351st Bomb Group

1. 1. TARGETS: 
   2. Visual Primary: Krefeld-Verdingen, [Germany] [R.R.] Marshalling Yard (GH)
   3. PFF Primary: Dusseldorf M/Y
   4. Visual Secondary: ____
   5. PFF Secondary: ____
   6. Last Resort: Any military objective definitely identified as being in Germany and East of Rhine. 1st Air Division units will not attack last resorts west of their assigned primaries.
   
   

2. TIMINGS:
   Zero Hour:	- 0900
   Stations:	- 0725
   Start Engines:	- 0735
   Taxi:	- 0745
   Take Off:	- 0800
   Target Time:	- 1118
   ETR [Estimated Time    of Return]:	- ____

   
     Gasoline 2,500 Gallons
   
   

3. LOADING:
   Lead -	18 x 250 G.P. [General Purpose] 1/10 – 1/40 [Fuses] Plus 2 M-17 IB's [Incendiary]
   High -	Same
   Low -	Same
   Composite -	___

   
   
4. Intervalometer Settings: ____
   
   
5. Chaff: ____
   
   

6. 	Disposition of Forces	[Bomb Group]	Target	Time of Departure
   	"A" Gp. in 94 CBW [Combat Bomb Wing]	457
   	"B" Gp. in 94 CBW	401
   	"C" Gp. in 94 CBW	351	Krefeld-Verdingen M/Y
   Task Force "A"	1 Div. Lead	41st "A"	Neuss M/Y	1002
   	2nd CBW	41st "B"	Neuss M/Y	1004
   	3rd CBW	41st "C"	Neuss M/Y	1006
   	4th CBW	94th "A"	Krefeld-Verdingen	1008
   	5th CBW	94th "B"	Krefeld-Verdingen	1010
   	6th CBW	94th "C"	Krefeld-Verdingen	1012
   Task Force "B"	1 Div. Lead	40th "A"
   	2nd CBW	40th "B"
   	3rd CBW	1st "A"
   	4th CBW	1st "B"
   	5th CBW	1st "C"
   2nd Div.	12 Grps.	Koblens Area
   3rd Div.	14 Grps.	Hamburg Area

   
   PFF A/C to fly as: Lead & Deputy Lead of Lead [Squadron], Lead of High [Squadron], Lead ship Combination.
   REMARKS:
    ____
   
7. Fighter Cover: 1 Gps. of P-47’s Close Support
   
   
8. Other Forces: 6 Groups P-51, 1 Group P-47.
   
   
9. Assembly:

   Lead at	17,000'	feet on	Kings Cliffe	Buncher
   High at	18,000'	feet on	Kings Cliffe	Buncher
   Low at	16,000'	feet on	Kings Cliffe	Buncher
   401st at	17,000'	feet on	Cottesmore	Buncher
   457th at	17,000'	feet on	Glatton	Buncher
   Composite at	____	feet on	____	Buncher

   
   Combat Wing Assembly Line: ____
   Division Assembly Line: ____
   
   
10. Navigator - _____
    
    
11. S-2 - _____
    
    
12. Weather - _____
    
    
13. Special Instructions:
     a. Type of Bombing Formation - Normal
     b. Bombardier and Navigator of the #3 A/C of each sqdn. report to Photo Lab.
      They are: Lead - Q-116, High - A-410, Low - T-461
     c. Camera A/C   V-854, Q-799, A-465
      to return at  ____
     d. Spares to turn back at Continental Coast.
     e. REMARKS: Some PW's [Prisoners of War] tell of 5 day trip after crossing Rhine. Bombing is doing plenty of good.
     Every precaution will be used to insure [sic] no Bombs dropped on friendly territory.
    
      BREAK!!  PILOT’S STAY!
    
    
14. CALL SIGNS:

    	CALL SIGN	FLARES	NAME
    351st	Woodcraft Charlie
    401st	Woodcraft Baker
    457th	Woodcraft Able
    1st Div. Air Commander
    94th CBW Air Commander			Major Maguire

    
    

    Fighters	Balance 3-3
    Bombers	Vinegrove 3-6
    Grnd. Control	Mohair - Colgate

    
    

    Control Points:		Fighter Reference Points:
    C.P. 1 - Clacton		O - Zwolle
    C.P. 2 - 51°22’N-03°22’E		W - Dummer Lake
    [Het Zwindorp, Netherlands]		O - Hamburg
    _____		W - Cuxhaven
    _____		N - Bremen
    _____		E - Hannover
    _____		R - Dummer Lake
    _____		S - Zwolle
    _____		H - Koln
    _____		I - Koblenz
    _____		P - Trier

