351st Bomb Group

1. 1. TARGETS: 
   2. Visual Primary & "GH" - Altenbeken - Transportation
   3. PFF Primary: ____
   4. Visual Secondary: Paderborn R/Y [Rail Yard] Centre
   5. PFF Secondary: Paderborn R/Y [Rail Yard] Centre
   6. Last Resort: Lohne R/Y [Rail Yard] Centre
   
   

2. TIMINGS:
   Zero Hour:	- 1030
   Stations:	- 0845
   Start Engines:	- 0855
   Taxi:	- 0905
   Take Off:	- 0920
   Target Time:	- 1228
   ETR [Estimated Time    of Return]:	- 1548

   
     Gasoline 2,600 Gallons
   
   

3. LOADING:
   Lead -	All A/C [Aircraft] 6 x 1000# G.P. [General Purpose] 1/10 x 1/100 [Fuses]
   High -	____
   Low -	____
   Composite -	____

   
   
4. Intervalometer Settings: Visual or "GH" – Salvo. Secondary P.F.F. – 100 FT.
   
   
5. Chaff: Each A/C 288 Units: Commence Release at I.P. [Initial Point of Bomb Run] and continue for 12 mins.
   
   

6. Disposition of Forces	[Bomb Group]	Target	Time of Departure at Coast
   "A" Gp. in 94 CBW [Combat Bomb Wing]	457	Altenbeken - Transportation	1100 - Felixstowe
   "B" Gp. in 94 CBW	401	Altenbeken - Transportation	1102 - Felixstowe
   "C" Gp. in 94 CBW	351	Altenbeken - Transportation	1104 - Felixstowe
   1 Div. Lead	94th "A"	Altenbeken - Transportation
   2nd CBW	1st "A"	Altenbeken - Transportation
   3rd CBW	41st "A"	Altenbeken - Transportation
   4th CBW	40th "A"	Altenbeken - Transportation
   2nd Div.	90 A/C	Hamburg - Fuel	1030 - Cromer
   3rd Div.	144 A/C	Hamburg - Fuel	1030 - Southwold

   
   PFF A/C to fly as: Group Lead - High & Low Sqdn. Leads. GH A/C to fly as Group Deputy lead.
   
   REMARKS: ____
   
   
7. Fighter Cover: One Gp. of P-51’s - Balance 3-1 - Close Support
   
   
8. Other Forces: Six Gps - P-51's - Close Support for 1st Division - 1 Group P-51's - Area Support in Dummer Lake Area.
   
   
9. Assembly:

   Lead at	11,000'	feet on	Kings Cliffe	Buncher
   High at	12,000'	feet on	Kings Cliffe	Buncher
   Low at	10,000'	feet on	Kings Cliffe	Buncher
   401st at	11,000'	feet on	Cottesmore	Buncher
   457th at	11,000'	feet on	Glatton	Buncher
   Composite at	____	feet on	____	Buncher

   Combat Wing Assembly Line: Swaffam To Hadleigh
   Division Assembly Line: Felixstowe to 52°37’N-04°37’E [Egmond aan Zee, Netherlands]
   
   
10. Navigator - _____
    
    
11. S-2 - _____
    
    
12. Weather - _____
    
    
13. Special Instructions:
     a. Type of Bombing Formation - Very Tight formation on Bomb Run.
     b. Bombardier and Navigator of the #3 A/C of each sqdn. report to Photo Lab.
      They are: Lead - P-038, High - Z-696, Low - C-753
     c. Camera A/C   G-862, F-705, v-854
      to return at   Continental Coast Out [Bound].
     d. Spares to turn back at 03° East.
     e. REMARKS: Lt. Dinning & Crew are to Depart Base no later than 0730 to go to Molesworth. A/C to T.O. [Take Off] from Molesworth and join Group at Buncher.  Flares aboard Truck.
    
      BREAK!!  PILOT’S STAY!
    
