351st Bomb Group

1. 1. TARGETS: 
   2. Visual Primary: Cologne [Germany] R/Y [Railway] Bridge (GH & Visual)
   3. PFF Primary: Cologne M/Y [R.R. Marshalling Yard]
   4. Visual Secondary: ____
   5. PFF Secondary: ____
   6. Last Resort: Limburg [Germany] R/Y [Rail Yard] Center
   
   

2. TIMINGS:
   Zero Hour:	- 0930
   Stations:	- 0820
   Start Engines:	- 0830
   Taxi:	- 0840
   Take Off:	- 0900
   Target Time:	- ____
   ETR [Estimated Time    of Return]:	- ____
   Dead Line for Last Take-Off:	- 1020

   
     Gasoline 2,600 Gallons
   
   

3. LOADING:
   Lead -	6 x 1000 G.P. [General Purpose] 1/10 x No Delay Tail [Fuses]
   High -	Same
   Low -	Same
   Composite -	Same

   
   
4. Intervalometer Settings: Visual or Gee-H - Salvo; PFF – 100 Ft.
   
   
5. Chaff: Release chaff at Battle Line at Discretion of Wing Commander and 4 min. after IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run] for 15 mins. Each A/C – 648 units.
   
   

6. Disposition of Forces	[Bomb Group]	Target	Time of Departure
   "A" Gp. in 94 CBW [Combat Bomb Wing]	351	Cologne	1112 - Dungeness
   "B" Gp. in 94 CBW	457 - Lead 401st - High 351 - Low	Cologne	1114 - Dungeness
   "C" Gp. in 94 CBW
   1 Div. Lead	40 - A (306)	Cologne
   2nd CBW	94 - A (351)	Cologne
   3rd CBW	1 - A (91)	Cologne
   4th CBW
   2nd Div.	340 A/C	Heide & Ehmen (Fuel)	0956 - Cromer
   3rd Div.	360 A/C	Darben & Salzbergen (Fuel)	0930 - Southwold

   
   PFF A/C to fly as: Group Lead, High, Low & Composite Sqdn Lead. "GH" A/C to fly as Group Deputy to 351.
   
   REMARKS:
    Targets of opportunity will not be attacked west of Rhine River.
   
   
7. Fighter Cover: 3 Gps. of P-51’s Close [Support] 4 Gps. Area [Coverage].
   
   
8. Other Forces: Scouting - 2 P-51's [Call Sign] Buckeye Red - Weather
   Screening - 10 P-51's [Call Sign] Buckeye Blue - Chaff
   
   
9. Assembly:

   Lead at	6,000'	feet on	Kings Cliffe	Buncher
   High at	7,000'	feet on	Kings Cliffe	Buncher
   Low at	5,000'	feet on	Kings Cliffe	Buncher
   Composite "B" Lead	6,000	feet on	Glatton	Buncher
   Composite "B" Low	5,000'	feet on	Glatton	Buncher

   Combat Wing Assembly Line: Colchester to Chatham
   Division Assembly Line: Dungeness to 50°51’N-01°35’E [Waringzelle, France]
   
   
10. Navigator - _____
    
    
11. S-2 - _____
    
    
12. Weather - _____
    
    
13. Special Instructions:
     a. Type of Bombing Formation - Normal
     b. Bombardier and Navigator of the #3 A/C of each sqdn. report to Photo Lab.
      They are: Lead - C-640, High - C-753, Low - L-515; Composite - F-566
     c. Camera A/C   V-854, G-862, G-954, F-566
      to return at   Continental Coast
     d. Spares to turn back at 03° East [Continental Coast].
     e. REMARKS: Z-376 will not have Scope Camera. Other PFF A/C will have Scope Cameras.
      Composite Sqdn. will fly Low Sqdn. in Composite Gp. "B" and will assemble on Glatton Buncher. Flares: Lead RY [Red Yellow] High G [Green] Low R [Red].
      401st will furnish 3 Flying Spares for "A" Group.
      457th will furnish 3 Flying Spares for "B" Group.
    
     BREAK!!  PILOT’S STAY!
    
    
14. CALL SIGNS:

    	CALL SIGN	FLARES	NAME
    351st	Woodcraft Able	RG [Red Green]	Major Roper
    Composite	Woodcraft Baker	RY	Major Havey
    457th
    1st Div. Air Commander	Foxhole Able	GG	Colonel Sutton
    94th CBW Air Commander	Woodcraft Able	RY	Major Roper

    
    

    Fighters	Balance 3
    Bombers	Vinegrove
    Grnd. Control	741 Mohair 701 Colgate

    
    

    Control Points:		Fighter Reference Points:
    C.P. 1 - 50°51’N-01°35’E		L - Lubeck
    [Waringzelle, France]		O - Hamburg
    C.P. 2 - 50°28’N-05°35’E		G - Ludwigslust
    [Comblain-au-Pont, Belgium]		S - Berlin
    C.P. 3 - 50°28’N-05°35’E		H - Magdeburg
    [Comblain-au-Pont, Belgium]		I - Brunswick
    _____		P - Hannover
    _____		M - Dummer Lake
    _____		E - Zwolle
    _____		N - Koln
    _____		T - Koblenz

    
    Remarks: Reference Altitude: 22,000’
    
    

15. Colors of the Day
    Time	Color	Letter	Challenge
    0700 – 1300	RY	Q	W
    1300 – 1900	RR	Y	V

    
    Ships To Monitor [Radio Channels A, B, C & D]
    1. Channel “A” - All A/C except -
    2. Channel “B” - R-156, F-124, Y-108, K-252
    3. Channel “C” - 67th F.W. [Fighter Wing] O-595
    4. Channel “C” - 8th A.F. [Air Force] T-384
    5. Channel “D” - All available except Z-376, R-016, D-405, B-349, which have 8 A.F. Fgts.
    
