Briefing Outline:
-
- TARGETS:
- Visual Primary: Comm. [Communications] Center, Bitburg [Germany]
- PFF Primary: Koblenz - Marshalling Yds.
- Visual Secondary:
- PFF Secondary:
- Last Resort: Any military objective positively identified as being in Germany & not prohibited by existing regulations.
-
TIMINGS: | | | |
Zero Hour: | - 1000 | | |
Stations: | - 0750 | | |
Start Engines: | - 0800 | | |
Taxi: | - 0810 | | |
Take Off: | - 0825 | | |
Target Time: | - ____ | | |
ETR [Estimated Time of Return]: | - ____ | | |
Last T/O [Take-Off] 0921
Gasoline 2,780 Gallons
-
LOADING: | |
Lead - | 12 x 500# G.P. [General Purpose] 1/10 – 1/40 [Fuses] |
High - | Same |
Low - | Same |
Composite - | ___ |
-
Intervalometer Settings: Visual – Salvo.; 50 Ft. if P.F.F. or GH
-
Chaff: Commence release 6 mins. after I.P. & continue for 24 mins. Each A/C will carry 576 units.
-
Disposition of Forces | [Bomb Group] | Target | Time of Departure |
"A" Gp. in 94 CBW [Combat Bomb Wing] | 351st | Bitburg | |
"B" Gp. in 94 CBW | 457th | Bitburg | |
"C" Gp. in 94 CBW | 401st | Bitburg | |
1 Div. Lead | 351st | Bitburg | |
2nd CBW | 41st | Blankenheim, Kall Germund, Euskirchen | |
3rd CBW | 40th | Blankenheim, Kall Germund, Euskirchen | |
4th CBW | -- | | |
2nd Div. | 300 A/C | Tactical Targets S.E. of 1st Div. Targets | |
3rd Div. | 396 A/C | Bielefield, Ruthen, Cologne | |
PFF A/C to fly as: Lead A/C is combined GH & PFF. PFF in Deputy Group Lead and Lead of High Squadron. Low Sqdn - Visual Lead.
REMARKS: ____
-
Fighter Cover: Six Gps. of P-51’s - 2 Groups of P51's Close Support. 1 Group of P-47's
-
Other Forces: 4 - P-51's - [Call Sign] Buckeye Red in target area.
-
Assembly:
Lead at | 16,000' | feet on | Kings Cliffe | Buncher |
High at | 17,000' | feet on | Kings Cliffe | Buncher |
Low at | 15,000' | feet on | Kings Cliffe | Buncher |
401st at | 16,000' | feet on | Cottesmore | Buncher |
457th at | 16,000' | feet on | Glatton | Buncher |
Composite at | ____ | feet on | ____ | Buncher |
Combat Wing Assembly Line: SPA. 6 to Colchester
Division Assembly Line: Clacton to 51°13’N-02°53’E [2 miles W of Ostend, Belgium]
- Navigator - _____
- S-2 - _____
- Weather - _____
-
Special Instructions:
a. Type of Bombing Formation - If G-H, Group Bombing; If PFF, Sqdn.
Bombing - Low Sqdn. Bombing on Lead.
b. Bombardier and Navigator of the #3 A/C of each sqdn. report to Photo Lab.
They are: Lead - F-705, High - T-461, Low - M-900
c. Camera A/C C-640, K-252, A-410
to return at Belgian Coast Out[bound]
d. Spares to turn back at Belgian Coast
e. REMARKS: Division Leader be ready to pass out information to formation in event leaders VHF is inop. Leader will contact Deputy on Command if VHF fails.
BREAK!! PILOT’S STAY!