    
14. CALL SIGNS:

    	CALL SIGN	FLARES	NAME
    351st	Woodcraft Charlie	RG [Red Green]
    401st	Woodcraft Baker	RY
    457th	Woodcraft Able	RY
    1st Div. Air Commander	Woodcraft Able Lead		Colonel Francis
    94th CBW Air Commander	Woodcraft Able Lead		Colonel Francis

    
    

    Fighters	Balance 3
    Bombers	Vinegrove 3-3
    Grnd. Control	Mohair
    Code Word for Authentication	"Bike Race"
    Mosquito [RAF Fighters] Screening Force	Maypole One

    
    

    Control Points:		Fighter Reference Points:
    C.P. 1 - English Coast		O - Cuxhaven
    C.P. 2 - Enemy Coast - In		T - Hamburg
    C.P. 3 - Target		H - Zwolle
    C.P. 4 - Enemy Coast - Out		E - Dummer Lake
    _____		R - Munster

    Remarks: Reference Altitude: 22,000’
    
    
15. Ships To Monitor [Radio Channels A, B, C & D]
    1. Channel “A” - All A/C monitor except the following:
    2. Channel “B” - A-465, Y-108, C-640
    3. Channel “C” - 67th F.W. [Fighter Wing] L-515
    4. Channel “C” - 8th A.F. [Air Force] H-280
    5. Channel “D” - All A/C have A/S [Air/Sea] rescue [Radio] Crystals available except A-358, Z-439, Q-116, B-349 which have 8 AF [Air Force] Fighter Crystals (701)
    
    
16. FLYING CONTROL:
    1. Runway on Take Off. ____
    2. Expected Runway on return. ____
    3. Emergency Airfields on Continent. ____

1. Date of Mission - 17 January, 1945.
   1. Target Attacked:  The secondary target at Paderborn, Germany, was attacked by PFF methods.
   2. Force: Thirty-eight aircraft, including one GH ship, three PFF ships, and two flying spares, were dispatched.
   3. Position: Flew the briefed position of third group in the Division Formation (94th “C”).
   4. Lead Teams

      	Group Lead
      	Air Commander:	Major Leonard B. Roper
      	Pilot:	Captain James M. Purcell
      	Navigator:	1st Lt John W. Bury
      	Bombardier:	1st Lt Alan B. Reed

      
      

      	High Squadron
      	Leader:	1st Lt Raleigh G. Knight
      	Pilot:	1st Lt James J. Cronin
      	Navigator:	1st Lt Howard S. Love
      	Bombardier:	1st Lt Lloyd H. Schuler

      
      

      	Low Squadron
      	Leader:	Captain Richard B. Moulton
      	Pilot:	2nd Lt Richard L. Steward
      	Navigator:	1st Lt Irl A. Irwin
      	Bombardier:	1st Lt George M. Miller