    Remarks: Reference Altitude: 22,000’
    
    
15. Ships To Monitor [Radio Channels A, B, C & D]
    1. Channel “A” - All monitor except:
    2. Channel “B” - M-964, F-124, C-753,
    3. Channel “C” - 67th F.W. [Fighter Wing] U-591
    4. Channel “C” - 8th A.F. [Air Force] C-640
    5. Channel “D” - Available to all except Y-034, Z-376, G-078, D-957
    
    
16. FLYING CONTROL:
    1. Runway on Take Off. ____
    2. Expected Runway on return. ____
    3. Emergency Airfields on Continent. ____

1. Date of Mission - 31 December, 1944.
   1. Target Attacked:  The Low Squadron attacked the primary target at Krefeld-Uerdingen, Germany by GH methods with a visual assist.
   2. Force: 94th "C" Group; Thirty-eight aircraft, including one GH ship, two PFF ships, and two flying spares, were dispatched.
   3. Position: Briefed to fly as the sixth group in the Division Formation.
   4. Lead Teams

      	Group Lead
      	Group Leader:	Major Mortimer L. Korges
      	Pilot:	Captain William R. Logan
      	Navigator:	1st Lt. Joseph A. Glover
      	Bombardier:	1st Lt. Wayne R. Smith

      
      

      	High Squadron
      	Pilot:	1st Lt. Winfield F. Muffett
      	Co-Pilot:	1st Lt. William C. Kniering
      	Navigator:	1st Lt. Charles H. Hubbell
      	Bombardier:	1st Lt. Frank H. Reising

      
      

      	Low Squadron
      	Pilot:	Captain John T. Eickhoff
      	Co-Pilot:	1st Lt. Francis W. Gray
      	Navigator:	1st Lt. William A. Mars
      	Bombardier:	2nd Lt. Elsmer W. Kreeger

