351st Bomb Group

1. 1. TARGETS: 
   2. Visual Primary: Armament Works, Berlin [Germany]
   3. PFF Primary: Armament Works, Berlin [Germany]
   4. Visual Secondary: Armament Works, Berlin [Germany]
   5. PFF Secondary: Armament Works, Berlin [Germany]
   6. Last Resort: Neuruppin, Airfield
   
   

2. TIMINGS:
   Zero Hour:	- 0845
   Stations:	- 0630
   Start Engines:	- 0640
   Taxi:	- 0650
   Take Off:	- 0705
   Target Time:	- 1055
   ETR [Estimated Time    of Return]:	- 1536

   
     Gasoline 2,780 Gallons
   
   

3. LOADING:
   Lead -	6 x 500 Lb. G.P. [General Purpose] 1/10 – 1/100 [Fuses] Plus 4 - M-17 I.B.'s [Incendiary Bombs]
   High -	Same
   Low -	Same
   Composite -	___

   
   
4. Intervalometer Settings: Visual – Salvo. P.F.F. – 140 Ft.
   
   
5. Chaff: Start 7 mins. before target, continue for 12 mins.
   
   
6. Division Formation:

   Disposition of Forces	[Bomb Group]	Target	Time of Departure
   “A” Gp. in 94 CBW [Combat Bomb Wing]	351	Berlin (Steel Works)
   “B” Gp. in 94 CBW	401	Berlin
   “C” Gp. in 94 CBW
   1 Div. Lead	91	Berlin
   2nd CBW	398	Berlin
   3rd CBW	305	Berlin
   4th CBW	306	Berlin
   5th CBW	351	Berlin
   6th CBW	401	Berlin
   2nd Div.	140 A/C	Munster
   3rd Div.	6 Grps.	Berlin - Lead 1st Div., Same route.

   
   4 PFF A/C to fly as: Group Lead, & Deputy Group Lead, High Squadron Lead & Low Squadron Lead.
   REMARKS:
    Odd # Groups - 25,000'; Even # Groups 26,500'
    Minimum Bomb Altitude 22,000'
   
   
7. Fighter Cover: 12 Gps. of P-51’s.
   
   
8. Other Forces: ____
   
   
9. Assembly:

   Lead at	10,000'	feet on	Kings Cliffe	Buncher
   High at	11,000'	feet on	Kings Cliffe	Buncher
   Low at	9,000'	feet on	Kings Cliffe	Buncher
   401st at	11,500'	feet on	Cottesmore	Buncher
   457th at	____	feet on	____	Buncher
   Composite at	____	feet on	____	Buncher

   
   Combat Wing Assembly Line: B. St. Edmonds - Clacton
   Division Assembly Line: Clacton to 52°37’N-04°37’E [Egmond aan Zee, Netherlands]
   
   
10. Navigator - _____
    
    
11. S-2 - _____
    
    
12. Weather - _____
    
    
13. Special Instructions:
     a. Type of Bombing Formation - Normal - by Sqdns. if H2X operating.
     b. Bombardier and Navigator of the #3 A/C of each sqdn. report to Photo Lab.
      They are: Lead - A-428 High - F-711 Low - C-640
     c. Camera A/C   J-579, F-124, C-640
      to return at   Continental coast.
     d. Spares to turn back at 03° East.
     e. REMARKS: Oxygen Discipline - Gunners alert.
      Suspect A-93, Liege - Bierset A/F being jammed.
    
      BREAK!!  PILOT’S STAY!
    
    
14. CALL SIGNS:

    	CALL SIGN	FLARES	NAME
    351st	Woodcraft Able	Normal	____
    401st	Woodcraft Baker	___	____
    457th	Woodcraft ____	___	____
    1st Div. Air Commander	____	____	Lt. Colonel Sheeler
    94th CBW Air Commander	____	RY	Lt. Colonel Ball

    
    

    Fighters	Balance 2-4, 2-5, 2-6
    Bombers	Vinegrove 2-5
    Grnd. Control	Mohair

    
    

