead.
8. Any other factors affecting accuracy? None

Bombardier - 2nd Lt. Friedlander, Herbert D.
Pilot - 2nd Lt. Redman, Robert P.
Navigator - 2nd Lt. Bury, John W.

Aircraft B-17G   B-701  Take-off - 0925 Landed - 1500
Objective - M/Y [Marshalling Yards] at Munster, Germany (Secondary – PFF)
Aiming Point (MPI) [Mean Point of Impact] - PFF
Initial Point - As Briefed
Method of Attack - Squadron
No. of Attacking A/C in Group: - 24   Composite Group - ____
Number A/C Dropping Bombs by own Sighting Operation: ONE
Deflection and Range Sighting, Group: Lead A/C   Composite Group - ____
Range Sighting only, Group - __   Composite Group - ____
Bombs, Types and Sizes - 17 x 250-LB., AN-M57 G.P.’s & 1 Marker
Number of Bombs Loaded - As above   Released - Same
Fusing, Nose - 1/10   Tail - 1/40
Synchronization - PFF On

Information at Release Point:  Low Squadron bombed on Lead (136° Magnetic Heading)

Type of Release - Train (100')
Point of Impact If Seen - Unobserved
Mean Temp. Metro -17.5 Actual -17.5
Winds - Altitude - 28,000 Ft.  Direction - Metro 140°  Actual 118°  Velocity - Metro 38  Actual 38
Temp C. - Metro -43° C. Actual -50° C.

1. Type of Bombing (Visual, PFF or Combined)?  PFF
2. Did Squadron perform own sighting operation, bomb on smoke marker, or was bombing done in Group Formation? High Squadron performed own sighting operation.
3. Was turn made at briefed I.P.? Yes
4. Cloud coverage and visibility. 10/10 cloud cover.
5. If Visual, when was MPI identified? If not actually seen, how was it located? PFF
6. Any Interference on Bomb Run? None
7. Did C-1 [Autopilot] function satisfactory? Yes
8. Any other factors affecting accuracy? None

Bombardier - 2nd Lt. Traczewitz, Gerald E.
Pilot - 1st Lt. Anderson, Duane S.
Navigator - 2nd Lt. Morrisette, Milton J.

Aircraft B-17G   B-701Z-687  Take-off - 0925 Landed - 1510
Objective - M/Y [Marshalling Yards] at Munster, Germany (Secondary – PFF)
Aiming Point (MPI) [Mean Point of Impact] - PFF
Initial Point - As Briefed
Method of Attack - Squadron
No. of Attacking A/C in Group: - 12   Composite Group - ____
Number A/C Dropping Bombs by own Sighting Operation: ONE
Deflection and Range Sighting, Group: Lead A/C   Composite Group - ____
Range Sighting only, Group - __   Composite Group - ____
Bombs, Types and Sizes - 17 x 250-LB., AN-M57 G.P.’s & 1 Marker
Number of Bombs Loaded - As above   Released - Same
Fusing, Nose - 1/10   Tail - 1/40
Synchronization - PFF On

Information at Release Point:

Type of Release - Train (100')
Point of Impact If Seen - Unobserved
Mean Temp. Metro -17.5 Actual -17.5
Winds - Altitude - 30,000 Ft.  Direction - Metro 140°  Actual 150°  Velocity - Metro 38  Actual 37
Temp C. - Metro -43° C. Actual -51° C.

1. No leaflets were carried on today's mission.
2. Bombing through 10/10 clouds was done on the secondary target, the M/Y [Marshalling Yards] at Munster, Germany. Cloud cover prevented visual observation of results. Photographs show no ground detail or bomb bursts. Bombing was done on PFF instruments with the Low Squadron bombing on the PFF of the Lead Squadron, and the High Squadron on its own PFF equipment. PFF equipment generally was working well but the Lead Squadron had some crowding from an unidentified Wing during the last portion of the bomb run and is doubtful about results. The High Squadron believes results should be good.
3. No enemy aircraft were encountered and no claims [of enemy aircraft being shot down] are being submitted.
4. Flak at the target was meager, scattered and inaccurate. Meager to moderate flak was observed at Osnabruck and Rheine. There was also meager, inaccurate flak on the Dortmund-Ems canal at 52°10’N - 07°40’E [Saerbeck, Germany], at Hengelo, and at Egmond [Netherlands].
5. There were 10/10 clouds in the target area with tops at about 12,000 feet, and persistent contrails at altitude hindered good formation flying on the bomb run.
6. No observations of military importance were made during the mission.
7. The equipment of the Lead PFF A/C malfunctioned on the bomb run, and the Deputy Lead PFF A/C took over the lead shortly before bombs away. See paragraph 2 above for further details. The Scouting Force furnished accurate weather information as to the conditions at the primary and secondary targets. Fighter support was as briefed. None of our A/C is missing.

    509th Squadron:
A/C 277-O I like the new plan of flying high and low groups. – Lt. Gwyn.
A/C 900-M Low Low element leader flew all over the sky today. – Lt. Mueller.
A/C 156-R Squadron Operations claimed we had a truck assigned to our plane and one other but we waited an hour and finally had to hail a jeep to get in. – F/O Lockard.

    510th Squadron:
A/C 665-N The food in the plane was very good today. – F/O Burr.
A/C 124-F I saw no reason for the gradual let-down today. – Lt. Carle.

    511th Squadron:
A/C 080-Q Glatton is still using V.H.F. during most of the mission, giving others very little chance to use it. – Lt. Popp.
A/C 694-C Trousers of heated suit do not heat quickly nor well enough. – Lt. Johnson.