2. Narrative.
   1.  Squadron and Group Assembly: The assembly was carried out at the King's Cliffe buncher without unusual difficulty at the briefed altitude of 17,000 feet.
   2.  Route Over England: Departure from the assembly area was made at the briefed time (0933). The route followed was slightly inside and to the right of the briefed route in order to permit the 94th "C" Group to get into the proper position behind the 94th "B" Group. The 94th "A" Group was observed shortly after the assembly taking a southeasterly heading. It evidently flew ahead of its briefed spot in the Division Formation. The briefed route was contacted just south of Norwich. From that point to Clacton, the briefed route was closely followed in staying in position behind the 94th "B" Group. Clacton, the departure point from the English coast, was reached three minutes early (1011) at an altitude of 21,500 feet, 500 feet above the briefed altitude.
   3.  Division Assembly Line: Departure from the English coast was made at Clacton. The briefed Division Assembly Line, however, was not followed. The 94th "C" Group was in last position in the Division Formation, although it had been briefed to fly as sixth group. Evidently the groups scheduled to follow it in the formation had reached the departure point early and so had proceeded on the flight ahead of their briefed positions. The Division column was followed in the flight across the channel, and the Belgian coast was crossed to the south of the briefed point at an altitude of 26,500 feet, 500 feet above the briefed altitude. At that point, the 94th "C" Group was seven minutes ahead of the time briefed for the planned entry point.
   4.  Flight to Target: The Division column was followed in the variance to the south of the briefed route. The briefed route was not contacted before the primary target was reached. The formation approached the briefed route north of Antwerp and flew parallel and to the right of it to the IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run]. The IP used for the first run on the primary target was three miles south of the briefed IP and was reached 8 minutes late (1120). The altitude at that point was 26,700 feet, 300 feet below the briefed altitude.
   5.  Description of Bombing Run: The run on the primary target was started, using the GH equipment to pick up the target. This decision to bomb by GH had been made after a report from the Weather Scouting Force indicated that the cloud cover at the target was seven to eight tenths. The GH equipment was found to be working poorly on the bomb run, and so the Lead Bombardier made an attempt to make a visual sighting on the target. However, by the time this change was made, too little time was left to make a run on the target, and the Lead and High Squadrons held their bombs. The lead aircraft of the Low Squadron was not informed that the target was not to be attacked on the first run. The lead bombardier of the Low Squadron, still thinking that it was a GH run as they continued on over the target in group formation, killed for rate when it became apparent that a visual sighting could be made through holes in the clouds. Visibility was good. The C-1 Pilot [Autopilot] was used and functioned satisfactorily. After passing over the Primary target, the Lead and High Squadrons executed a 360° turn to the left and made a second run on the target. Due to the fact that the Directional Arm Lock on the bombsight did not release properly, bombs could not be dropped on this run.
       The two squadrons passed over the primary target a second time and made a turn to the north towards the target of opportunity at Munchen-Gladbach, Germany. The target was believed to be east of the restricted bombing line. The bombardier reported that a visual sighting could be made on a marshalling yard and received the Group Leader's permission to bomb. There was slight cloud cover over the target and the visibility was reported as fair. No interference was encountered on the bomb run. The C-1 Pilot was rough on the start of the run, but improved as the run progressed.
       The High Squadron had followed the Lead Squadron in the aforementioned maneuvers and also bombed the same target. The High Squadron was half a mile behind the Lead Squadron when the Lead Squadron dropped its bombs. Instead of dropping his bombs then and hitting short, the Lead Bombardier of the High Squadron followed the smoke markers of the Lead Squadron down and killed for rate ahead of where they landed. The High Squadron Leader was briefed to drop on the Lead Squadron if bombing was to be done by GH methods or if a visual run was not called. No indication was given as to whether the run was visual or GH during the run.
   6.  Flight From Target: After attacking the target of opportunity, the Lead and High Squadrons contacted the briefed route and followed it with very slight variance on the withdrawal. The Low Squadron, after attacking the primary target, had not waited for the other two squadrons, but had followed the other groups of the Division on the withdrawal route. The Belgian coast was crossed at the briefed point 37 minutes late (1243) at an altitude of 16,500 feet. From that point to the English coast there was no variance from course. Just inside of the English coast, it was necessary to make a dog-leg to the left of course in order to avoid bad weather on the briefed route. It was also necessary to cut off the last turn before reaching base because of weather. A normal let-down procedure had been followed.
   7.  Fighter Support: Very thin.
   8.  Comments: No aircraft were lost. No enemy aircraft were encountered. Meager to moderate, fairly accurate continuous following flak was encountered in the general target area and in the vicinity of Dusseldorf while the 360° turn was being made. PFF aircraft were used as navigational aids. The Scouting Force's weather information indicated blind bombing, but it was found that visual bombing was possible. One of our aircraft [Lt Foreman A/C # 44-6156 R], after aborting and landing at the 303rd Group's base [Molesworth], used one of their aircraft to complete the mission. This aircraft flew with the 398th Group and attacked its target.
       The Group Leader reported that his impression of the track over the target area was as follows: After the 360° turn a southwesterly heading was taken while going over the target the second time. The turn to the north and towards the target of opportunity was to the left, rather than to the right, as indicated on the Track Chart.
       Strong winds from the north were encountered in the target area and undoubtedly were responsible for the impression of the Group Leader that the bombardier had selected a target of opportunity that was east of the restricted bombing area.
   9.  Aircraft Not Attacking: Not including the aircraft which aborted and took off again with a 303rd Group aircraft, there were three abortives. Two of these were replaced by flying spares.

1. Flight Plan and Log attached.
2. Track Chart attached.
3. Narrative.
   1. T/O [Take Off] at 0752 hours.
   2. Group formed at 0930 hours on Kings Cliffe buncher at 17,000 feet.
   3. Wing assembly was completed at 1000 hours at Norwich.
   4. Route over England was not flown as briefed. 
   5. Methods of Navigation over England. Gee and Pilotage.
   6. Division formation was joined at 1030 hours at mid-channel.
   7. Flight to IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run] was (not) flown as briefed. South of course to stay in division column.
   8. Methods of Navigation to the I.P. Gee, pilotage, mickey [radar] and DR [Dead Reckoning].
   9. BOMB RUN.
      1. Actual I.P. was (not) as briefed. 3 runs made on primary. On final run approx. IP was 5056 0620E
      2. True heading over target. 17.
      3. Actual Drift 7° Right.
      4. Altitude over Target 27,500.
      5. Time Bombs Away 1155.
      6. Wind used for bombing 360°/95 knots.
      7. Method of target identification. Pilotage
      8. Difficulties on bomb run.
          1st run: too short for Bombardier to make a good run.
          2nd run: Bombsight malfunction.
          3rd run: Primary obscured by clouds.
         