    Control Points:		Fighter Reference Points:
    C.P. 1 - Clacton		S - Dummer Lake
    C.P. 2 - 52°37’N-04°37’E		H - Steinhuder Lake
    [Egmond aan Zee, Netherlands]		O - Ulzen
    C.P. 3 - 50°38’N-09°12’E		P - Wittenburg
    [22 miles SE of Marburg, Germany]		L - Berlin
    C.P. 4 - 50°38’N-09°12’E		I - Brandenburg
    [22 miles SE of Marburg, Germany]		F - Magdeburg
    _____		T - Brunswick
    _____		E - Zwolle
    _____		R - Munster

    
    Remarks: Reference Altitude: 25,000’
    
    
15. Ships To Monitor [Radio Channels A, B, C & D]
    1. Channel “A” - All A/C except
    2. Channel “B” - N-592, L-515, P-258
    3. Channel “C” - 67th F.W. [Fighter Wing] K-585
    4. Channel “D” - 8th A.F. [Air Force] U-381
    5. Channel “D” - All except: U-374, B-701, D-957, B-349, ([These A/C have] 8th A.F. Fighter Crystals [in the Radios])
    
    
16. FLYING CONTROL:
    1. Runway on Take Off. 
    2. Expected Runway on return. 
    3. Emergency Airfields on Continent. 
       
       

1. Date of Mission - 5 December, 1944.
   1. Target Attacked:  Secondary Target at Berlin (Tegal), Germany, by PFF methods.
   2. Force: 94th "A" Group. Thirty-eight aircraft, including two flying spares and Four PFF ships (flying as lead of each squadron and deputy group lead), were dispatched.
   3. Position: Briefed and flew as fifth group in the Division Formation.
   4. Lead Teams

      	Group Lead
      	Air Commander:	Lt Col Clinton F. Ball
      	Pilot:	Captain Clifford T. Pryor
      	Navigator:	2nd Lt. Charles H. Hubbell
      	Bombardier:	1st Lt. Frank H. Reising

      
      

      	High Squadron
      	Group Leader:	1st Lt. Clifford T. Prior.
      	Pilot:	2nd Lt. Walter H. Brooks.
      	Navigator:	1st Lt. John E. Rowen.
      	Bombardier:	1st Lt. Joseph Loiscono.

      
      

      	Low Squadron
      	Group Leader:	1st Lt. Robert P. Redman
      	Pilot:	2nd Lt. Louis Vagias
      	Navigator:	2nd Lt. John W. Bury
      	Bombardier:	2nd Lt. Eldon L. Stear