-
CALL SIGNS:
| CALL SIGN | FLARES | NAME |
351st | Woodcraft Able Leader | RG [Red Green] | Lt. Col. Ball |
401st | Woodcraft Charlie | RY | Capt. Lewis |
457th | Woodcraft Baker | RY | Capt. Dozier |
1st Div. Air Commander | Woodcraft Able | GG | Lt. Col. Ball |
94th CBW Air Commander | Woodcraft Able | RY | Lt. Col. Ball |
Fighters | Balance 2 | Balance 2-1, 2-2 Close Support |
Bombers | Vinegrove | 351st Vinegrove 2-1 |
Grnd. Control | Mohair - 741 | Colgate - 701 |
Control Points: | | Fighter Reference Points: |
C.P. 1 - English Coast | | O - Lingen |
C.P. 2 - Enemy Coast | | Y - Dummer Lake |
C.P. 3 - 49°55'N-05°20'E | | S - Paderborn |
[17 mi WSW of Bastogne, Belgium] | | T - Koblenz |
_____ | | E - Koln |
_____ | | R - Mannheim |
_____ | | K - Strasbourg |
_____ | | I - Munster |
_____ | | N - Nancy |
_____ | | G - Trier |
Remarks: Reference Altitude: 25,000’
-
Ships To Monitor [Radio Channels A, B, C & D]
- Channel “A” - All except:
- Channel “B” - H-435, N-665, J-978
- Channel “C” - 67th F.W. [Fighter Wing] F-566
- Channel “C” - 8th A.F. [Air Force] A-428
- Channel “D” - All available except Z-8439; Z-376; Q-080; O-957 which have 8th A.F. Fighter Crystals.
-
FLYING CONTROL:
- Runway on Take Off. ____
- Expected Runway on return. ____
- Emergency Airfields on Continent. ____
Operational Narrative.
-
Date of Mission - 7 January, 1945.
- Target Attacked: The primary target at Bitburg, Germany was attacked by GH methods.
- Force: 94th "A" Group. Thirty-eight aircraft, including one GH aircraft borrowed from the 303rd Group, one PFF ship, two flying spares, were dispatched.
- Position: Briefed and flew as the Lead Group in the First Division formation.
-
Lead Teams
| Group Lead | |
| Division Commander: | Lt. Col. Clinton F. Ball |
| Pilot: | Captain Duane S. Anderson |
| Navigator: | Major Ralph W. Menees |
| Bombardier: | 1st Lt. Jerald E. Traczewitz |
| High Squadron | |
| Pilot: | 1st Lt. Richard G. Dinning |
| Copilot: | 2nd Lt. Richard B. Franz |
| Navigator: | 2nd Lt. John W. Martin |
| Bombardier: | 2nd Lt. Elmer J. Houser |
| Low Squadron | |
| Pilot: | 1st Lt. Winfield F. Muffett |
| Copilot: | 1st Lt. J.W. Anderson |
| Navigator: | 1st Lt. Charles H. Hubbell |
| Bombardier: | 1st Lt. Frank H. Reising |
-
Narrative.
-
Squadron and Group Assembly: The lead crew took off from the 303rd Group's base [Molesworth] in the GH aircraft. The plan was for it to fly to the buncher and
assemble the group. The GH ship broke through the overcast at 10,500 feet, and encountered some difficulty in getting to the briefed altitude of 16,000 feet. Icing
conditions were a handicap. As a result of the weather, the assembly was carried out slowly. It was, however, completed at the briefed altitude of 16,000 feet at the King's
Cliffe buncher. Some difficulty was offered by the wind at assembly. On the last turn, the 94th "A" flew west and made a 180° turn. The other groups did the same and
departed from their respective bunchers together.
-
Route Over England: Departure from the assembly point was made on time (0946). The 94th "B" and "C" groups fell in behind the Division Leader. It was necessary
to make a double drift to the left of course in order to lose time. Splasher six was reached at the briefed time. It then became apparent that the formation would be late
at the departure point if the briefed route were closely followed. A direct route to Clacton, the departure point, was taken up. It was necessary to leave the coast north
of Clacton in order to make the departure time good. The coast was departed on time (1021) at the briefed altitude of 20,000 feet.
-
Division Assembly Line: The 94th "A" Group gradually closed into the briefed Division Assembly Line and so reached the Belgian coast at the briefed point. This
point was reached on time (1042) at an altitude of 23,000 feet, 1,000 feet below the briefed altitude. The 94th "A" Group flew its briefed position as Division Lead Group.