2. Narrative.
   1.  Squadron and Group Assembly: The assembly was carried out without difficulty and the formation was completed before the scheduled departure time from the Kings Cliffe buncher. A 180° turn was made to the west in order to lose time and to check the C-1 Pilot [Autopilot]. The formation passed over the buncher upon the completion of the turn and made its departure on time (1030) and on course at the briefed altitude of 11,000 feet.
   2.  Route Over England: No difficulty was encountered in getting into position behind the 94th “A” and “B” Groups shortly after leaving the assembly area. The route followed was slightly inside of the briefed course and as a result, Hadleigh and Felixstowe were reached early.
   3.  Division Assembly Line: Departure from the English coast was made in the proper position behind the two preceding 94th Combat Wing Groups. The departure was made one minute early (1103) at the briefed altitude of 15,000 feet. The briefed Division Assembly Line was not flown in crossing the channel. The course taken was to the right of the briefed route. However, the formation gradually closed into the briefed course and the Dutch coast was reached slightly to the right of course one minute late (1140) at the briefed altitude of 22,000 feet.
   4.  Flight to Target: Clouds were encountered at the enemy coast. Woodcraft Able announced that it was possible to fly in them, and so the 94th “C” Group attempted to follow the briefed route through them. Formation flying in this weather was difficult. Variances from the briefed route were necessary in attempting to fly in the best weather. However, the briefed IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run] was reached four minutes late (1219) at the briefed altitude plus one (23,000 feet).  The GH equipment in the deputy lead aircraft was found to be inoperative before the IP was reached. As a result, the Group Leader informed the Squadron Leaders that the secondary target would be attacked by PFF methods.
   5.  Description of Bombing Run: The run on the secondary target was easily made from the IP briefed for the primary target. It was necessary to change the heading a few degrees to the south. A good run was made. Each squadron performed its own sighting operation. The target was completely overcast and results were not observed. No difficulties were encountered on the bombing run. The IP was reached, but the briefed turn was not made when the run on the secondary target was started. The target was attacked from 23,000 feet, 1,000 feet above the briefed height, in order to avoid prop wash.
   6.  Flight From Target: The 94th “A” Group had evidently not attacked the target on its first run, and so had decided to make a 360° turn in order to attack. The 94th “C” Group was following it and assumed that the 94th “A” had attacked and was turning back to the briefed route. When the 94th “A” made its 360° turn, which was started outside of the turn shown for the 94th “C” on the Track Chart, it was necessary to deviate from course in order to avoid any difficulties. The 94th “C” soon contacted the briefed route and followed it closely with little variance other than that made in the area of Osnabruck when it cut inside of the briefed course to avoid flak. The briefed departure point from the coast of Holland was reached seven minutes early (1407) at an altitude of 21,000 feet, 1,000 feet below the briefed altitude. As cloud cover was observed along the briefed route, the formation flew to the left of course to avoid it. The English coast was reached to the left of the briefed course thirteen minutes early (1458). The briefed route was contacted inside of England and was followed closely to base. The High and Low Squadrons went to their respective stand-off areas before landing. A normal let-down procedure had been followed.
   7.  Fighter Support: Very Good.
   8.  Comments: Aircraft 42-31384, pilot Lt. Della Cioppa, is missing due to unknown causes. The aircraft was seen to lag behind just before the target; then it pulled away and the pilot called for fighter support. No enemy aircraft were encountered. There was no flak at the target. Meager flak, accurate for altitude, but inaccurate for deflection, was encountered on the route in and out. The Weather Scouting Force provided accurate weather information.
   9.  Aircraft Not Attacking: The two flying spares returned as planned.

1. Flight Plan and Log attached.
2. Track Chart attached.
3. Narrative.
   1. T/O at 0930 hours.
   2. Group formed at 0915 hours on Kings Cliffe buncher at 11,000 feet.
   3. Wing assembly was completed at 1103 hours at Felixstowe.
   4. Route over England was (not) flown as briefed. 
   5. Methods of Navigation over England. Pilotage and Gee.
   6. Division formation was joined at 1103 hours at Felixstowe.
   7. Flight to IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run] was (not) flown as briefed. Yes, except for S'ing before I.P. [Initial Point of Bomb Run] to get behind Woodcraft Baker.
   8. Methods of Navigation to the I.P. Gee, DR [Dead Reckoning] and Mickey [Radar].
   9. BOMB RUN.
      1. Actual I.P. was (not) as briefed. 5150 0934.
      2. True heading over target. 196°.
      3. Actual Drift 17° Left.
      4. Altitude over Target 23,000.
      5. Time Bombs Away 1230½.
      6. Wind used for bombing 280°/55 knots.
      7. Method of target identification. Mickey
      8. Difficulties on bomb run. None
      9. Weather over Target. 10/10ths
      10. Axis of withdrawal 075° T.H. [True Heading]
   10. Group rally was accomplished at ____ at ____ hours. Did not break up.
   11. Wing rally was accomplished at ____ at ____ hours.
   12. Division rally was accomplished at ____ at ____ hours.
   13. Flight home was (was not) as briefed. Woodcraft Charlie lead division on return route.
   14. Methods of navigation on return route. Pilotage, Mickey and GEE.
   15. Winds aloft were (not) called out to the formation.
   16. Fighter rendezvous' were (not) as briefed.
   17. PERFORMANCE OF EQUIPMENT.
       1. Mickey [Radar]: OK
       2. Gee: OK
       3. Radio Compass: OK
       4. Fluxgate: OK
       5. Other Equipment OK