    
16. FLYING CONTROL:
    1. Runway on Take Off. ____
    2. Expected Runway on return. ____
    3. Emergency Airfields on Continent. ____

1. Date of Mission - 14 January, 1945.
   1. Target Attacked:  The primary target at Cologne, Germany, was attacked visually.
   2. Force: 94th "A" Group. Thirty-six aircraft, including one GH aircraft and five PFF ships were dispatched.
   3. Position: The 94th "A" Group flew as second group, its briefed position, in the Task Force.
   4. Lead Teams

      	Group Lead
      	Air Commander:	Major Leonard B. Roper
      	Pilot:	Captain John T. Eickhoff
      	Navigator:	Captain John R. Gulnac
      	Bombardier:	1st Lt. Allan B. Reed

      
      

      	High Squadron
      	Group Leader:	Captain Richard B. Moulton
      	Pilot:	Captain Frederick R. Glazier
      	Navigator:	1st Lt. Irl A. Irwin
      	Bombardier:	1st Lt. George M. Miller

      
      

      	Low Squadron
      	Group Leader:	1st Lt. Richard G. Dinning
      	Pilot:	2nd Lt. Richard B. Franz
      	Navigator:	2nd Lt. John W. Martin
      	Bombardier:	2nd Lt. Elmer J. Houser

2. Narrative.
   1. Squadron and Group Assembly: The assembly was carried out at the briefed altitude of 6,000 feet without difficulty.
   2. Route Over England: Departure from the assembly was made at the briefed time (1003) at the briefed altitude. The formation cut inside of the briefed course, but it was again contacted shortly after leaving Crowland. Colchester was reached five minutes early (1036) and so a dog-leg was started in order to lose time. It was possible to get behind the Task Force Leader while performing this maneuver and departure from the coast was made in the proper position.
   3. Division Assembly Line: Departure from Dungeness was made one and one-half minutes late (1113½) at the briefed altitude of 10,000 feet. The Task Force Leader was followed in a divergency to the right of course and as a result, the French coast was reached to the right of course. This point was reached one minute late (1126) at an altitude of 10,000 feet, the briefed height.
   4.  Flight to Target: The Task Force Leader was followed without difficulty on the flight to the target. There was a variance made to the right of the briefed course, but no trouble was encountered as a result of it. The briefed course was contacted at 50°28'N - 05°35'E [Comblain-au-Pont, France], and was closely followed to the IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run]. The briefed IP was reached seven minutes early (1320). The altitude at that point was 25,000 feet, as briefed.
   5.  Description of Bombing Run: No information as to the weather at the target was received from the Weather Scouting Force. It was evident, however, that the target would be visual when the IP was reached. The Group Leader informed the Squadrons that bombing would be done visually by Squadrons. Interval was taken without difficulty. Each Squadron had a long run on the target, as it could be seen shortly after leaving the IP. Accurate flak was encountered on the bomb run. The C-1 Pilot [Autopilot] is reported as having functioned satisfactorily, for the Lead and High Squadrons. A manual run was made by the Low Squadron. The Low Squadron was forced to attack 1,000 feet below the Lead Squadron due to the interference caused by the low element of the Lead Squadron. No other difficulties were encountered.  The Low Squadron identified the MPI [Mean Point of Impact] twenty-five miles from the target, but it was later obscured by smoke. As a bridge south of the assigned one was open, a sighting was made on it. Results were good.
   6.  Flight From Target: The assembly after bombing was carried out without difficulty. The turn after the target was made wide of the briefed course, but the formation quickly contacted the briefed route at the IP and followed the withdrawal route closely until Nivelles, Belgium, was reached. From that point, the formation flew to the right of the briefed course and reached the Belgian coast to the right of course at an altitude of 10,500 feet. From that point a direct route was followed to Felixstowe, the briefed entry point at the English coast. At that point, the altitude was 7,000 feet. Due to the fact that the lead aircraft had a badly wounded man aboard and also because the formation had suffered considerable battle damage, the briefed route was not followed over England. Base was reached in group formation and landings were carried out. A normal let-down procedure had been followed.
   7.  Fighter Support: Little in evidence.
   8.  Comments: No aircraft were lost. No enemy aircraft were encountered. Intense and accurate flak was encountered in the target area. The weather at the target was CAVU [Ceiling & Visibility Unlimited]. En route to the target, 4 to 6/10ths clouds were encountered to five degrees east, after which there were no clouds and visibility was unlimited. The GH aircraft borrowed from the 384th Group, and scheduled to fly as deputy lead, aborted. Two aircraft of the High Squadron also failed to attack.