2. Narrative.
   1.  Squadron and Group Assembly: Carried out over the Kings Cliffe buncher at the briefed altitude of 10,000 feet. Considerable difficulty was caused by darkness, Gee box out, and a faulty radio compass in the lead ship. The Low Squadron had great difficulty assembling, picking up eight planes. The other four tacked on the Lead and High which departed in formation. The Low Squadron of eight aircraft was unable to identify the Lead until after crossing Control Point 1 where it essed and fell into formation.
   2.  Route Over England: The assembly area was departed one minute late (0822). Point R was cut short due to a cloud formation present over Spalding and the briefed route. The formation then essed across the briefed course in order to lose the time it had gained in cutting the turn at Point R. The English coast was crossed at Clacton as briefed, at the briefed altitude of 14,000 feet, one minute late (0858).
   3.  Division Assembly Line: An S turn was made just after crossing the coast for the dual purpose of getting into the proper position in the Division Formation - fifth - and picking up the Low Squadron of the 351st formation. As indicated on the Track Chart, the briefed Division Assembly Line was not flown; but, instead, the Division Column was followed on a route south of the briefed course. The continental coast was crossed south of the briefed point six minutes late (0944) at 22,000 feet. This deviation from the briefed route was also caused by staying in the Division Formation.
   4.  Flight to Target: Once inside the enemy coast, the briefed course was gradually regained, and was followed closely to the IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run]. Control points were reached five to six minutes late because of a change in winds.
   5.  Description of Bombing Run: As the formation preceding the 94th "A" Group overshot the IP, it was necessary for the 94th "A" Group to deviate from the briefed course, as indicated on the Track Chart, in order not to cut off the preceding formation on its bomb run. The actual IP was just slightly north of the briefed IP. Nine to ten-tenths clouds prevailed in the target area, and PFF sightings were necessary. The PFF equipment of the Low Squadron lead ship was operational, but the scope return was so great that the MPI [Mean Point of Impact] could not be discovered by the operator after the first two tangent angle checks; hence, the Low Squadron released on the Group Leader. The High Squadron made its own PFF sighting operation. No interference was reported on the bombing run. The High Squadron reported the C-1 Pilot [Autopilot] functioned satisfactorily, while the Lead Squadron reported a C-1 defect on the aileron axis which did not hinder bombing.
   6.  Flight From Target: After bombs away, at 1109½, the 94th "A" Group followed the Division Formation on the withdrawal, which accounts for a deviation to the east immediately after the target, and two other minor deviations on the route out. The enemy coast was crossed at the briefed point at 1342, twenty-four minutes early, at an altitude of 21,000 feet. The English coast was crossed at Cromer at 1441 at an altitude of 2,500 feet. On the return to base, a course north of briefed was flown because of severe haze and crowded conditions on the briefed route. A normal let-down procedure had been followed.
   7.  Fighter Support: As briefed.
   8.  Comments: Aircraft 43-38432, Pilot Captain Williamson, was reported last seen losing altitude, but under control, just after the target, and is missing in action. Flak at the target was meager and generally inaccurate for the 94th "A" Group. No enemy aircraft were encountered. Information furnished by the Scouting Force was accurate and helpful. As previously noted, nine to ten tenths cloud cover prevailed in the target area, which, together with dense, consistent contrails and haze, made visual observation of the bombing results difficult.
   9.  Aircraft Not Attacking: The two flying spares returned as planned. Aircraft 43-38650, Pilot Lt Kasper, and Aircraft 43-37595, Pilot Lt Butler, both of the Lead Squadron, returned early because of mechanical difficulties. The remaining thirty-four aircraft attacked the secondary target at Berlin (Tegal) Germany.

1. Flight Plan and Log attached.
2. Track Chart attached.
3. Narrative.
   1. T/O at 0700 hours.
   2. Group formed at 0822 hours on Kings Cliffe buncher at 10,000 feet.
   3. Wing assembly was completed at 0854 hours at Clacton.
   4. Route over England was (not) flown as briefed. Leg from W to R out short because of cloud bank on course. From R to V south of course because of cloud. V to U S'ing to lose time.
   5. Methods of Navigation over England. DR [Dead Reckoning], Gee, Pilotage.
   6. Division formation was joined at 1012 hours at 5237 0437E.
   7. Flight to IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run] was not flown as briefed. 
   8. Methods of Navigation to the I.P. DR [Dead Reckoning] Mickey [radar], Gee and pilotage.
   9. BOMB RUN.
      1. Actual I.P. was not as briefed. 
      2. True heading over target. 135°.
      3. Actual Drift +8°.
      4. Altitude over Target 25,000.
      5. Time Bombs Away 1109½.
      6. Wind used for bombing 260°/68 knots.
      7. Method of target identification. PFF
      8. Difficulties on bomb run. None.
      9. Weather over Target. 9/10ths cloud coverage.
      10. Axis of withdrawal 009°
   10. Group rally was accomplished at 52°50'N 13°40'E at 1115 hours.
   11. Wing rally was accomplished at 53°04'N 13°00'E at 1127 hours.
   12. Division rally was accomplished at 53°10'N 12°30'E at 1131 hours.
   13. Flight home was was not as briefed.
   14. Methods of navigation on return route. DR [Dead Reckoning] Mickey, Gee.
   15. Winds aloft were (not) called out to the formation.
   16. Fighter rendezvous' were not as briefed.
   17. PERFORMANCE OF EQUIPMENT.
       1. Mickey [Radar]: OK
       2. Gee: OK
       3. Radio Compass: OK
       4. Fluxgate: OK
       5. Other Equipment OK