      9. Weather over Target. 3 to 8/10ths cloud.
      10. Axis of withdrawal 247°
   10. Group rally was accomplished at none at ____ hours.
   11. Wing rally was accomplished at none at ____ hours.
   12. Division rally was accomplished at none at ____ hours.
   13. Flight home was was not as briefed.
   14. Methods of navigation on return route. Mickey, DR [Dead Reckoning] and Gee.
   15. Winds aloft were not called out to the formation.
   16. Fighter rendezvous' were not as briefed.
   17. PERFORMANCE OF EQUIPMENT.
       1. Mickey [Radar]: OK
       2. Gee:  OK
       3. Radio Compass: OK
       4. Fluxgate: OK
       5. Other Equipment OK

1. Flight Plan and Log attached.
2. Track Chart attached.
3. Narrative.
   1. T/O at 0759 hours.
   2. Group formed at 0933 hours on Kings Cliffe buncher at 17,000 feet.
   3. Wing assembly was completed at 0947 hours at 52°51'N 00°13'E [at the coast near Gedney Drove End, England].
   4. Route over England was (not) flown as briefed. 
   5. Methods of Navigation over England. Gee and DR [Dead Reckoning]
   6. Division formation was joined at 1000 hours at Norwich.
   7. Flight to IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run] was (not) flown as briefed. 10-12 miles south of course but in division column.
   8. Methods of Navigation to the I.P. Gee, pilotage and DR.
   9. BOMB RUN.
      1. Actual I.P. was (not) as briefed. 51°00'N 06°16'E [1 mile WNW of Glimbach, Germany].
      2. True heading over target. 20.
      3. Actual Drift -16.
      4. Altitude over Target 28,500.
      5. Time Bombs Away 1156½.
      6. Wind used for bombing 360°/108 knots.
      7. Method of target identification. Pilotage and DR
      8. Difficulties on bomb run. Group leader led us back and forth all over the Ruhr [Valley].
      9. Weather over Target. 6/10ths at 10,000'.
      10. Axis of withdrawal 270°
   10. Group rally was accomplished at ____ at ____ hours.
   11. Wing rally was accomplished at ____ at ____ hours.
   12. Division rally was accomplished at ____ at ____ hours.
   13. Flight home was was not [sic] as briefed.
   14. Methods of navigation on return route. Gee and Pilotage.
   15. Winds aloft were not called out to the formation.
   16. Fighter rendezvous' were not as briefed.
   17. PERFORMANCE OF EQUIPMENT.
       1. Mickey [Radar]: OK
       2. Gee:  OK
       3. Radio Compass: OK
       4. Fluxgate: OK
       5. Other Equipment OK

1. Flight Plan and Log attached.
2. Track Chart attached.
3. Narrative.
   1. T/O [Take Off] at 0801 hours.
   2. Group formed at 0925 hours on Kings Cliffe buncher at 17,000 feet.
   3. Wing assembly was completed at ____ hours at ____.
   4. Route over England was not flown as briefed. 
   5. Methods of Navigation over England. DR [Dead Reckoning], Gee, Pilotage.
   6. Division formation was joined at ____ hours at ____.
   7. Flight to IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run] was (not) flown as briefed. 10-15 mi. South of course from Clacton to primary - in Division column.
   8. Methods of Navigation to the I.P. Pilotage, Gee and DR [Dead Reckoning].
   9. BOMB RUN.
      1. Actual I.P. was (not) as briefed. 5145 0540.
      2. True heading over target. ___.
      3. Actual Drift -12.
      4. Altitude over Target 26,000.
      5. Time Bombs Away 1133.
      6. Wind used for bombing 005°/65 knots.
      7. Method of target identification. Pilotage points.
      8. Difficulties on bomb run. Wing formation made course difficult to kill.
      9. Weather over Target. 2/10ths covered.
      10. Axis of withdrawal 180° (general).
   10. Group rally was accomplished at ____ at ____ hours.
   11. Wing rally was accomplished at ____ at ____ hours.
   12. Division rally was accomplished at ____ at ____ hours.
   13. Flight home was was not as briefed. Flew from 10 mi. South of briefed rally point with 2nd Div. escort.
   14. Methods of navigation on return route. Gee, Pilotage and DR [Dead Reckoning].
   15. Winds aloft were (not) called out to the formation.
   16. Fighter rendezvous' were not as briefed.
   17. PERFORMANCE OF EQUIPMENT.
       1. Mickey [Radar]: ____
       2. Gee:    OK
       3. Radio Compass: OK
       4. Fluxgate: OK
       5. Other Equipment OK

