351st Bomb Group

Group Mission #231

Credited Mission #225

Briefing Outline:

1. 1. TARGETS: 
   2. Visual Primary: Ground Support - Gun Positions, Eschweiler, Germany
   3. PFF Primary: Ground Support - Gun Positions, Eschweiler, Germany
   4. Visual Secondary: No Secondary
   5. PFF Secondary: No Secondary
   6. Last Resort: No Last Resort
   
   

2. TIMINGS:
   Zero Hour:	- 1000
   Stations:	- 0735
   Start Engines:	- 0745
   Taxi:	- 0755
   Take Off:	- 0810
   Target Time:	- ____
   ETR [Estimated Time    of Return]:	- ____

   
     Gasoline 2,400 Gallons
   
   

3. LOADING:
   Lead -	30 x 250# Frags [Fragmentation Bombs] Instantaneous Nose - No Tail [Fuse]
   High -	Same
   Low -	Same
   Composite -	___

   
   
4. Intervalometer Settings: 150 Feet - Do Not Salvo
   
   
5. Chaff: All A/C [Aircraft] will commence release of chaff at 10 minutes before target & continue for 15 minutes. Each A/C will carry 360 units.
   
   
6. Division Formation:

   Disposition of Forces	[Bomb Group]	Target	Time of Departure
   “A” Gp. in 94 CBW [Combat Bomb Wing]	457	Ground Support	1037
   “B” Gp. in 94 CBW	351	Ground Support	1038
   “C” Gp. in 94 CBW	401	Ground Support	1039
   1 Div. Lead	457	Ground Support	1037
   2nd CBW	351	Ground Support	1038
   3rd CBW	401	Ground Support	1039
   4th CBW	91	Ground Support	1040
   2nd Div.	40 Sqdns.	Ground Support
   3rd Div.	12 Grps.	Ground Support

   
   PFF A/C to fly as: Lead, Deputy Lead - High Lead, Low Lead.
   
   REMARKS:
    Base Reference Altitude - 20,000'
    Division Assembly Line - Dungeness to 50°52'N - 01°36'E
    Interval between CBW's [Combat Bomb Wings] – 1 minutes.
   
7. Fighter Cover: 4 Gps. of P-51’s
   
   
8. Other Forces: ____
   
   
9. Assembly:

   Lead at	16,500'	feet on	Kings Cliffe	Buncher
   High at	17,500'	feet on	Kings Cliffe	Buncher
   Low at	15,500'	feet on	Kings Cliffe	Buncher
   401st at	15,000'	feet on	Cottesmore	Buncher
   457th at	15,000'	feet on	Glatton	Buncher
   Composite at	____	feet on	____	Buncher

   
   Combat Wing Assembly Time: ____
   Division Assembly Time: ____
   
   
10. Navigator - _____
    
11. S-2 - _____
    
12. Weather - _____
    
13. Special Instructions:
     a. Type of Bombing Formation - Group 36 Ships
     b. Bombardier and Navigator of the #3 A/C of each sqdn. report to Photo Lab.
      They are: Lead - M-650, High - T-461, Low - M-900
     c. Camera A/C - J-579, G-862, Q-799
     d. Spares to turn back at 03° East.
     e. REMARKS: Navigators and Bombardiers will be briefed on the possibility of ground being covered with fresh snow and the
            difficulty in identifying snow covered targets
            No second runs to be made on target.
    
      BREAK!!  PILOT’S STAY!
    
    
14. CALL SIGNS:

    	CALL SIGN	FLARES	NAME
    351st	Woodcraft B - Baker	RG [Red Green] Normal	Major Carraway
    401st	Woodcraft C - Charlie	Normal	Major Jonckheere
    457th	Woodcraft A - Able	Normal	Major Snow
    1st Div. Air Commander	A - Able	Normal	Major Snow
    94th CBW Air Commander	A - Able	Normal	Major Snow

    
    

    Fighters	Balance 2
    Bombers	Vinegrove 2-2
    Grnd. Control	On channel 741 - Mohair, on channel 701 - Colgate and Honey Pot in Target Area

    
    

    Control Points:		Fighter Reference Points:
    C.P. 1 - Dungeness		H - Brussels
    C.P. 2 - 50°52’N-01°36’E		O - Aachen
    C.P. 3 - 50°52’N-01°36’E		T - Koln

    Remarks: Reference Altitude: 20,000’
    
    
15. Ships To Monitor [Radio Channels A, B, C & D]
    
    1. Channel “A” - All except
    2. Channel “B” - K-585, S-512, O-258
    3. Channel “C” - 67th F.W.[Fighter Wing] A-428
    4. Channel “C” - 8th A.F., P-676
    5. Channel “D” - All available
    
    
16. FLYING CONTROL:
    1. Runway on Take Off. ___ 
    2. Expected Runway on return. ___
    3. Emergency Airfields on Continent.  Brussels & Villacoublay
    
    

Interval between CBW - 2 minutes.
Zero [hour] + 39 [minutes] - Departure
Group leader will fire GG [Green Green] flare when he has passed over SCS-51 line [A vertical radio localizer transmitter beacon placed a short distance in the rear of the U.S. front line. The beacon indicated to the bombers their exact position in relation to the front line and the bomb release point.].
All A/C will acknowledge with GG flare.
No bombs will be dropped unless it is definitely established that the line has been passed.
Bombing Altitude is now 21,000'.
[Signed] Lt Hollaway 94 CBW.