-
Flight to Target: The briefed route was followed with very slight divergency. The briefed IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run] was reached on time (1115) at the briefed
altitude of 25,000 feet. The Weather Scouting Force could not be contacted and so the Division Air Commander asked the accompanying fighters to go ahead and scout the
weather. They reported that it would be necessary to increase altitude by 1,000 feet. This was deemed impossible, however, as the drag caused by the open bomb bay doors
was too great. Also it was possible to bomb the 94th primary at the briefed altitude.
-
Description of Bombing Run: A cloud layer, above the briefed altitude, could be seen to the right and parallel to the bomb run. The bombing was done in group
formation, both the High and Low Squadrons dropping on the Lead. The briefed turn was made at the IP. GH equipment was used satisfactorily on the bomb run. The target was
found to be completely overcast. There was no interference on the bomb run. C-1 Pilot [Autopilot] functioned satisfactorily.
-
Flight From Target: In order to avoid the cloud, southeast of the bomb run, a 180° turn to the right was made after bombing. The 94th "B" and "C" Groups were told
on channel A to do the same. No difficulty was encountered in doubling back, and paralleling the briefed bomb run. The turn was made wide enough to avoid any following
formations. The 2nd Division passed by to the south and was not in any way interfered with or by the 94th Combat Wing. The briefed route was intercepted shortly after
completing the turn and the 94th "A" Group fell in behind at least two groups of the 41st Combat Wing. A let-down to 11,000 feet was made over Belgium. Weather made it
necessary to increase altitude to 12,500 feet, however, when the Belgian coast was crossed. This point was reached at 1249, six minutes early, and 2,500 feet above the
briefed altitude. The formation paralleled the briefed route in crossing the channel. It was necessary to climb above the weather before the English coast was reached.
The 94th "A" Group was at an altitude of 16,500 feet when it crossed the English coast four miles north of Felixstowe. It was necessary to increase altitude to 17,000 feet
over England. Upon going to the north of the briefed course inside of England, the formation found a large hole in the clouds at the Wash [A large coastal inlet 41 miles NE of
Polebrook], became worse as base was approached. The High and Low Squadrons went to their respective stand-off areas before landing. Landings were carried out with difficulty
in poor visibility. A normal let-down procedure had been followed.
-
Fighter Support: Good.
-
Comments: No aircraft were lost. No enemy aircraft were encountered. Two or three bursts of flak were observed behind the formation after it had turned away from
the target. Meager and fairly accurate flak was reported over the battle lines. The target was found to be completely overcast. VHF channel "B" did not perform
satisfactorily. Cycle [a radio relay station] could not be contacted on the return flight for weather information. Buckeye Red [P-51 fighters] also could not be contacted
but it was always apparent that the target would not be visual.
-
Aircraft Not Attacking: One aircraft returned to base early. One aircraft flew with the 457th Group. The two flying spares remained with the formation.
[Signed] Carl C. Hinkle, Jr., Major, Air Corps, Operations Officer
Statistical Summary:
| 351st Bombardment Group (H) |
| Lead Box | High Box | Low Box | TOTAL |
No. of A/C Failing to Take Off | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
No. of A/C Airborne | 13* | 13 | 12 | 38 |
No. of A/C Airborne Less Unused Spares | 13 | 13 | 12 | 38 |
No. of A/C Sorties | 13 | 12 | 12 | 37 |
No. of A/C Attacking | 13* | 12 | 12 | 37 |
No. of A/C Not Attacking | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
Name of Primary Target | BITBURG, GERMANY |
(A) No. of A/C Attacking Primary Target | 13 | 12 | 12 | 37 |
(B) No., Size & Type Of Bombs | 153 x 500# GP | 129 x 500# GP | 155 x 500# GP | 437 x 500# GP |
Name of Secondary Target | |
(A) No. of A/C Attacking Secondary Target | | | | |
(B) No., Size & Type Of Bombs | | | | |
Name of Last Resort Target (LRT) | |
(A) No. of A/C Attacking LRT | | | | |
(B) No., Size & Type Of Bombs | | | | |
Name of Target of Opportunity (T.O.) | | | | |
(A) No. of A/C Attacking T.O. | | | | |
(B) No., Size & Type Of Bombs | | | | |
No. of A/C Lost - Total | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
No. of A/C Lost - Flak | | | | |
No. of A/C Lost - Flak and E/A | | | | |
No. of A/C Lost - Enemy Aircraft | | | | |
No. of A/C Lost - Accident | | | | |
No. of A/C Lost - Unknown | | | | |
Time of Take Off | 0821 | 0826 | 0824 | |
Time of Attack | 1130 | 1130 | 1130 | |
Average Time of Flight | 6:19 | 5:58 | 5:56 | |
Altitude of Release | 23,150’ | 23,700’ | 23,000’ | |
Visual or PFF | GH | GH | GH | |
Enemy Resistance – AA Intensity & Accuracy | MEAGER AND ACCURATE |
Enemy Resistance – Fighter | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Enemy Resistance – Bombers | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
U.S. A/C Engaged by Enemy Aircraft | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Degree of Success | RESULTS UNOBSERVED | |
* - Includes one A/C that attacked with 457th Bomb Group and one GH aircraft borrowed from 303rd Bomb Group.