1. Date of Mission - 14 January, 1945.
   1. Target Attacked:  The primary target at Cologne, Germany, was attacked visually.
   2. Force: Low Squadron, 94th "B" Composite Group. Twelve aircraft, including one PFF ship, were dispatched.
   3. Position: The Low Squadron of the 94th "B" Composite Group flew its briefed position with that formation.
   4. Lead Team:

      	Low Squadron
      	Leader:	1st Lt. Benjamin F. Nay
      	Pilot:	2nd Lt. Donald L. Fish
      	Navigator:	1st Lt. John P. Curley
      	Bombardier:	F/O [Flight Officer] Wayne A. Grundish

      
      
2. Narrative.
   1.  Squadron and Group Assembly: The assembly was carried out without difficulty at the Blatton buncher. No trouble was encountered in forming with the other two Squadrons of the Composite Group.
   2.  Route Over England: The briefed route was followed with little divergency. The formation departed from the English coast in position behind the 94th "A" Group.
   3.  Division Assembly Line: Flown in formation with the 94th "B" Composite Group. The proper position was flown.
   4.  Flight to Target: The briefed route was followed with little divergency. The 94th "B" Composite Group followed the preceding formations.
   5.  Description of Bombing Run: The primary target at Cologne, Germany, was attacked visually. The Low Squadron performed its own sighting operation. The briefed turn was made at the IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run]. The target was covered by smoke from previous bombing, so the MPI [Mean Point of Impact] was located by triangulation.  No interference was encountered on the bomb run. The C-1 Pilot functioned satisfactorily.
   6.  Flight From Target: Rally after bombing was made without difficulty. The briefed route was followed on the withdrawal with little divergency. A normal let-down procedure was followed. The low squadron returned to base and landings were carried out without difficulty.
   7.  Fighter Support: Little in evidence.
   8.  Comments: No aircraft were lost. No enemy aircraft were encountered. Flak was intense and accurate in the target area. Further details as to altitudes, times, and variances from the briefed flight plan will be covered in the report of the 457th Bomb Group, which furnished the Lead Squadron of the 94th "B" Composite Group.

1. Flight Plan and Log attached.
2. Track Chart attached.
3. Narrative.
   1. T/O at 0856 hours.
   2. Group formed at 1003 hours on Kings Cliffe buncher at 6,000 feet.
   3. Wing assembly was completed at 1011 hours at Crowland.
   4. Route over England was (not) flown as briefed. Was 2 min. early so took a double drift by Clochester and then intercepted 40th CBW before Dungeness.
   5. Methods of Navigation over England. Pilotage, Gee and DR [Dead Reckoning].
   6. Division formation was joined at 1113½ hours at Dungeness.
   7. Flight to IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run] was (not) flown as briefed. 
   8. Methods of Navigation to the I.P. Pilotage, Gee, Mickey [Radar] and DR [Dead Reckoning].
   9. BOMB RUN.
      1. Actual I.P. was (not) as briefed. 
      2. True heading over target. 314°.
      3. Actual Drift 11° Left.
      4. Altitude over Target 25,000.
      5. Time Bombs Away 1335.
      6. Wind used for bombing 100°/38 knots.
      7. Method of target identification. Pilotage
      8. Difficulties on bomb run. None
      9. Weather over Target. CAVU [Ceiling and Visibility Unlimited].
      10. Axis of withdrawal General Turn to 134°
   10. Group rally was accomplished at 51°05'N 07°20'E at 1343 hours.
   11. Wing rally was accomplished at None at ____ hours.
   12. Division rally was accomplished at None at ____ hours.
   13. Flight home was was not as briefed. Came straight home from 0400 E. Wounded in lead ship and in formation.
   14. Methods of navigation on return route. Mickey, Pilotage and DR [Dead Reckoning].
   15. Winds aloft were (not) called out to the formation.
   16. Fighter rendezvous' were (not) as briefed.
   17. PERFORMANCE OF EQUIPMENT.
       1. Mickey [Radar]: OK
       2. Gee: OK
       3. Radio Compass: OK
       4. Fluxgate: OK
       5. Other Equipment 

1. Flight Plan and Log attached.
2. Track Chart attached.
3. Narrative.
   1. T/O [Take Off] at 0858 hours.
   2. Group formed at 0950 hours on Kings Cliffe buncher at 7,000 feet.
   3. Wing assembly was completed at 1015 hours at Crowland.
   4. Route over England was (not) flown as briefed. It was with exception of DD [Double Drift] from Chathem to Dungeness.
   5. Methods of Navigation over England. Gee and DR [Dead Reckoning].
   6. Division formation was joined at 1115 hours at Dungeness.
   7. Flight to IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run] was (not) flown as briefed. 
   8. Methods of Navigation to the I.P. Pilotage and DR [Dead Reckoning].
   9. BOMB RUN.
      1. Actual I.P. was (not) as briefed. 
      2. True heading over target. 312°.
      3. Actual Drift 11° Left.
      4. Altitude over Target 25,600.
      5. Time Bombs Away 1335.
      6. Wind used for bombing 72°/48 knots.
      7. Method of target identification. Visual
      8. Difficulties on bomb run. None
      9. Weather over Target. CAVU [Ceiling and Visibility Unlimited].
      10. Axis of withdrawal 80°
   10. Group rally was accomplished at 51°57'N 07°03'E at 1340 hours.
   11. Wing rally was accomplished at ____ at ____ hours.
   12. Division rally was accomplished at ____ at ____ hours.
   13. Flight home was was not as briefed.
   14. Methods of navigation on return route. Pilotage, Gee and DR [Dead Reckoning].
   15. Winds aloft were (not) called out to the formation.
   16. Fighter rendezvous' were (not) as briefed.
   17. PERFORMANCE OF EQUIPMENT.
       1. Mickey [Radar]: Poor
       2. Gee: OK
       3. Radio Compass: OK
       4. Fluxgate: OK
       5. Other Equipment ____