Operational Narrative – 94th “C” CBW:

1. Date of Mission - 16 Nov, 1944.
   1. Target Attacked:  Primary Target (Eschweiler, Germany) by PFF methods.
   2. Force: 94th “B” Group. Thirty-eight aircraft, including three PFF ships, two flying spares, and one GH aircraft, were dispatched.
   3. Position: Briefed to fly as second group in the Division formation. Due to a late take-off, it was impossible to fly the briefed position. It is believed that the 94th "B" Group was able to get into third place in the formation.
   4. Lead Teams

      	"B" Group Lead
      	Air Commander:	Major John B. Carraway.
      	Pilot:	1st Lt. Duane S. Anderson
      	Navigator:	2nd Lt. Milton J. Morrisette
      	Bombardier:	Captain William B. Lyttle

      
      

      	High Squadron Lead
      	Leader:	1st Lt. Mahlon A. Hillebrand
      	Pilot:	1st Lt. John I. Belmeyer
      	Navigator:	1st Lt. Frederic S. Kelley
      	Bombardier:	1st Lt. Alan B. Reed

      
      

      	Low Squadron Lead
      	Leader:	Captain Norman A. Trapp
      	Pilot:	1st Lt. Virgil M. Bullock
      	Navigator:	1st Lt. John C. Talbott
      	Bombardier:	1st Lt. Robert E. McFarlane

2. Narrative.
   1.  Squadron and Group Assembly: Due to the fact that the take off was delayed from 0810 to 0904 by bad weather at the base, the crews were instructed to make their assembly at 15,000 feet rather than the briefed altitude of 16,500 feet. The assembly was carried out over the Kings Cliffe buncher without difficulty.
   2.  Route Over England: Departure from the assembly area was made at 1008, twenty one minutes late. In order to catch up to the preceding groups, which had been able to take off as planned, the 94th "B" Group flew a direct course to the briefed point of entry of the French coast. As a result, there was a wide variance from the briefed route over England. Departure from the English coast was made from Dover rather than Dungeness, at 1041, two minutes late, at an altitude of 21,500 feet, 1,500 feet below the briefed altitude over Dungeness. A steady climb was maintained in order to reach the briefed altitude as soon as possible.
   3.  Division Assembly Line: The briefed Division Assembly Line was not flown. However, it was possible for the 94th "B" Group to reach the French coast at the briefed point at 1047, the briefed time, 1,000 feet below the briefed altitude of 23,000 feet. It was not possible to reach the briefed position of second in the Division Formation. It is believed that the 94th "B" Group was preceded by two groups when it reached the French coast.
   4.  Flight to Target: The briefed route was closely followed after the French coast. At a point ninety miles from the target (50°43'N - 03°50'E) [Lessines, Belgium] the deputy aircraft, a GH ship, took over the lead of the 94th "B" Group in order to make a GH run on the target. It took up a northeasterly heading and led the formation north of course and to the east of Antwerp. The Group Leader was unable to contact the GH ship over VHF in order to determine the reason for the variance from course. After several attempts to contact the GH ship, the Group Leader forced it out of the lead position and turned back towards the briefed course. The turn was made northeast of Antwerp at approximately 51°36'N - 04°41'E [Prinsenbeek, Netherlands]. It is now known that failure of the GH equipment was responsible for the divergency [sic] from course. The briefed course was contacted again at the IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run] at 1158, twenty-seven minutes late.
   5.  Description of Bombing Run: A PFF run on the primary target was made. The target was attacked at 1210, twenty-six minutes late. No difficulty was encountered on the bomb run. The briefed IP was reached in the return to the briefed course. The C-1 Pilot [autopilot] was used satisfactorily. The Low Squadron bombed on the smoke markers of the Lead Squadron. The High Squadron attacked the target by PFF methods, making its own sighting, The High Squadron made its turn four miles north of the briefed IP, but had no difficulty in contacting the briefed route. No interference was encountered on the bomb run. The C-1 Pilot functioned satisfactorily. The 94th "B" Group was not the last group to attack the target. Reports indicate that either two or three groups followed it over the target, after the Leader had reported that he was last.
   6.  Flight From Target: The briefed turn to the right was made after the target was attacked. It was necessary to fly to the left of course after the next right turn in order to stay clear of a group flying on the right of the 94th "B" Group. The briefed route was soon contacted and was followed for the remainder of the mission. The French coast was crossed at the briefed point at 1327, twenty-eight minutes late, at 10,000 feet, 5,000 feet below the briefed altitude. The English coast was reached at the briefed point at 1335, twenty-six minutes late at an altitude of 5,000 feet. A normal let-down procedure had been followed. Reports from 1st Division indicated that there would be a ceiling of 1,500 feet at the base. This, however, was not the case, and landings were carried out with great difficulty. While the Lead Squadron was landing, the weather became progressively worse. The High and Low Squadrons were instructed to land at other fields where visibility was better. Eleven aircraft of the High Squadron landed at Gaydon, and one at Stratford. Two aircraft of the Low Squadron landed at Leicester, and three at Litchfield. All of these aircraft have now returned to base.
   7.  Fighter Support: As briefed.
   8.  Comments: No aircraft were lost. No enemy aircraft were encountered. The only flak encountered was in the target area, where it was meager and generally reported as accurate for both height and deflection. Weather in the target area was six to eight-tenths, with haze. The Scouting Force was not contacted. Some crews report observing a few of the marker barrage balloons, and others report friendly flak. The ground panel markers were not observed. The SCS-51 Localizer worked well for the Group. Aircraft 43-37862, pilot Lt Gonske, returned early with mechanical trouble. This aircraft was replaced by a flying spare. The other flying spare remained with the formation, due to a regularly scheduled aircraft dropping out and then returning to the formation at a point too late to turn back. A mechanical failure was responsible for one aircraft of the Lead Squadron dropping thirteen bombs in the vicinity of 50°45'N - 04°45'E [Near Beauvechain, Belgium].