PFF A/C were borrowed from Groups as follows: None
PFF A/C were loaned to Groups as follows: None
GH Aircraft | | [POSITION] | | [FROM] |
[44-]8439 | | LEAD | | 303rd Group |
PFF Aircraft | | | | |
44-8376 | | DEPUTY LEAD | | 351st Group |
[Lead Sqdn.] Lead Navigator’s Narrative of Raid on Bitburg 7 January, 1945
- Flight Plan and Log attached.
- Track Chart attached.
-
Narrative.
- T/O at 0812 hours.
- Group formed at 0946 hours on Kings Cliffe buncher at 16,000 feet.
- Wing assembly was completed at 1021 hours at Clacton.
- Route over England was
(not) flown as briefed. As briefed.
- Methods of Navigation over England. GEE & DR [Dead Reckoning].
- Division formation was joined at 1021 hours at Clacton.
- Flight to IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run] was
(not) flown as briefed. As briefed.
- Methods of Navigation to the I.P. Gee & DR [Dead Reckoning].
-
BOMB RUN.
- Actual I.P. was
(not) as briefed. As briefed.
- True heading over target. 070°.
- Actual Drift 1° Right.
- Altitude over Target 25,000.
- Time Bombs Away 1130.
- Wind used for bombing 268°/38 knots.
- Method of target identification. GH bomb run.
- Difficulties on bomb run. None
- Weather over Target. 10/10ths overcast. Clouds at 11,000'.
- Axis of withdrawal 280° T.H. [True Heading]
-
Group rally was accomplished at ____ at ____ hours.
-
Wing rally was accomplished at __None__ at ____ hours.
-
Division rally was accomplished at ____ at 1140 hours.
-
Flight home was
was not as briefed. As briefed except change after target to avoid weather.
-
Methods of navigation on return route. Gee & DR [Dead Reckoning].
- Winds aloft were
(not) called out to the formation.
- Fighter rendezvous' were (not) as briefed. Don't Know.
-
PERFORMANCE OF EQUIPMENT.
- Mickey [Radar]: Good
- Gee: Good
- Radio Compass: Good
- Fluxgate: Good
- Other Equipment Good
[Signed:] Ralph W. Menees, Maj., Air Corps, Lead Navigator, Lead Box
[High Sqdn.] Lead Navigator’s Narrative of Raid on Bitburg 7 January, 1945
- Flight Plan and Log attached.
- Track Chart attached.
-
Narrative.
- T/O [Take Off] at 0825 hours.
- Group formed at 0930 hours on Kings Cliffe buncher at 16,000 feet.
- Wing assembly was completed at ____ hours at ____.
- Route over England was
(not) flown as briefed. Took double drift to right to avoid other groups.
- Methods of Navigation over England. GEE, Radio, DR [Dead Reckoning].
- Division formation was joined at ____ hours at ____.
- Flight to IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run] was
(not) flown as briefed.
- Methods of Navigation to the I.P. DR [Dead Reckoning] and GEE
-
BOMB RUN.
- Actual I.P. was
(not) as briefed.
- True heading over target. 060°.