1. Flight Plan and Log attached.
2. Track Chart attached.
3. Narrative.
   1. T/O at 0900 hours.
   2. Group formed at 1003 hours on Kings Cliffe buncher at 6,000 feet.
   3. Wing assembly was completed at 1115 hours at Crowland.
   4. Route over England was (not) flown as briefed. Took double drift to right to avoid other groups.
   5. Methods of Navigation over England. DR [Dead Reckoning], Gee, Pilotage and Radio.
   6. Division formation was joined at 1115 hours at Dungeness.
   7. Flight to IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run] was (not) flown as briefed. 
   8. Methods of Navigation to the I.P. DR [Dead Reckoning], Pilotage, Gee and Mickey [Radar].
   9. BOMB RUN.
      1. Actual I.P. was (not) as briefed. 5150 0934.
      2. True heading over target. 316°.
      3. Actual Drift 11° Left.
      4. Altitude over Target 24,000.
      5. Time Bombs Away 1335.
      6. Wind used for bombing 070°/60 knots.
      7. Method of target identification. Visual
      8. Difficulties on bomb run. None
      9. Weather over Target. CAVU [Ceiling and Visibility Unlimited].
      10. Axis of withdrawal 080° M.H. [Magnetic Compass Heading]
   10. Group rally was accomplished at ____ at ____ hours.
   11. Wing rally was accomplished at ____ at ____ hours.
   12. Division rally was accomplished at ____ at ____ hours.
   13. Flight home was was not as briefed.
   14. Methods of navigation on return route. DR [Dead Reckoning], Pilotage, Gee and Mickey.
   15. Winds aloft were (not) called out to the formation.
   16. Fighter rendezvous' were (not) as briefed.
   17. PERFORMANCE OF EQUIPMENT.
       1. Mickey [Radar]: OK
       2. Gee: OK
       3. Radio Compass: OK
       4. Fluxgate: OK
       5. Other Equipment 

1. Flight Plan and Log attached.
2. Track Chart attached.
3. Narrative.
   1. T/O at 0900 hours.
   2. Group formed at 1012 hours on Kings Cliffe buncher at 5,200 feet.
   3. Wing assembly was completed at 1140 hours at Colchester.
   4. Route over England was (not) flown as briefed. S'ing to lose time to make division formation.
   5. Methods of Navigation over England. Gee and Pilotage.
   6. Division formation was joined at 1112 hours at Dungeness.
   7. Flight to IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run] was (not) flown as briefed. 
   8. Methods of Navigation to the I.P.  Gee, Mickey [Radar], DR [Dead Reckoning] and Pilotage.
   9. BOMB RUN.
      1. Actual I.P. was (not) as briefed. 5150 0934.
      2. True heading over target. 300°.
      3. Actual Drift 9° Left.
      4. Altitude over Target 24,200.
      5. Time Bombs Away 1338¼.
      6. Wind used for bombing 083°/50 knots.
      7. Method of target identification. Visual
      8. Difficulties on bomb run. None
      9. Weather over Target. CAVU [Ceiling and Visibility Unlimited].
      10. Axis of withdrawal 076°
   10. Group rally was accomplished at 50°46'N 07°28'E at 1347 hours.
   11. Wing rally was accomplished at ____ at ____ hours.
   12. Division rally was accomplished at ____ at ____ hours.
   13. Flight home was (not) as briefed.
   14. Methods of navigation on return route. Gee, DR [Dead Reckoning], Pilotage.
   15. Winds aloft were (not) called out to the formation.
   16. Fighter rendezvous' were (not) as briefed.
   17. PERFORMANCE OF EQUIPMENT.
       1. Mickey [Radar]: OK
       2. Gee: OK
       3. Radio Compass: OK
       4. Fluxgate: Out
       5. Other Equipment ____

1. Type of Bombing (Visual, PFF or Combined)?  Visual
2. Did Squadron perform own sighting operation, bomb on smoke marker, or was bombing done in Group Formation? Squadron made own sighting operation.
3. Was turn made at briefed I.P.? Yes
4. Cloud coverage and visibility. Good
5. If Visual, when was MPI [Mean Point of Impact] identified? If not actually seen, how was it located? M.P.I. could be seen 30 miles away.
6. Any Interference on Bomb Run? None
7. Did C-1 [Autopilot] function satisfactory? Yes
8. Any other factors affecting accuracy? None

I certify that this 12E Form is complete and accurate.
[Signed] William B. Lyttle, Captain, Air Corps, Group Bombardier. Lead Squadron, 94th "A" Group

Bombardier - 1st Lt. Reed, Alan B.
Pilot - Major Roper,L. B. & Capt. Eickhoff, J.T.
Navigator - Capt. Gulnac, John R.