1. Set Take off Time and check with duty officer.
2. Work complete flight plan.
3. Obtain time tick and check hack and take-off time with Glatton & Deenethorpe.
4. Call duty clerk one hour before briefing.
    Stations: 0625 Start Engines: 0635 Taxi: 0645 Take off: 0700
   
        BRIEFING CHECK LIST
   
   

1. Give time tick.
2. Group will assemble over Kings Cliffe at  17,000  feet.
3. Wing will assemble on a line from Norwich to  Clacton .
4. Division assembly line is from Clacton to ____
5. Climb will start at Holbeach and the bombing altitude of  27,000 will be reached at  IP.
6. Route to target and special navigation instructions.
7. Axis of attack is  108 magnetic and the distance from the I.P. [Initial Point of Bomb Run] to the Target is  40 nautical miles.
8. Turn after the target is to the  Rt.  to a heading of  273 magnetic.
9. Route back and special navigation instructions.
10. Start descent at ____. Cross enemy coast at  10,000 feet and enter English coast at 6.000 feet.
11. Point for instrument let down is  Kings Cliffe mag. heading of  80.
12. Total time of mission is  5 [hours] total distance is ____.
    Time over 10,000 feet is  4 [hours]. [Oxygen needed over 10,000 feet.]
13. Deadline for last take off is  0820 and point to intercept the group is Clacton at  21,000 feet.
14. CHECK YOUR WORK.

1. Type of Bombing (Visual, PFF or Combined)?  Visual
2. Did Squadron perform own sighting operation, bomb on smoke marker, or was bombing done in Group Formation? Lead Squadron made own sighting operation.
3. Was turn made at briefed I.P.? 50°56'N., 06°20'E [1 mile NW of Jülich, Germany]
4. Cloud coverage and visibility. Slight cloud over target, but visibility was fair.
5. If Visual, when was MPI identified? If not actually seen, how was it located? The north section of M/Y was picked as an MPI [Mean Point of Impact] sixty seconds before "Bombs Away".
6. Any Interference on Bomb Run? None
7. Did C-1 [Autopilot] function satisfactory? C-1 was rough at the start of the run, but improved as run progressed.
8. Any other factors affecting accuracy? None

Lead Squadron, 94th "C" Group Bombardier - 1st Lt. Smith, Wayne T.
Pilot - Major Korges, M.L. & Capt. Logan, W.R.
Navigator - 1st Lt. Glover, Joseph A.

Aircraft B-17G   Y-034  Take-off - 0745 Landed - 1415
Objective - M/Y at Gladbach, Germany (Target Of Opportunity)
Aiming Point (MPI) [Mean Point of Impact] - North section of M/Y
Initial Point - 50°56'N., 06°20'E
Method of Attack - Squadron - Group
No. of Attacking A/C in Group: - 24   Composite Group - ____
Number A/C Dropping Bombs by own Sighting Operation: ____
Deflection and Range Sighting, Group: One   Composite Group - ____
Range Sighting only, Group - One   Composite Group - ____
Bombs, Types and Sizes - 18 x 250 Lb., AN-M57 G.P.[General Purpose] & 2 x M-17 I.B.'s & Markers
Number of Bombs Loaded - As Above   Released - Same
Fusing, Nose - 1/10   Tail - 1/40
Synchronization - On

Information at Release Point:

Type of Release - Train 30'
Point of Impact If Seen - Unobserved
Mean Temp. Metro -22 Actual -__
Winds - Altitude - 26,000 Ft.  Direction - Metro 350°  Actual 350°  Velocity - Metro 80  Actual 90
Temp C. - Metro -46° C. Actual -43° C.

1. Type of Bombing (Visual, PFF or Combined)?  Combined - See Reverse Side.
2. Did Squadron perform own sighting operation, bomb on smoke marker, or was bombing done in Group Formation? See Reverse Side.
3. Was turn made at briefed I.P.? 51°00'N., 06°16'E [Glimbach, Germany]
4. Cloud coverage and visibility. Fair.
5. If Visual, when was MPI identified? If not actually seen, how was it located? -
6. Any Interference on Bomb Run? None
7. Did C-1 [Autopilot] function satisfactory? C-1 Pilot was not used.
8. Any other factors affecting accuracy? See Reverse Side

Lead Squadron, 94th "C" Group Bombardier - 1st Lt. Reising, Frank H.
Pilot - 1st Lt. Muffett, Winfield F.
Navigator - 1st Lt. Hubbell, Charles H.