- Actual Drift -8
- Altitude over Target 25,600.
- Time Bombs Away 1130¼.
- Wind used for bombing 280°/52 knots.
- Method of target identification. None GH
<- Difficulties on bomb run. Lead and Deputy Lead of High Sq. had to feather engine immediately after Bombs Away.
- Weather over Target. 10/10ths cloud - contrails.
- Axis of withdrawal 180°
-
Group rally was accomplished at ____ at ____ hours.
-
Wing rally was accomplished at ____ at ____ hours.
-
Division rally was accomplished at ____ at ____ hours.
-
Flight home was was not as briefed.
-
Methods of navigation on return route. DR [Dead Reckoning], GEE and Radio.
- Winds aloft were
(not) called out to the formation.
- Fighter rendezvous' were
(not) as briefed.
-
PERFORMANCE OF EQUIPMENT.
- Mickey [Radar]: Good
- Gee: Good
- Radio Compass: Good
- Fluxgate: Good
- Other Equipment Good
[Signed:] John W. Martin, 2nd Lt., Air Corps, Lead Navigator, High Squadron
[Low Sqdn.] Lead Navigator’s Narrative of Raid on Bitburg 7 January, 1945
- Flight Plan and Log attached.
- Track Chart attached.
-
Narrative.
- T/O [Take Off] at 0826 hours.
- Group formed at 0930 hours on Kings Cliffe buncher at 14,000 feet.
- Wing assembly was completed at ____ hours at ____.
- Route over England was
(not) flown as briefed.
- Methods of Navigation over England. Gee & DR [Dead Reckoning].
- Division formation was joined at ____ hours at ____.
- Flight to IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run] was
(not) flown as briefed.
- Methods of Navigation to the I.P. Gee & DR
-
BOMB RUN.
- Actual I.P. was
(not) as briefed.
- True heading over target. 062°
- Actual Drift -6
- Altitude over Target 24,800.
- Time Bombs Away 1131½
- Wind used for bombing 270°/60 knots.
- Method of target identification. G.H.
- Difficulties on bomb run. None
- Weather over Target. 10/10ths - Contrails
- Axis of withdrawal 180 T.H. [True Heading]
-
Group rally was accomplished at ____ at ____ hours.
-
Wing rally was accomplished at ____ at ____ hours.
-
Division rally was accomplished at ____ at ____ hours.
-
Flight home was
was not as briefed.
-
Methods of navigation on return route. DR, GEE and Radio.
- Winds aloft were
(not) called out to the formation.
- Fighter rendezvous' were
(not) as briefed.
-
PERFORMANCE OF EQUIPMENT.
- Mickey [Radar]: Good
- Gee: Good
- Radio Compass: Good
- Fluxgate: Good
- Other Equipment All Good
[Signed:] Charles Hubbell, 1st Lt., Air Corps, Lead Navigator, Low Box
Lead Bombardier’s Narrative:
Date - 7 Jan. 1945
Field Order # 600
Squadron or Group - Lead Sqdn., 94th CBW "A" Group
Target - Bitburg, Germany
-
Type of Bombing (Visual, PFF or Combined)? G.H. Method
-
Did Squadron perform own sighting operation, bomb on smoke marker, or was bombing done in Group Formation? Lead Sqdn made sighting operation with the High dropping on
a mag. [magnetic] heading of 067° at 1130 hours. The Low dropped at 1131½ hours on a mag. heading of 069°.
-
Was turn made at briefed I.P.? Yes
-
Cloud coverage and visibility. 10/10
-
If Visual, when was MPI identified? If not actually seen, how was it located? G.H. Method
-
Any Interference on Bomb Run? None
-
Did C-1 [Autopilot] function satisfactory? Yes
-
Any other factors affecting accuracy? None
[Signed] Jerald E. Traczewitz, 1st Lt., Air Corps, Lead Bombardier
Combat Bombing Flight Record:
Lead Squadron, 94th CBW "A" Group
Bombardier - 1st Lt. Traczewitz, Jerald E.
Pilot - lt. Col. Ball, C.F. & Capt. Anderson, D.S.
Navigator - Maj. Menees, Ralph W.