1. Abortives and Flying Spares:
   1. Airplane No. 44-6082, 510th Squadron, returned early because waste gate became stuck in open position on #1 engine.
   2. Airplane No. 42-97252, 510th Squadron, returned early due to broken nipple at base of #4 propeller governor, causing leak in external oil line from governor to accessory section.
2. Battle Damage:
   1. None

1. The following armament malfunctions were reported on the mission of 30 October, 1944.
   1. A/C No. 43-38592 - Failed to attack target. Ground check shows Intervalometer malfunctioning. Salvo system operating OK. Altitude flight made and bombs released in select and salvo without trouble.
   2. A/C No. 43-38585 Failed to attack target. Bombing system checks out perfectly on ground. Aircraft taken to altitude and bombing system checked out OK.
2. Although these aircraft check well on altitude flight check, it is the opinion of this office that weather and altitude were the causes of failure to attack. The combat mission was flown by these aircraft at an altitude of 31,000 feet with the temperature at minus 54°. During the flight check the racks were tested at a temperature of minus 30°. Close examination of the crews in question indicates that all possible means were used to attack the target, and it is suggested that the failures to attack be classified other than mechanical or personnel.

Aircraft No. 42-97252 Squadron - 510th   Pilot - Lt Lawson
Time of Abortive - 1110  Location when Aborted - 30 miles NE of Peterborough [England]
Reason For Abortive - Visible oil leak from external oil line on #4 engine. Leak started slowly and grew in intensity until it seemed imminent that #4 engine would be lost.
Disposition of Bombs: Returned
Altitude At Time of Aborting: 17,000’
Enemy Opposition Encountered - None
Remarks: None
[Signed] George C. Lawson, Jr., 1st Lt., Air Corps


Aircraft No. 44-6082 Squadron - 510th   Pilot - Lt Dinning
Time of Abortive - 1055  Location when Aborted - 52°45’N - 00°15’W [SW of Spalding, England]
Reason For Abortive - No turbo boost on number 1 engine. Waste gate linkage faulty.
Disposition of Bombs: Not released.
Altitude At Time of Aborting: 16,000’
Enemy Opposition Encountered - None
Remarks: ____
[Signed] Richard G. Dinning

1. Last Four numbers and Call Letter of A/C in each Squadron:

   a. 94th "C" Group   Lead Squadron - 351st Group
   Sqdn 508th A/C: (N–7727 Flying Spare)
   Sqdn 509th A/C: B–7701 PFF
   Sqdn 510th A/C: V–8079 PFF, H–8280, S–7512, T–8461, N–7665, C–2576, B–6082, G–7862, A–8465, K–7252, F–7124
   Sqdn 511th A/C: None

   
   

   b. 94th "C" Group   High Squadron - 351st Group
   Sqdn 508th A/C: (K–8130 Flying Spare)
   Sqdn 509th A/C: None
   Sqdn 510th A/C: None
   Sqdn 511th A/C: Z–7687 PFF, Q–8080, A–8428, N–8592, P–2676, C–8694, H–8435, U–7381, M–8650, K–8585, G–8070, X–7571

   
   

   c. 94th "C" Group   Low Squadron - 351st Group
   Sqdn 508th A/C: H–8666, F–1711, O–8277, (M–7900 D.A. [Delayed Action])
   Sqdn 509th A/C: P–8432, Q–8116, N–7169, T–1384, M–7964, G–6078, L–7676, R–6156
   Sqdn 510th A/C: None
   Sqdn 511th A/C: None

2. Target: GQ-1509
   
3. W/T and R/T Operational Call Sign of each Squadron:

   Squadron	508 [Call Sign]	W/T LNS R/T CARLTON		Squadron	510 [Call Sign]	W/T MCG R/T TIPSTAFF
   Squadron	509 [Call Sign]	W/T RNA R/T HOTMINT		Squadron	511 [Call Sign]	W/T TKA R/T PARTNERSHIP

4. a. Lead Box: Taxi – 0915; Take-Off – 0930; E.T.D. Field – 0930
   b. ____ Box: Taxi – ____; Take-Off – ____; E.T.D. Field – ____

5. Time:	Height:	Place of Crossing English Coast: (OUT)
   1129	20,500 Ft	Clacton

6. Time:	Height:	Place of Crossing Enemy Coast: (IN)
   1220	28,000 Ft	52°37'N-04°37'E [Egmond, Netherlands]

7. Time:	Height:	Place of Crossing Enemy Coast: (Out)
   1348	26,000 Ft	52°37'N-04°37'E [Egmond, Netherlands]

8. Time:	Height:	Place of Crossing English Coast: (IN)
   1420	10,000 Ft	Orfordness

9. E.T.R.(Estimated Time of Return) Base: 1446 Hours
10. MF/DF [Medium Frequency/Direction Finder] Section: "H"
11. Bomb load of Each A/C: "A" Lead Box
    Lead Squadron: 18 x 250 G.P. - 1/10 x 1/40
    High Squadron: 18 x 250 G.P. - 1/10 x 1/40
    Low Squadron: 14 x 250 G.P. - 1/10 x 1/40 (A/C M-7900 D.A. [Delayed Action Fuses])
    ___ Squadron:
    
12. Fuel Load of each A/C: 2200 Gallons
    
13. Leaders:
    a. Lead Box: Rank & Name: Maj. Davey A/C No & Sqdn. V-8079 PFF - 510th
    b. High Box: Rank & Name: Lt. Anderson A/C No & Sqdn. Z-7687 PFF - 511th
    c. Low Box: Rank & Name: Lt. Weatherman A/C No & Sqdn. P-8432 - 509th
14. Passengers, if any: (Full Name, Rank, A/C and Squadron Passenger flying with)
    None

Report Compiled By I.C. Muesing, S/Sgt.