Aircraft B-17G   Z-376  Take-off - 0900 Landed - 1550
Objective - Bridge at Cologne, Germany
Aiming Point (MPI) [Mean Point of Impact] - Bridge
Initial Point - As Briefed
Method of Attack - Squadron
No. of Attacking A/C in Group: - 12   Composite Group - ____
Number A/C Dropping Bombs by own Sighting Operation: ____
Deflection and Range Sighting, Group: One   Composite Group - ____
Range Sighting only, Group - ____   Composite Group - ____
Bombs, Types and Sizes - 6 x 1000 Lb. AN-M44 G.P.[General Purpose] & Markers
Number of Bombs Loaded - As Above   Released - Same
Fusing, Nose - 1/10   Tail - Instantaneous
Synchronization - On

Information at Release Point:

Type of Release - Salvo
Point of Impact If Seen - 1,200' Short
Mean Temp. Metro -16 Actual -16
Winds - Altitude - 24,000 Ft.  Direction - Metro 110°  Actual 100°  Velocity - Metro 40  Actual 40
Temp C. - Metro -43° C. Actual -40° C.

1. Type of Bombing (Visual, PFF or Combined)?  Visual
2. Did Squadron perform own sighting operation, bomb on smoke marker, or was bombing done in Group Formation? Own sighting.
3. Was turn made at briefed I.P.? Yes
4. Cloud coverage and visibility. Good
5. If Visual, when was MPI [Mean Point of Impact] identified? If not actually seen, how was it located? 30 miles before bombs away.
6. Any Interference on Bomb Run? None
7. Did C-1 [Autopilot] function satisfactory? Yes
8. Any other factors affecting accuracy? None

I certify that this 12E Form is complete and accurate.
[Signed] William B. Lyttle, Captain, Air Corps, Group Bombardier. Lead Squadron, 94th "A" Group

High Squadron, 94th "A" Group Bombardier - 1st Lt. Miller, George M.
Pilot - Capt. Moulton, Richard B.
Navigator - 1st Lt. Irwin, Irl A.

Aircraft B-17G   B-701  Take-off - 0855 Landed - 1630
Objective - Bridge at Cologne, Germany
Aiming Point (MPI) [Mean Point of Impact] - As Briefed
Initial Point - As Briefed
Method of Attack - Squadron
No. of Attacking A/C in Group: - 12   Composite Group - ____
Number A/C Dropping Bombs by own Sighting Operation: ____
Deflection and Range Sighting, Group: One   Composite Group - ____
Range Sighting only, Group - ____   Composite Group - ____
Bombs, Types and Sizes - 6 x 1000 Lb. AN-M44 G.P.[General Purpose] & Markers
Number of Bombs Loaded - As Above   Released - Same
Fusing, Nose - 1/10   Tail - Instantaneous
Synchronization - On

Information at Release Point:

Type of Release - Salvo
Point of Impact If Seen - "M.P.I."
Mean Temp. Metro -16 Actual -16
Winds - Altitude - 24,000 Ft.  Direction - Metro 110°  Actual 90°  Velocity - Metro 40K  Actual 70K
Temp C. - Metro -43° C. Actual -41° C.

1. Type of Bombing (Visual, PFF or Combined)?  Visual
2. Did Squadron perform own sighting operation, bomb on smoke marker, or was bombing done in Group Formation? Squadron performed own sighting operation.
3. Was turn made at briefed I.P.? Yes
4. Cloud coverage and visibility. Good, but briefed target was obscured by smoke.
5. If Visual, when was MPI [Mean Point of Impact] identified? If not actually seen, how was it located? M.P.I. Identified 25 miles from target, but later was obscured by smoke and as bridge south of primary was open, a sighting was made on it. This bridge was an assigned target for another group. Results were good.
6. Any Interference on Bomb Run? None
7. Did C-1 [Autopilot] function satisfactory? P.D.I. [Pilot's Deviation Indicator] needle would not stay centered.
8. Any other factors affecting accuracy? None

I certify that this 12E Form is complete and accurate.
[Signed] William B. Lyttle, Captain, Air Corps, Group Bombardier. Lead Squadron, 94th "A" Group

Low Squadron, 94th CBW "A" Group Bombardier - 2nd Lt. Houser, Elmer J.
Pilot - 1st Lt. Dinning, Richard G.
Navigator - 2nd Lt. Martin, John W.

Aircraft B-17G   Z-687  Take-off - 0900 Landed - 1615
Objective - Bridge at Cologne, Germany
Aiming Point (MPI) [Mean Point of Impact] - Bridge over Rhine, River - Alternate A.P. [Aiming Point]
Initial Point - As Briefed
Method of Attack - Squadron
No. of Attacking A/C in Group: - 12   Composite Group - ____
Number A/C Dropping Bombs by own Sighting Operation: ____
Deflection and Range Sighting, Group: One   Composite Group - ____
Range Sighting only, Group - ____   Composite Group - ____
Bombs, Types and Sizes - 6 x 1000 Lb. AN-M44 G.P.[General Purpose] & Markers
Number of Bombs Loaded - As Above   Released - Same
Fusing, Nose - 1/10   Tail - Instantaneous
Synchronization - On

Information at Release Point:  Bombed bridge south of briefed bridge.