Aircraft B-17G Z-439 Take-off - 0812 Landed - 1432
Objective - Bitburg, Germany
Aiming Point (MPI) [Mean Point of Impact] - G.H.
Initial Point - As Briefed
Method of Attack - Group
No. of Attacking A/C in Group: - 36 Composite Group - ____
Number A/C Dropping Bombs by own Sighting Operation: ____
Deflection and Range Sighting, Group: One Composite Group - ____
Range Sighting only, Group - __ Composite Group - ____
Bombs, Types and Sizes - 12 x 500 G.P.[General Purpose] AN-M43, & Markers
Number of Bombs Loaded - As Above Released - Same
Fusing, Nose - 1/10 Tail - 1/40
Synchronization - On GH
Information at Release Point:
Altitude of Target - 1,110' | | Magnetic Heading Ordered 078° Actual 077° |
True Altitude Above Target - 23,150 | | True Heading 070° |
Indicated Altitude - 25,000 | | Drift, Estimated 15° Right - Actual 4° Right |
Pressure Altitude of Target +982 | | True Track 074° |
Altimeter Setting 29.92 | | Actual Range 10,580' |
Calculated Indicated Air Speed - 150K | | Bomb Sight Type - M-9 |
True Air Speed - 212K | | Time of Release 1130 Hours |
Ground Speed Est. 226 Actual 280 | | Length of Bombing Run - 53 miles |
Wind Direction Metro - 40° Actual - 40° | | Intervalometer Setting - 50 Feet |
Wind Velocity Metro 340 Actual 269 | | C-1 Pilot [Autopilot] - X [Used] |
D.S. - 132.3 Trail - 56 ATF - 40.40 | | A-5 Pilot _____ |
Tan. D.A, Est. .51 Actual .466 | | Manual Pilot - ____ |
Type of Release - Train 50'
Point of Impact If Seen - Unobserved
Mean Temp. Metro -19.5 Actual -19.5
Winds - Altitude - 26,000 Ft. Direction - Metro 340° Actual 269° Velocity - Metro 58 Actual 58
Temp C. - Metro -44° C. Actual -43° C.
Narrative Teletype Report:
- No leaflets were carried on today's mission.
-
The three squadrons of this group bombed by G*H methods the primary target at Bitburg, Germany. Bombing was done in group formation and the results are unknown.
-
No E/A [Enemy Aircraft] were encountered and no claims [of enemy aircraft being shot down] are being submitted.
-
Two or three bursts of flak were observed behind out formation after they had turned away from the target. Meager fairly accurate flak was reported over the battle lines on
the way out at approximately 4938 N - 0627 E.
-
There were 10/10 clouds over the target.
-
There were no observations of military importance.
-
PFF equipment was used as an aid to navigation. Fighter support was good. The Scouting Force could not be contacted. None of our A/C are missing.
Track Chart:
Click on Chart to Enlarge
Mission Summary Report:
-
Abortives and Flying Spares:
- Airplane No. 43-37696, 509th Squadron, returned early. Pilot stated pitot tube was inoperative. Investigation revealed that there was a loose connection within
the circuit to the heating element.
[Signed:] John W. Freeman, Captain, Air Corps, Group Engineering Officer
Abortive Report
Aircraft No. Z-37696 Squadron - 509 - Low Date - 7 January 1945
-
PILOT'S STATEMENT:
-
Reason for abortive Airspeed & Rate of Climb instruments out. Pitot Heat inoperative - wing Ice also.
-
Place and altitude 13,000' - Lincoln, Eng.
-
Time 0925
-
Position in formation Lead - Low section - Low Sqdn.
-
Disposition of bombs Returned
-
Remarks
(Pilot's Signature) Carl L. Stahl
-
GROUP ENGINEERING OFFICER'S STATEMENT:
-
Cause (if mechanical) Open electrical circuit.
-
Responsibility Eng. [Engineering]
-
Tyoe if abortive
-
Position in formation
-
Disposition of bombs
-
Remarks
(Eng. Officer's Signature)
The above records were obtained at the National Archives Records Administration and have been
declassified by authority NND 745005