1. Flight Plan and Log attached.
2. Track Chart attached.
3. Narrative.
   1. T/O at 0703 hours.
   2. Group formed at 0818 hours on Kings Cliffe buncher at 10,000 feet.
   3. Wing assembly was completed at ____ hours at ____.
   4. Route over England was (not) flown as briefed. 
   5. Methods of Navigation over England. DR [Dead Reckoning], Gee, Pilotage.
   6. Division formation was joined at ____ hours at ____.
   7. Flight to IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run] was not flown as briefed. IP was changed for mickey [radar] run.
   8. Methods of Navigation to the I.P. DR [Dead Reckoning] Mickey [radar] and Gee.
   9. BOMB RUN.
      1. Actual I.P. was not as briefed. 5150 0934.
      2. True heading over target. 125°.
      3. Actual Drift +13°.
      4. Altitude over Target 26,000.
      5. Time Bombs Away 1111.
      6. Wind used for bombing 255°/70 knots.
      7. Method of target identification. PFF
      8. Difficulties on bomb run. Pilot not on interphone.
      9. Weather over Target. 9/10ths cloud coverage.
      10. Axis of withdrawal 010°
   10. Group rally was accomplished at 52°50'N 13°40'E at 1115 hours.
   11. Wing rally was accomplished at ____ at ____ hours.
   12. Division rally was accomplished at ____ at ____ hours.
   13. Flight home was was not as briefed.
   14. Methods of navigation on return route. DR [Dead Reckoning] Mickey, Gee and Pilotage.
   15. Winds aloft were (not) called out to the formation.
   16. Fighter rendezvous' were not as briefed.
   17. PERFORMANCE OF EQUIPMENT.
       1. Mickey [Radar]: OK
       2. Gee: OK
       3. Radio Compass: Unsatisfactory
       4. Fluxgate: OK
       5. Other Equipment OK

1. Flight Plan and Log attached.
2. Track Chart attached.
3. Narrative.
   1. T/O at 0705 hours.
   2. Group formed at 0915 hours on ____ buncher at 18,000 feet.
   3. Wing assembly was completed at ____ hours at ____.
   4. Route over England was (not) flown as briefed. Cut corners at Pts. R, V, U. Departed at CP No. 1.
   5. Methods of Navigation over England. DR [Dead Reckoning], Gee, Mickey [Radar].
   6. Division formation was joined at ____ hours at ____.
   7. Flight to IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run] was not flown as briefed. 
   8. Methods of Navigation to the I.P. DR [Dead Reckoning] Mickey [radar], Gee.
   9. BOMB RUN.
      1. Actual I.P. was not as briefed. Actual IP was 4 mi. north of briefed. Heading to target was 134° T.H. [True Heading] not 108° as briefed.
      2. True heading over target. 134°.
      3. Actual Drift +2°.
      4. Altitude over Target 24,500.
      5. Time Bombs Away 1109½.
      6. Wind used for bombing 253°/68 knots.
      7. Method of target identification. PFF
      8. Difficulties on bomb run. Mickey scope blacked out half way down run.
      9. Weather over Target. 9/10ths.
      10. Axis of withdrawal 010° TH [True Heading]
   10. Group rally was accomplished at 52°50'N 13°40'E at 1115 hours.
   11. Wing rally was accomplished at ____ at ____ hours.
   12. Division rally was accomplished at ____ at ____ hours.
   13. Flight home was was not as briefed.
   14. Methods of navigation on return route. DR [Dead Reckoning] Mickey, Gee.
   15. Winds aloft were (not) called out to the formation.
   16. Fighter rendezvous' were not as briefed.
   17. PERFORMANCE OF EQUIPMENT.
       1. Mickey [Radar]: OK
       2. Gee: OK
       3. Radio Compass: OK
       4. Fluxgate: OK
       5. Other Equipment OK

1. Type of Bombing (Visual, PFF or Combined)?  PFF
2. Did Squadron perform own sighting operation, bomb on smoke marker, or was bombing done in Group Formation? Lead Squadron made own PFF sighting operation. The Low Squadron bombed on the lead squadron on a magnetic heading of 138°.
3. Was turn made at briefed I.P.? Yes
4. Cloud coverage and visibility. 9/10 - 10/10 clouds.
5. If Visual, when was MPI identified? If not actually seen, how was it located? PFF
6. Any Interference on Bomb Run? None
7. Did C-1 [Autopilot] function satisfactory? C-1 did not function satisfactory.
8. Any other factors affecting accuracy? None

Lead Squadron, 94th "A" Group Bombardier - 1st Lt. Henry, Charles F.
Pilot - Lt. Col. Ball, C.F. & Capt. Pryor, C.T.
Navigator - 2nd Lt. Curley, John P.