Type of Release - Salvo
Point of Impact If Seen - Unobserved
Mean Temp. Metro -16 Actual -16
Winds - Altitude - 24,000 Ft.  Direction - Metro 110°  Actual 070°  Velocity - Metro 40K  Actual 60K
Temp C. - Metro -43° C. Actual -32° C.

1. Type of Bombing (Visual, PFF or Combined)?  Visual
2. Did Squadron perform own sighting operation, bomb on smoke marker, or was bombing done in Group Formation? Own sighting operation.
3. Was turn made at briefed I.P.? Yes
4. Cloud coverage and visibility. ____
5. If Visual, when was MPI [Mean Point of Impact] identified? If not actually seen, how was it located? Target was covered by smoke and MPI was located by triangulation.
6. Any Interference on Bomb Run? None
7. Did C-1 [Autopilot] function satisfactory? Yes
8. Any other factors affecting accuracy? None

I certify that this 12E Form is complete and accurate.
[Signed] William B. Lyttle, Captain, Air Corps, Group Bombardier. Lead Squadron, 94th "A" Group

Lead Squadron, 94th "A" Group Bombardier - 2nd Lt. Grundish, Wayne A.
Pilot - 1st Lt. Nay, Benjamin F.
Navigator - 1st Lt. Curley, John P.

Aircraft B-17G   V-079  Take-off - 0900 Landed - 1630
Objective - Bridge at Cologne, Germany
Aiming Point (MPI) [Mean Point of Impact] - As briefed by triangulation
Initial Point - As Briefed
Method of Attack - Squadron
No. of Attacking A/C in Group: - 12   Composite Group - ____
Number A/C Dropping Bombs by own Sighting Operation: ____
Deflection and Range Sighting, Group: One   Composite Group - ____
Range Sighting only, Group - ____   Composite Group - ____
Bombs, Types and Sizes - 6 x 1000 Lb. AN-M44 G.P.[General Purpose] & Markers
Number of Bombs Loaded - As Above   Released - Same
Fusing, Nose - 1/10   Tail - Instantaneous
Synchronization - On

Information at Release Point:  Smoke over target.

Type of Release - Salvo
Point of Impact If Seen - Into the smoke on the briefed target.
Mean Temp. Metro -16 Actual -16
Winds - Altitude - 24,000 Ft.  Direction - Metro 110°  Actual 55°  Velocity - Metro 40K  Actual 34K
Temp C. - Metro -43° C. Actual -41° C.

1. Leave Buncher: No. of A/C [Aircraft] - Lead ____ , High 13, Low 13.
2. A/C at Enemy Coast: Lead ____ , High 12, Low 12.
3. Abortives - None
4. Spares Filling In: No of A/C - ____  Position - ____
5. Remarks:   Lt. Johnson left formation about 15 minutes after Bombs Away, ship under control.
6. Fighter Escort - Time Sighted: 13:15
7. Flak: Near Laroche & Target
   Estimated No. of Guns -  about 300 guns.
8. Position from you -   Tracking Flak
9. Time - 13:38
10. Accuracy -   Fair at target; good at front lines.
11. Remarks on Formation - ____
12. Bombs Away: A/C Releasing Late - ____
       A/C Releasing Early - ____
13. Remarks - ____
14. A/C in trouble: ____
15. [Enemy] Fighter Tactics Report - Time of Attacks - ____
16. Number of E/A [Enemy Aircraft] - ____
17. Type of Attacks - ____
18. Number of Passes - ____
19. Type of E/A - ____
20. Remarks - ____
21. Turrets not searching - ____

1. The target for the three squadrons of this Group flying as the "A" group was the north (d) bridge at Cologne, while the target for the squadron flying as low squadron in the "B" group was the south (b) bridge at Cologne. Bombing by both groups was visual and photo cover is complete for all squadrons.
2. The bombs of the lead squadron fell in a badly scattered pattern approximately 1,200 feet to the east and short of the bridge. The pattern covers an area 4,655 feet by 1,837 feet, with the main concentration being in a residential section. There is a direct hit by a salvo of bombs on a large train shed on the railroad line approaching the bridge, and a possible direct hit on the railroad line near the eastern approach to the bridge.
3. The low squadron bombed the wrong bridge with good results. The bombs fell in a compact pattern on and around the southern (b) bridge, with a possible direct hit near the east shore, and a possible direct hit near the center of the span. The pattern is 2,140 feet by 1,070 feet, with the actual MPI [Mean Point of Impact] 1,712 feet short of the briefed MPI.
4. The bombs of the high squadron fell in a compact concentration on and around the target. Smoke from previous bombing makes pin pointing of strikes difficult, but there are two possible direct hits on the bridge and a direct hit on the approach to the bridge from the west. The visual pattern is 2,354 feet by 1,369 feet, with the actual MPI right on the briefed MPI.
5. The bombs of the composite low squadron fell into the smoke of previous bombing, and no assessment can be made. Approximately seven bursts can be seen through the smoke in the target area and it indicates that the bombs hit on or around the briefed target.