Aircraft B-17G   L-045  Take-off - 0759 Landed - 1450
Objective - M/Y at Gladbach, Germany (Target Of Opportunity)
Aiming Point (MPI) [Mean Point of Impact] - Markers of Lead Sqdn. and killed for rate with B.S. [Bombsight]
Initial Point - 51°00'N., 06°16'E
Method of Attack - Squadron - Group
No. of Attacking A/C in Group: - 24   Composite Group - ____
Number A/C Dropping Bombs by own Sighting Operation: ____
Deflection and Range Sighting, Group: One   Composite Group - ____
Range Sighting only, Group - One   Composite Group - ____
Bombs, Types and Sizes - 18 x 250 Lb., AN-M57 G.P.[General Purpose] & 2 x M-17 I.B.'s & Markers
Number of Bombs Loaded - As Above   Released - Same
Fusing, Nose - 1/10   Tail - 1/40
Synchronization - On

Information at Release Point:

Type of Release - Train 30'
Point of Impact If Seen - Unobserved
Mean Temp. Metro -22 Actual -22
Winds - Altitude - 26,000 Ft.  Direction - Metro 350°  Actual 360°  Velocity - Metro 80  Actual 108
Temp C. - Metro -46° C. Actual -42° C.

1. Type of Bombing (Visual, PFF or Combined)?  See Reverse Side.
2. Did Squadron perform own sighting operation, bomb on smoke marker, or was bombing done in Group Formation? Sighting was for rate only.
3. Was turn made at briefed I.P.? 51°45'N., 05°40'E [½ mile NW of Reek, Germany]
4. Cloud coverage and visibility. Good
5. If Visual, when was MPI identified? If not actually seen, how was it located? See Reverse Side.
6. Any Interference on Bomb Run?  -
7. Did C-1 [Autopilot] function satisfactory? Yes
8. Any other factors affecting accuracy? See Reverse Side.

Lead Squadron, 94th "C" Group Bombardier - 2nd Lt. Kreeger, Elmer W.
Pilot - 1st Lt. Gray, Francis W.
Navigator - 1st Lt. Mars, William A.

Aircraft B-17G   D-957  Take-off - 0801 Landed - 1430
Objective - M/Y [RR Marshalling Yard] at Krefeld-Uerdingen, Germany
Aiming Point (MPI) [Mean Point of Impact] - G.H. with visual Assist - N.E. part of yards.
Initial Point - 51°45'N., 05°40'E [½ mile NW of Reek, Germany]
Method of Attack - Squadron
No. of Attacking A/C in Group: - 12   Composite Group - ____
Number A/C Dropping Bombs by own Sighting Operation: ____
Deflection and Range Sighting, Group: One   Composite Group - ____
Range Sighting only, Group - ___   Composite Group - ____
Bombs, Types and Sizes - 18 x 250 Lb., AN-M57 G.P.[General Purpose] & 2 x M-17 I.B.'s & Markers
Number of Bombs Loaded - As Above   Released - Same
Fusing, Nose - 1/10   Tail - 1/40
Synchronization - On

Information at Release Point:

Type of Release - Train 30'
Point of Impact If Seen - Unobserved
Mean Temp. Metro -22 Actual -__
Winds - Altitude - 26,000 Ft.  Direction - Metro 350°  Actual 260°  Velocity - Metro 80K  Actual 7K0
Temp C. - Metro -46° C. Actual -42° C.

1. The assigned primary target for the three squadrons of this Group was the M/Y [R.R. Marshalling Yard] at Krefeld-Uerdingen, Germany. The low squadron, bombing by GEE-H with visual assist, attacked the primary target; the lead and high squadrons bombed visually a target of opportunity at Munchen-Gladbach, Germany. Photo coverage is fair for the low squadron, poor for the lead squadron, and clouds obscure the bursts of the high squadron.
2. The bombs of the low squadron fell across a road and railroad junction 2¾ miles southeast of the city of Krefeld-Uerdingen. The pattern is 4,700 feet by 2,150 feet.
3. The bombs of the high squadron hit in the southern half of the built-up area of Gladbach. This section is well built up with both residences and industry. The heaviest concentration measures 2,250 feet by 1,125 feet. Approximately 18 bursts can be plotted 4,500 feet to the southwest of the main pattern.
4. The bombs of the lead squadron can be seen falling into the northern half of the built-up area of Gladbach, near a M/Y, but no bursts can be seen on the ground because of cloud formations.