Aircraft B-17G   B-701  Take-off - 0705 Landed - 1520
Objective - Berlin, Germany
Aiming Point (MPI) [Mean Point of Impact] - PFF
Initial Point - As Briefed
Method of Attack - Squadron, Group
No. of Attacking A/C in Group: - 24   Composite Group - ____
Number A/C Dropping Bombs by own Sighting Operation: One
Deflection and Range Sighting, Group: Lead A/C   Composite Group - ____
Range Sighting only, Group - ____   Composite Group - ____
Bombs, Types and Sizes - 6 x 500 Lb. An M-43 G.P.[General Purpose] & 4 x M17's [Incendiary Bomb], 2 Markers
Number of Bombs Loaded - As Above   Released - Same
Fusing, Nose - 1/10   Tail - 1/100
Synchronization - On PFF

Information at Release Point:   Low Sqdn dropped on Lead Squadron.

Type of Release - Train 140 Feet.
Point of Impact If Seen - Unobserved
Mean Temp. Metro -19.5 Actual -19.5
Winds - Altitude - 26,000 Ft.  Direction - Metro 270°  Actual 260°  Velocity - Metro 70  Actual 68
Temp C. - Metro -45° C. Actual -54° C.

1. Type of Bombing (Visual, PFF or Combined)?  PFF
2. Did Squadron perform own sighting operation, bomb on smoke marker, or was bombing done in Group Formation? High Squadron made own PFF sighting operation.
3. Was turn made at briefed I.P.? Yes
4. Cloud coverage and visibility. 9/10 - 10/10 clouds.
5. If Visual, when was MPI identified? If not actually seen, how was it located? PFF
6. Any Interference on Bomb Run? None
7. Did C-1 [Autopilot] function satisfactory? Yes
8. Any other factors affecting accuracy? None

High Squadron, 94th "A" Group Bombardier - 1st Lt. Reising, Frank H.
Pilot - 1st Lt. Muffett, Winfield F.
Navigator - 1st Lt. Hubbell, Charles H.

Aircraft B-17G   Z-376  Take-off - 0710 Landed - 1530
Objective - Berlin, Germany
Aiming Point (MPI) [Mean Point of Impact] - PFF
Initial Point - As Briefed
Method of Attack - Squadron
No. of Attacking A/C in Group: - 12   Composite Group - ____
Number A/C Dropping Bombs by own Sighting Operation: One
Deflection and Range Sighting, Group: Lead A/C   Composite Group - ____
Range Sighting only, Group - ____   Composite Group - ____
Bombs, Types and Sizes - 6 x 500 Lb. An M-43 G.P.[General Purpose] & 4 x M17's [Incendiary Bomb], 2 Markers
Number of Bombs Loaded - As Above   Released - Same
Fusing, Nose - 1/10   Tail - 1/100
Synchronization - On PFF

Information at Release Point:   

Type of Release - Train 140 Feet.
Point of Impact If Seen - Unobserved
Mean Temp. Metro -19.5 Actual -19.5
Winds - Altitude - 26,000 Ft.  Direction - Metro 270°  Actual 255°  Velocity - Metro 72  Actual 70
Temp C. - Metro -47° C. Actual -48° C.

1. The three Squadrons of this Group attacked the secondary target at Berlin (Tegal) Germany. Bombing was done by PFF methods.
2. The bombs of the lead squadron fell at the eastern edge of the settlement of Blankenfelde, five and a quarter miles NE of the briefed target. The town seems to be 10 to 47% built up and damage will be slight. The bombs of the low squadron will fall into the same general locality but no definite bursts are seen.
3. No bursts are seen from the high squadron. An unidentified pattern of I.B. [Incendiary Bomb] bursts is seen just south of the lead squadron pattern.