1. No leaflets were carried on today's mission.
2. Three squadrons of this Group comprising the 94th "A" Combat Wing attacked the north bridge at Cologne as a primary target. Bombing was visual, with the bridge partially obscured from smoke of the Wing ahead. The bombs of the lead squadron landed approx. 500 yards to the east of the bridge and on the railroad approaching the target.  There is a possible direct hit on a railway shed of some sort. The bombs of the low squadron fell on or around the southern, or "B", bridge in a compact pattern.  Photos show possibility of one direct hit on the bridge. Photos of the high squadron show the bombs falling on or around the briefed target. Smoke obscures the detail of the bridge, but there is a possibility of a hit on the bridge. The Composite squadron of this Group, flying as a low squadron of the 94th "B" Group, attacked the primary target, the "B" bridge at Cologne. Photos show a pattern just east of the end of the bridge, with possible damage to the bridge approaches.
3. No enemy aircraft was encountered, and no claims [of enemy aircraft being shot down] are being submitted.
4. Two distinct groups of flak were noted at the target, one group from the town proper and the other from the marshalling yard northeast of the town. Flak from these two places was intense and accurate. Moderate accurate flak was encountered on the way in, in the general vicinity of St. Vith; on the way out, flak in this same area was meager and fairly accurate. Meager flak was observed in the vicinity of Clotten.
5. The weather at the target was CAVU [Ceiling and Visibility Unlimited]. Enroute [sic] to the target 4-6/10ths clouds were encountered to 5 degrees east, after which there were no clouds and visibility was unlimited.
6. An airfield was observed at 5040 N. - 0721 E. which appeared to be in operation. The runways were cleared of snow; however, the presence of A/C is questionable. A V-2 [rocket] site was observed in a small town at 5032 N. - 0740 E [Giershofen, Germany approx 12.5 mi. N of Koblenz]. There appeared to be a great amount of activity in the area and an actual V-2 was observed, being launched from this site.
7. PFF units were used only for navigational purposes and rendered satisfactory results. Scouting Force was not contacted. There was very little fighter support in evidence.  One B-17 from the group behind, the 94th "B" CBW [Combat Bomb Wing], was observed to crash at approx. 5010 N. - 0600 E [3 mi. North of Troisvierges, Luxembourg]. No chutes were observed. None of our A/C is missing.

    508th Squadron:
A/C D-405: Squadron lead too low; interfered with high element of lead. Good evasive action, however, and group lead good. No fighter support, - Lt. Stahl.
A/C C-753: Lead of high squadron was very, very good. - Lt. Crutcher.
A/C M-900: Weatherman was wrong about contrails; they were dense. - Lt. Farrell.

    509th Squadron:
A/C N-169: The only fighter support we saw all day was 4 or 5 P-51's over the target. - Lt. Nowakowski.
    Carlton, B-Baker, taxied out of order this morning. - Lt. Foreman.
A/C L-193: Traffic pattern of 303rd and 351st were intermixed on today's returning. - Lt. Maddux.
    Very good formation flying. - Lt. Gallamore.

    510th Squadron:
A/C P-038: Bomb-bay doors wouldn't close - the second time this has happened to us in this ship. - Lt. Rebo.
A/C G-862: Fighter cover sparse. - Lt. Madson.
A/C N-665: Group lead good, but element lead poor. - Lt. Blaney.

1. Abortives:
   1. Airplane No. 43-37978, 508th Squadron returned early. Pilot stated that #4 engine was leaking oil and running rough. Investigation revealed that #4 engine failed internally.
   2. Airplane No. 44-8016, GH Aircraft from Grafton-Underwood [384th Bomb Group] returned early. Pilot stated that #2 engine had no boost. Investigation revealed that the #2 induction system had a leak.

1. Airplane No. 43-38277 - Failed to attack the target. Bombardier states bombs would not release in train or salvo. The bombing system of this aircraft checks out perfectly on the ground. No altitude check flight could be made due to an engine change.

1. PILOT'S STATEMENT:
   1. Reason for abortive #4 Eng. started leaking oil. Oil pressure dropped to 35 lbs., prop ran away, was spraying oil badly then feathered engine.
   2. Place and altitude 17,000' 5030N 0335E
   3. Time 1205
   4. Position in formation High Sqdn., Lead Low Low section.
   5. Disposition of bombs Brought back.
   6. Remarks None
     (Pilot's Signature) Robert S. Parnell

1. PILOT'S STATEMENT:
   1. Reason for abortive #2 Engine went out. Was unable to keep up with formation.
   2. Place and altitude 22,000 ft. at Front Lines.
   3. Time 1245 approx.
   4. Position in formation Deputy Group Lead.
   5. Disposition of bombs Jettisoned in Channel
   6. Remarks Grafton-Underwood planes are poorly maintained.
     (Pilot's Signature) Charles E. Daugherty Jr.