1. No leaflets were carried on today's mission.
2. The Lead and High Squadrons of this Group bombed as a target of opportunity the city of Gladbach, Germany; the bombs of the Lead Squadron hit in the southern built-up portion of the city, approximately two (2) miles from the center of the city. The section seems to be well built-up, with both residences and industry. The bombs of the High Squadron can be seen from photographs falling into the Northeastern section of the upper city near railroad M/Y [Marshalling Yard], but no bursts can be seen on the ground because of cloud. The Low Squadron bombed the primary target at Krefeld-Uerdingen, Germany, by G-H method with visual assist; the bombs fell across a road and railroad junction 2¾ths miles southeast of the city. A bombsight malfunction in the lead A/C forced the Lead and High Squadrons to bomb other than the briefed target.
3. No e/a [enemy aircraft] were encountered; no claims [of enemy aircraft being shot down] are therefore being submitted.
4. Meager to moderate, fairly accurate continuous following flak was encountered in the general target area and in the vicinity of Dusseldorf while the 360 degree turn was being made.
5. 4-5/10ths low clouds in the target area. A GH run was first made on the primary target, but bombing on that target was finally done visually when it was found that breaks in the clouds would enable visual bombing.
6. One aircraft reports seeing three chutes going down near the Dutch coast and apparently over land at 5130N. - 0410E. at 1050 hours. There was no aircraft in trouble observed at this time. Another A/C reported seeing two chutes going down in similar fashion and with no aircraft in difficulty in sight at 5122N.- 0320E. near the coast on the route In. This was at 1038 hours.
7. PFF aircraft were used as navigational aids. The Scouting Force's weather information indicated blind bombing, but it was found that visual bombing was possible. Fighter support was very thin. One of our A/C flew with the 398th Group after having been separated from our formation and bombed their target. Another of our A/C had mechanical difficulties and bombed a target of opportunity at Grevenbraich with unobserved results. None of our A/C is missing.

    508th Squadron:
A/C 753-C: 1st. Bomb Division check list not complete - suggest use of old check list. - Lt. Crutcher.
      VHF should have been used after first dry run to announce intention of lead crew, and also to have used ABC channel
      for other ships on it. - Lt. Crutcher.
A/C 428-A: One run is plenty. - Lt. Beringer

    509th Squadron:
A/C 854-V: Power was too high and formation badly strung out. - Lt. Johnson.
A/C 843-P: I don't like circling around German towns. - Lt. Gallamore.
A/C 591-U: Don't like doing 360's in target area. - Lt. Gwyn.
A/C 384-T: Stud of new modified RF27 unit was not on navigator's flimsy. Suggest it be put on flimsy as well as frequency for
      regular RF27 unit for Cologne and Reims Chains. - Lt. Clark.

    510th Squadron:
A/C 124-F: The ammunition should be loaded again immediately after a gunnery mission in preparation for a regular mission. -
      Lt. Carle.
A/C 465-A: When you make a 360 turn hold it so they can keep the formation together. - Lt. Gonske.

1. Abortives and Flying Spares:
   1. Airplane No. 44-6108, 508th Squadron returned early because #1 engine failed internally on climb.
   2. Airplane No. 44-6156, 509th Squadron returned early because #3 engine failed shortly after take-off.
   3. Airplane No. 42-97252, 510th Squadron returned early because #2 engine lost manifold pressure. Aircraft returned to base and upon investigation it was found that the exhaust collector ring clamp had broken between #5 and #6 cylinders of #2 engine.
   4. Airplane No. 43-38585, 511th Squadron returned early. #2 engine was reported rough and a loss of manifold pressure on #1 and #3 engines. This aircraft left formation and returned to home station, crashed on landing leaving no way of checking engine malfunctions.
2. Battle Damage:
   1. Airplane No. 43-37964, 509th Squadron. Flak hole in leading edge of left wing outer panel, skin, spar, and stiffner [sic] damaged. (Major)
   
   

   TOTAL A/C DAMAGED		MAJOR DAMAGE		DAMAGED BY FLAK
   1		1		1

1. PILOT'S STATEMENT:
   1. Reason for abortive #1 Eng. went out - #'s 2, 3 & 4 also in bad shape.
   2. Place and altitude 51°21'N, 03°35'E [Schoondjke, Netherlands]  25,000'
   3. Time 1036
   4. Position in formation #4 Lead of High Element
   5. Disposition of bombs Channel, 51°27'N, 02°00'E [25.72 miles ENE of Margate, England]
   6. Remarks Engines should be changed before 454 hours.
     (Pilot's Signature) Carl L Stahl