1. No leaflets were carried on today's mission.
2. The three squadrons of this group attacked the secondary target at Berlin (Tegal), Germany. Bombing was done by PFF methods. There were occasional breaks in the clouds but the target area could not be seen. Photos show the bombs hitting approximately 4¾ miles NE of the target in the vicinity of the settlement of Blankenfelde. PFF operators experienced difficulty in interpreting scope returns in the general Berlin area.
3. No enemy aircraft were encountered and no claims [of enemy aircraft being shot down] are being submitted.
4. Flak at the target was moderate and generally inaccurate for our formation, though there appeared to be more intense flak tracking to the left on the way in. Meager fairly accurate flak was encountered at Ymuiden, and there were about 12 bursts of inaccurate flak in the vicinity of Fallersleben.
5. There was 9/10ths cloud cover in the target area, and dense persistent contrails plus haze prevented any visual observation of bombing results and made formation flying difficult.
6. There are no observations of military importance.
7. Bombing by the lead and low squadrons was done on the PFF lead A/C of the Group. The high squadron bombed on its own PFF A/C, but because of PFF operational difficulties the low squadron was unable to bomb on its PFF A/C. The Scouting Force furnished helpful information concerning weather in the target area. Fighter support was as briefed. Our A/C 432-P has not yet returned to base and was last seen losing altitude just after bombs away after having been hit by flak at the target. The A/C appeared to be under control but could not stay with the formation. Another A/C, believed to be from the Group just ahead of this Group, was seen to fall smoking over the target, and up to 5 chutes were reported from this B-17.

    508th Squadron:
A/C 799-Q: Air speed too slow. - Lt. Galloway.

    510th Squadron:
A/C 957-D: Too many flares fired during assembly by all planes including lead, leaving everyone in doubt as to which plane actually is the lead ship. - Lt. Gray.

1. Abortives and Flying Spares:
   1. Airplane No. 44-6566, 509th Squadron, returned early as planned.
   2. Airplane No. 43-37595, 509th Squadron, returned early. The Pilot stated that #1 propeller ran away, #1 engine stopped and all instrument readings dropped to zero. Investigation revealed #1 eng. had failed internally - the accessory drive gears were sheared.
   3. Airplane No. 43-37676, 509th Squadron, returned early as planned
   4. Airplane No. 43-38650, 511th Squadron, returned early. The Pilot stated that #2 engine would not give full manifold pressure and he was unable to maintain the formation. Investigation revealed a large hole in the #2 manifold.
2. Battle Damage:
   1. Airplane No. 44-8374, 508th Squadron. Two flak holes underside RH wing panel, damaging skin and tokio tank. One flak skin hole left bomb bay door. One flak skin hole bottom of fuselage, forward of tail gunner's escape hatch. One flak hole left inboard wing panel, damaging skin and rib. Flak skin hole through dorsal fin. Flak skin hole right side of vertical stabilizer. Pilot's window broken. (Major).
   2. Airplane No. 43-38567, 508th Squadron. Flak hit underside LH wing and damaged skin, diagonals, feeder tank and main tank. (Major).
   3. Airplane No. 43-107124, [Plane number should be 42-107124] 510th Squadron. Flak hit #4 nacelle, damaged skin, stringer and circumferential. Two flak holes through right wing, one flak hole through right flap, skin and corrugation damaged. One flak hole through right flap, skin and corrugation damaged. One flak hole through right elevator. Two flak holes through left stabilizer. (Major).
   4. Airplane No. 44-6579, 511th Squadron. Flak hole left wing, skin and tokio tank damaged. Flak hole right wing, skin damage only. (Minor).
   5. Airplane No. 43-38428, 511th Squadron. Flak entered tail section at bottom, damaging skin and ammo belt. Flak damaged fabric of left elevator. Two flak holes left stabilizer, skin and formers damaged. Flak hole entered camera well, skin stringer, and oxygen bottle damaged. Four flak holes left wing, skin corrugation and tokio tank damaged. Flak hole right waist, skin damage only. (Major).
   