1. Last Four numbers and Call Letter of A/C in each Squadron:

   a. 94th Combat Wing "A" Group   Lead Squadron - 351st Group
   Sqdn 508th A/C: (Z–8376 PFF),
   Sqdn 509th A/C: C–8640, L–7193, N–7169, O–7595, P–7843, Q–8116, R–6156, T–1384, V–7854, Z–7696
   Sqdn 510th A/C: None
   Sqdn 511th A/C: None
   Sqdn 544th A/C: (R-8016 GH)

   
   

   b. 94th Combat Wing "A" Group   Low Squadron - 351st Group
   Sqdn 508th A/C: None
   Sqdn 509th A/C: None
   Sqdn 510th A/C: (X–8468 PFF), A–8465, F–7124, G–7862, H–8280, L–7515, M–9001, N–7665, P–8038, S–7512, T–8461
   Sqdn 511th A/C: (Z–7687 PFF)

   
   

   c. 94th Combat Wing "A" Group   High Squadron - 351st Group
   Sqdn 508th A/C: A–8410, B–7349, C–8753, D–8405, F–1711, G–8954, J–7978, M–7900, O–8277, Y–6108
   Sqdn 509th A/C: (B–7701 PFF)
   Sqdn 510th A/C: None
   Sqdn 511th A/C: (O–8455 PFF)

2. Target: (9) 5006 E/B/2
   
3. W/T and R/T Operational Call Sign of each Squadron:

   Squadron	508 [Call Sign]	W/T WLU R/T CARLTON		Squadron	510 [Call Sign]	W/T TLK R/T TIPSTAFF
   Squadron	509 [Call Sign]	W/T UGU R/T HOTMINT		Squadron	511 [Call Sign]	W/T NBH R/T PARTNERSHIP

4. Taxi – 0840; Take-Off – 0900; E.T.D. Field – 0900
   

5. Time:	Height:	Place of Crossing English Coast: (OUT)
   1112	10,000 Ft	Dungeness

6. Time:	Height:	Place of Crossing Enemy Coast: (IN)
   1125	10,000 Ft	50°51'N-01°35'E [Waringzelle, France]

7. Time:	Height:	Place of Crossing Enemy Coast: (Out)
   1509	10,000 Ft	Ostend [Belgium]

8. Time:	Height:	Place of Crossing English Coast: (IN)
   1527	5,000 Ft	Felixstowe

9. E.T.R.(Estimated Time of Return) Base: 1600 Hours
10. MF/DF [Medium Frequency/Direction Finder] Section: "G"
11. Bomb load of Each A/C: "A" Lead Box
    Lead Squadron: 6 x 1000# G.P. - 1/10 Nose x Non-delay Tail [Fuses]
    Low Squadron: 6 x 1000# G.P. - 1/10 Nose x Non-delay Tail [Fuses]
    High Squadron: 6 x 1000# G.P. - 1/10 Nose x Non-delay Tail [Fuses]
    ___ Squadron:
    
12. Fuel Load of each A/C: 2600 Gallons
    
13. Leaders:
    Lead Sqdn: Rank & Name: Major Roper A/C No & Sqdn. Z-8376 PFF (508)
    Low Sqdn: Rank & Name: Lt. Dinning A/C No & Sqdn. Z-7687 (511)
    High Sqdn: Rank & Name: Capt. Moulton A/C No & Sqdn. B-7701 (509)
14. Passengers, if any: (Full Name, Rank, A/C and Squadron Passenger flying with)
    None

Report Compiled By D.W. Grasmehr, Sgt.

1. Last Four numbers and Call Letter of A/C in each Squadron:

   b. 94th Combat Wing "B" Group   Low Squadron - 351st Group
   Sqdn 508th A/C: L–7956
   Sqdn 509th A/C: F–6566
   Sqdn 510th A/C: (J–8079 PFF), B–6610, K–7252
   Sqdn 511th A/C: (L–8045 PFF), A–8428, B–8691, C–8694, N–8592, U–7216, X–6802

   
   
2. Target: (7) 5006 E/D/1
   
3. W/T and R/T Operational Call Sign of each Squadron:

   Squadron	508 [Call Sign]	W/T WLU R/T CARLTON		Squadron	510 [Call Sign]	W/T TLK R/T TIPSTAFF
   Squadron	509 [Call Sign]	W/T UGU R/T HOTMINT		Squadron	511 [Call Sign]	W/T NBH R/T PARTNERSHIP

4. Taxi – 0840; Take-Off – 0900; E.T.D. Field – 0900
   

5. Time:	Height:	Place of Crossing English Coast: (OUT)
   1114	10,000 Ft	Dungeness

6. Time:	Height:	Place of Crossing Enemy Coast: (IN)
   1127	10,000 Ft	50°51'N-01°35'E [Waringzelle, France]

7. Time:	Height:	Place of Crossing Enemy Coast: (Out)
   1504	10,000 Ft	Ostend [Belgium]

8. Time:	Height:	Place of Crossing English Coast: (IN)
   1527	5,000 Ft	Felixstowe

9. E.T.R.(Estimated Time of Return) Base: 1600 Hours
10. MF/DF [Medium Frequency/Direction Finder] Section: "G"
11. Bomb load of Each A/C: "A" Lead Box
    Lead Squadron: None
    Low Squadron: 6 x 1000 G.P. - 1/10 Nose x Non-delay Tail [Fuses]
    High Squadron: None
    ___ Squadron:
    
12. Fuel Load of each A/C: 2600 Gallons
    
13. Leaders:
    Lead Sqdn: Rank & Name: None A/C No & Sqdn. ____
    Low Sqdn: Rank & Name: Lt. Nay A/C No & Sqdn. V-8079 (510)
    High Sqdn: Rank & Name: None A/C No & Sqdn. ____
14. Passengers, if any: (Full Name, Rank, A/C and Squadron Passenger flying with)
    None
    
    Last Take Off: 1030

Report Compiled By D.W. Grasmehr, Sgt.