1. PILOT'S STATEMENT:
   1. Reason for abortive Drop in #3 manifold pressure - reason undetermined
   2. Place and altitude Kings Cliffe Buncher 18,000 ft.
   3. Time 0940
   4. Position in formation #3 high element - high squadron
   5. Disposition of bombs Brought Back
   6. Remarks ____
     (Pilot's Signature) Clyde W. Armstrong

1. PILOT'S STATEMENT:
   1. Reason for abortive: Loss of power on Number 2 Engine due to broken collar on exhaust stack.
   2. Place and altitude: 50 miles inside Belgium at 24,000 ft.
   3. Time: 10:15
   4. Position in formation: Lead of low element in Low Sqdn.
   5. Disposition of bombs: Returned to Base.
   6. Remarks: None
     (Pilot's Signature) Junior W. Miller

1. Last Four numbers and Call Letter of A/C in each Squadron:

   a. 94th Combat Wing "C" Group   Lead Squadron - 351st Group
   Sqdn 508th A/C: (Z–8376 PFF),
   Sqdn 509th A/C: C–8640, G–6078, M–7964, P–7843, Q–8116, T–1384, V–7854, U–8591, Z–7696, (G–8070 Spare)
   Sqdn 510th A/C: None
   Sqdn 511th A/C: None
   Sqdn 526th A/C: (Y–8034 GH 379th BG)

   
   

   b. 94th Combat Wing "C" Group   Low Squadron - 351st Group
   Sqdn 508th A/C: None
   Sqdn 509th A/C: None
   Sqdn 510th A/C: A–8465, B–6610, D–7957, F–7124, K–7252, M–9001, T–8461, U–7216
   Sqdn 511th A/C: F–7705, J–6579, N–8592, U–7381

   
   

   c. 94th Combat Wing "C" Group   High Squadron - 351st Group
   Sqdn 508th A/C: A–8410, C–8753, D–8405, L–7956, O–8277, Q–8799, Y–6108
   Sqdn 509th A/C: None
   Sqdn 510th A/C: None
   Sqdn 511th A/C: (L–8405 PFF), A–8428, K–8585, M–8650, X–6802, (H–8435 Spare)

2. Target: GH-611
   
3. W/T and R/T Operational Call Sign of each Squadron:

   Squadron	508 [Call Sign]	W/T PRW R/T CARLTON		Squadron	510 [Call Sign]	W/T PCQ R/T TIPSTAFF
   Squadron	509 [Call Sign]	W/T RCR R/T HOTMINT		Squadron	511 [Call Sign]	W/T KLT R/T PARTNERSHIP

4. Taxi – 0745; Take-Off – 0800; E.T.D. Field – 0800
   

5. Time:	Height:	Place of Crossing English Coast: (OUT)
   1014	21,000 Ft	Clacton

6. Time:	Height:	Place of Crossing Enemy Coast: (IN)
   1038	26,000 Ft	51°22'N-03°22'E [Het Zwindorp, Netherlands]

7. Time:	Height:	Place of Crossing Enemy Coast: (Out)
   1202	10,000 Ft	51°22'N-03°22'E [Het Zwindorp, Netherlands]

8. Time:	Height:	Place of Crossing English Coast: (IN)
   1237	6,000 Ft	Felixstowe

9. E.T.R.(Estimated Time of Return) Base: 1319 Hours
10. MF/DF [Medium Frequency/Direction Finder] Section: "H"
11. Bomb load of Each A/C: "A" Lead Box
    Lead Squadron: 13 A/C - 18 x 250 G.P. - 1/10 x 1/40 + 2 M-17 IB's [Incendiary Bomb]
    Low Squadron: 12 A/C - 18 x 250 G.P. - 1/10 x 1/40 + 2 M-17 IB's [Incendiary Bomb]
    High Squadron: 13 A/C - 18 x 250 G.P. - 1/10 x 1/40 + 2 M-17 IB's [Incendiary Bomb]
    ___ Squadron:
    
12. Fuel Load of each A/C: 2500 Gallons
    
13. Leaders:
    Lead Sqdn: Rank & Name: Maj. Korges A/C No & Sqdn. Y-8034 GH (526 Sqdn. 379th BG)
    Low Sqdn: Rank & Name: Lt. Gray A/C No & Sqdn. D-7957 (510)
    High Sqdn: Rank & Name: Lt. Muffett A/C No & Sqdn. L-8045 (511)
14. Passengers, if any: (Full Name, Rank, A/C and Squadron Passenger flying with)
    None

Report Compiled By _____