1. Flight Plan and Log attached.
2. Track Chart attached.
3. Narrative.
   1. T/O [Take Off] at 0917 hours.
   2. Group formed at 0930 hours on Kings Cliffe buncher at 12,000 feet.
   3. Wing assembly was completed at 1047 hours at Swaffman.
   4. Route over England was (not) flown as briefed. 
   5. Methods of Navigation over England. Gee, Pilotage and DR [Dead Reckoning].
   6. Division formation was joined at 1103 hours at Felixstowe.
   7. Flight to IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run] was not flown as briefed. 
   8. Methods of Navigation to the I.P. Mickey [Radar] and DR [Dead Reckoning]
   9. BOMB RUN.
      1. Actual I.P. was (not) as briefed. 
      2. True heading over target. 205.
      3. Actual Drift 18° Left.
      4. Altitude over Target 23,900.
      5. Time Bombs Away 1231.
      6. Wind used for bombing 295°/75 knots.
      7. Method of target identification. Mickey
      8. Difficulties on bomb run. Bomb Bay doors inoperative, cranked down.
      9. Weather over Target. 10/10ths.
      10. Axis of withdrawal 180°
   10. Group rally was accomplished at 52°00'N 08°50'E at 1250 hours.
   11. Wing rally was accomplished at 52°20'N 08°35'E at 1300 hours.
   12. Division rally was accomplished at ____ at ____ hours.
   13. Flight home was (was not) as briefed.
   14. Methods of navigation on return route. Pilotage, Mickey, Gee and DR.
   15. Winds aloft were (not) called out to the formation.
   16. Fighter rendezvous' were (not) as briefed.
   17. PERFORMANCE OF EQUIPMENT.
       1. Mickey [Radar]: OK
       2. Gee: 27 unit inoperative
       3. Radio Compass: OK
       4. Fluxgate: OK
       5. Other Equipment OK

1. Flight Plan and Log attached.
2. Track Chart attached.
3. Narrative.
   1. T/O [Take Off] at 0919 hours.
   2. Group formed at 1020 hours on Kings Cliffe buncher at 11,000 feet.
   3. Wing assembly was completed at 1045 hours at Swaffam.
   4. Route over England was (not) flown as briefed. Took double drift to right to avoid other groups.
   5. Methods of Navigation over England. Pilotage and DR [Dead Reckoning].
   6. Division formation was joined at 1115 hours at Felixstowe.
   7. Flight to IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run] was (not) flown as briefed. 
   8. Methods of Navigation to the I.P. Pilotage, Gee, Mickey and DR [Dead Reckoning].
   9. BOMB RUN.
      1. Actual I.P. was (not) as briefed. 5150 0934.
      2. True heading over target. 193°.
      3. Actual Drift 21° Left.
      4. Altitude over Target 22,480.
      5. Time Bombs Away 1230½.
      6. Wind used for bombing 300°/72 knots.
      7. Method of target identification. Mickey
      8. Difficulties on bomb run. None
      9. Weather over Target. 10/10ths
      10. Axis of withdrawal 315°
   10. Group rally was accomplished at 52°21'N 08°28'E at 1258 hours.
   11. Wing rally was accomplished at ____ at ____ hours.
   12. Division rally was accomplished at ____ at ____ hours.
   13. Flight home was (was not) as briefed.
   14. Methods of navigation on return route. Mickey, Gee, Pilotage and DR [Dead Reckoning].
   15. Winds aloft were (not) called out to the formation.
   16. Fighter rendezvous' were (not) as briefed.
   17. PERFORMANCE OF EQUIPMENT.
       1. Mickey [Radar]: Fair
       2. Gee: Good, 25 unit, 27 unit did not work.
       3. Radio Compass: Good
       4. Fluxgate: Out, fell off the headings.
       5. Other Equipment Nav. Magnetic compass also out.