   

   TOTAL A/C DAMAGED		MAJOR DAMAGE		MINOR DAMAGE		BY FLAK
   5		4		1		5

1. PILOT'S STATEMENT:
   1. Reason for abortive No. 2 Engine would not give full manifold pressure. Inspection by Engineering Officer revealed that the manifold had a large hole in it.
   2. Place and altitude 52°31'N - 04°45'E [Krommenie, Netherlands] 20,500 Ft.
   3. Time 0946
   4. Position in formation No. 2 in High Element of Lead Squadron.
   5. Disposition of bombs None
   6. Remarks Was unable to maintain Formation.
     (Pilot's Signature) R.R. Kasper, 1st Lt.

1. PILOT'S STATEMENT:
   1. Reason for abortive Lost #1 Engine during climb to Alt. in formation.
   2. Place and altitude 52°22'N - 00°23'E [35 miles ESE of Polebrook]
   3. Time 0840
   4. Position in formation #3 pos. in High Element in Lead Squadron.
   5. Disposition of bombs Brought Back
   6. Remarks Engine ran rough on take-off - Lost oil pressure and fuel pressure and all engine instruments - Feathered immediately.
     (Pilot's Signature) Raymond E. Butler

1. Last Four numbers and Call Letter of A/C in each Squadron:

   a. 94th Combat Wing "A" Group   Lead Squadron - 351st Group
   Sqdn 508th A/C: (U–8374 PFF)
   Sqdn 509th A/C: (B–7701 PFF), O–7595, (F–6566 Spare)
   Sqdn 510th A/C: None
   Sqdn 511th A/C: A–8428, C–8694, B–7524, H–8435, J–6579, K–8585, M–8650, N–8592, P–2676

   
   

   b. 94th "C" Group   Low Squadron - 351st Group
   Sqdn 508th A/C: None
   Sqdn 509th A/C: None
   Sqdn 510th A/C: A–8465, D–7957, F–7124, H–8280, K–7252, L–7515, N–7665, R–7714, S–7512, T–8461, U–7216
   Sqdn 511th A/C: (L–8045 PFF)

   
   

   c. 94th Combat Wing "A" Group   High Squadron - 351st Group
   Sqdn 508th A/C: (Z–8376 PFF), A–8410, B–7349, C–8753, K–8130, L–7956, P–7258, Q–8799, Y–6108
   Sqdn 509th A/C: C–8640, T–1384, (L–7676 Spare)
   Sqdn 510th A/C: None
   Sqdn 511th A/C: None

2. Target: GF-2258
   
3. W/T and R/T Operational Call Sign of each Squadron:

   Squadron	508 [Call Sign]	W/T W2W R/T CARLTON		Squadron	510 [Call Sign]	W/T PTG R/T TIPSTAFF
   Squadron	509 [Call Sign]	W/T JWW R/T HOTMINT		Squadron	511 [Call Sign]	W/T SFA R/T PARTNERSHIP

4. Taxi – 0650; Take-Off – 0705; E.T.D. Field – 0705
   

5. Time:	Height:	Place of Crossing English Coast: (OUT)
   0853	14,000 Ft	Clacton

6. Time:	Height:	Place of Crossing Enemy Coast: (IN)
   0934	22,000 Ft	52°37'N-04°37'E [Egmond aan Zee, Netherlands]

7. Time:	Height:	Place of Crossing Enemy Coast: (Out)
   1417	22,000 Ft	52°37'N-04°37'E [Egmond aan Zee, Netherlands]

8. Time:	Height:	Place of Crossing English Coast: (IN)
   1517	5,000 Ft	Cromer

9. E.T.R.(Estimated Time of Return) Base: 1553 Hours
10. MF/DF [Medium Frequency/Direction Finder] Section: "H"
11. Bomb load of Each A/C: "A" Lead Box
    Lead Squadron: 6 x 500 G.P. - 1/10 x 1/100 Plus 4 M-17 I.B's [Incendiary Bomb] - Fusing 36.97
    Low Squadron: 6 x 500 G.P. - 1/10 x 1/100 Plus 4 M-17 I.B's [Incendiary Bomb] - Fusing 36.97
    High Squadron: 6 x 500 G.P. - 1/10 x 1/100 Plus 4 M-17 I.B's [Incendiary Bomb] - Fusing 36.97
    