  [Signed] Clinton F. Ball, Lt Col, Air Corps, Operations Officer

Explanation of deviation from Field Order No. 556.

1. The High Squadron of the 351st Bomb Group made its own bomb run on the mission of 16 November, 1944 upon orders of the undersigned, as an alternate procedure in case of Gee-H failure of the Group lead aircraft.
2. The 1st Bombardment Division instruction stated that PFF aircraft would be in the lead position of each squadron. This order was then supplemented by instructions that Gee-H Bombing by the groups would be used instead of Micro-Wave H Bombing. Since the disposition of PFF aircraft was not changed by the Field Order or the supplement from 94th Combat Wing, the decision that bombing by Mickey [Radar] in the event of Gee-H failure, which occurred, should be done by squadrons to fully justify the flying of PFF aircraft in each squadron lead.
3. In no event did the Squadron Leaders of the 351st Bomb Group disobey instructions or by ineptitude break up the group formation on bombing.

  [Signed] Clinton F. Ball, Lt. Colonel, Air Corps, Operations Officer

Statistical Summary:

	351st GROUP FORMATION
	LEAD SQDN.	HIGH SQDN.	LOW SQDN.	TOTALS
No. of A/C Failing to Take Off	0	0	0	0
No. of A/C Airborne	13	13	12	38
No. of A/C Airborne Less Unused Spares	13	13	12	38
No. of A/C Sorties	13	12	12	37
No. of A/C Attacking	13	12	12	37
No. of A/C Not Attacking	0	1	0	1
Name of Primary Target	ESCHWEILER, GERMANY (GROUND SUPPORT)
(A) No. of A/C Attacking Primary Target	13	12	12	37
(B) No., Size & Type Of Bombs	333 x 260# FRAG	330 x 260# FRAG	309 x 260# FRAG	972 x 260# FRAG
Name of Secondary Target
(A) No. of A/C Attacking Secondary Target
(B) No., Size & Type Of Bombs
Name of Last Resort Target (LRT)
(A) No. of A/C Attacking LRT
(B) No., Size & Type Of Bombs
Name of Target of Opportunity (T.O.)
(A) No. of A/C Attacking T.O.
(B) No., Size & Type Of Bombs
No. of A/C Lost - Total	0	0	0	0
No. of A/C Lost - Flak
No. of A/C Lost - Flak and E/A
No. of A/C Lost - Enemy Aircraft
No. of A/C Lost - Accident
No. of A/C Lost - Unknown
Time of Take Off	0843	0904	0905
Time of Attack	1210
Average Time of Flight	5:26	5:28	5:33
Altitude of Release	21,900’
Visual or PFF	PFF	PFF	PFF
Enemy Resistance – AA Intensity & Accuracy	MEAGER AND ACCURATE
Enemy Resistance – Fighter	0	0	0	0
Enemy Resistance – Bombers	0	0	0	0
U.S. A/C Engaged by Enemy Aircraft	0	0	0	0
Degree of Success	RESULTS UNOBSERVED

PFF A/C were borrowed from Groups as follows: None
PFF A/C were loaned to Groups as follows: None

PFF Aircraft		POSITION
44-8376		LEADER		ATTACKED PRIMARY
44-8358		HIGH SQDN LEAD		ATTACKED PRIMARY
42-97687		LOW SQDN LEAD		ATTACKED PRIMARY
GH A/C 44-6166		DEPUTY LEAD		ATTACKED PRIMARY	Furnished by 303rd Group Included above in Lead Sqdn Totals

  [Signed] William B. Lyttle, Captain, Air Corps, Group Bombardier.



  [Signed] Alan B. Reed, 1st Lt., Air Corps, Lead Bombardier.