12. Fuel Load of each A/C: 2780 Gallons
    
13. Leaders:
    Lead Box: Rank & Name: Lt. Col. Ball A/C No & Sqdn. B-7701 PFF (509)
    Low Box: Rank & Name: Lt Redman A/C No & Sqdn. L-8045 PFF (511)
    High Box: Rank & Name: Lt. Muffett A/C No & Sqdn. Z-8376 PFF (508)
14. Passengers, if any: (Full Name, Rank, A/C and Squadron Passenger flying with)
    None

Report Compiled By I.C. Muesing, S/Sgt.

• A/C# 43-38432   RQ-P  Pilot: Lt. Williamson  A/C's 19th Mission   MACR # 11037

  Aircraft Loss Circumstances:

  Eyewitness Account:
  I, Ralph N. Fox, 0-927077, was flying as Pilot of Aircraft No. 44-6579 on a mission to Berlin, Germany on 5 December 1944. Captain Williamson was leading our element, and I first noticed that he was in trouble when he started falling out of formation over the target. Apparently he was hit by flak as there were no enemy aircraft around. He lost altitude and went down under control with all four engines turning. There were no visible signs of damage, and I saw no parachutes. He went out of sight due to the heavy contrails and clouds. I heard nothing over VHF.
  [Signed] Ralph N. Fox, 2nd Lt, Air Corps.
  
  Eyewitness Account:
  I, Clinton F. Ball, 0-23945, was flying as leader of the 94th Combat Bomb Wing on a mission to Berlin, Germany on 5 December 1944. About ten (10) minutes after bombs away, Captain Williamson called me and asked for fighter support. He was not in serious trouble, but was unable to maintain altitude. Four (4) minutes later I called him and told him to get up on top of the formation so that the fighters could see him and pick him up, but he said he couldn't make it. I heard nothing more from him, and was unable to see anything due to the heavy clouds and contrails. He was flying at approximately 24,000 ft.
  [Signed] Clinton F. Ball, Lt Colonel, Air Corps.
  
  A Summary of Eye-Witness Accounts describes that the plane was hit by flak in top turret and near cockpit.
  

  Individual Accounts of Crewmen Fates:
  • Pilot - Capt Williamson, Henry F. Jr., POW camp not specified in National Archives database. He was Returned to Military Control, Liberated or Repatriated.
  • Co-pilot - 2nd Lt Cadwell, Andrew L. Jr., POW at Stalag Luft 1 Barth-Vogelsang Prussia 54-12, Returned to Military Control, Liberated or Repatriated.
  • Navigator - 2nd Lt Gourash, Andrew A., POW at Stalag Luft 1 Barth-Vogelsang Prussia 54-12, Returned to Military Control, Liberated or Repatriated.
  • Bombardier - F/O Bredar, Joseph R., POW at Stalag Luft 1 Barth-Vogelsang Prussia 54-12, Returned to Military Control, Liberated or Repatriated.
  • Top Turret Gunner - Sgt Shepard, Robert W., POW at Stalag Luft 1 Barth-Vogelsang Prussia 54-12, Returned to Military Control, Liberated or Repatriated.
  • Radio Operator - S/Sgt Peterson, Arthur F., POW at Stalag Luft 1 Barth-Vogelsang Prussia 54-12, Returned to Military Control, Liberated or Repatriated.
  • Waist Gunner - S/Sgt Bishop, Harold A., POW camp not specified in National Archives database. He was Returned to Military Control, Liberated or Repatriated.
  • Ball Turret Gunner - Sgt Coble, John L., POW at Stalag Luft 4 Gross-Tychow (formerly Heydekrug) Pomerania, Prussia (moved to Wobbelin Bei Ludwigslust) (To Usedom Bei Savenmunde) 54-16. Returned to Military Control, Liberated or Repatriated.
  • Tail Gunner - Sgt Smith, Dallas M., POW at Stalag Luft 1 Barth-Vogelsang Prussia 54-12, Returned to Military Control, Liberated or Repatriated.