1. Type of Bombing (Visual, PFF or Combined)?  PFF
2. Did Squadron perform own sighting operation, bomb on smoke marker, or was bombing done in Group Formation? Squadron made own PFF sighting operation.
3. Was turn made at briefed I.P.? Yes
4. Cloud coverage and visibility. 10/10
5. If Visual, when was MPI identified? If not actually seen, how was it located? PFF
6. Any Interference on Bomb Run? None
7. Did C-1 [Autopilot] function satisfactory? Yes
8. Any other factors affecting accuracy? None

I certify that this 12E Form is complete and accurate.
[Signed] William B. Lyttle, Captain, Air Corps, Group Bombardier. Lead Squadron, 94th CBW "C" Group

Bombardier - 1st Lt. Reed, Allan B.
Pilot - Major Roper, L.B. & Capt. Purcell, J.M.
Navigator - 1st Lt. Bury, John W.

Aircraft B-17G   Z-358  Take-off - 0915 Landed - 1540
Objective - Paderborn, Germany
Aiming Point (MPI) [Mean Point of Impact] - PFF
Initial Point - As Briefed
Method of Attack - Squadron
No. of Attacking A/C in Group: - 12   Composite Group - ____
Number A/C Dropping Bombs by own Sighting Operation: ____
Deflection and Range Sighting, Group: One   Composite Group - ____
Range Sighting only, Group - __   Composite Group - ____
Bombs, Types and Sizes - 6 x 1000 Lb., AN-M44 G.P.[General Purpose] & Markers
Number of Bombs Loaded - As Above   Released - Same
Fusing, Nose - 1/10   Tail - 1/100
Synchronization - On

Information at Release Point:

Type of Release - Train
Point of Impact If Seen - Unobserved
Mean Temp. Metro -15 Actual -15
Winds - Altitude - 24,000 Ft.  Direction - Metro 270°  Actual 280°  Velocity - Metro 75K  Actual 50K
Temp C. - Metro -36° C. Actual -32° C.

1. Type of Bombing (Visual, PFF or Combined)?  PFF
2. Did Squadron perform own sighting operation, bomb on smoke marker, or was bombing done in Group Formation? Squadron performed own PFF sighting operation.
3. Was turn made at briefed I.P.? Yes
4. Cloud coverage and visibility. 10/10
5. If Visual, when was MPI identified? If not actually seen, how was it located? PFF
6. Any Interference on Bomb Run? None
7. Did C-1 [Autopilot] function satisfactory? Yes
8. Any other factors affecting accuracy? None

I certify that this 12E Form is complete and accurate.
[Signed] William B. Lyttle, Captain, Air Corps, Group Bombardier. Lead Squadron, 94th CBW "C" Group

Bombardier - 1st Lt. Schuler, Lloyd H.
Pilot - 1st Lt. Knight, Galeigh G.
Navigator - 1st Lt. Love, Howard S.

Aircraft B-17G   B-701  Take-off - 0917 Landed - 1547
Objective - Paderborn, Germany
Aiming Point (MPI) [Mean Point of Impact] - PFF
Initial Point - As Briefed
Method of Attack - Squadron
No. of Attacking A/C in Group: - 12   Composite Group - ____
Number A/C Dropping Bombs by own Sighting Operation: ____
Deflection and Range Sighting, Group: One   Composite Group - ____
Range Sighting only, Group - __   Composite Group - ____
Bombs, Types and Sizes - 6 x 1000 Lb., AN-M44 G.P.[General Purpose] & Markers
Number of Bombs Loaded - As Above   Released - Same
Fusing, Nose - 1/10   Tail - 1/100
Synchronization - On  Checked with Mickey.

Information at Release Point:

Type of Release - Train
Point of Impact If Seen - Unobserved
Mean Temp. Metro -15 Actual -15
Winds - Altitude - 20,000 Ft.  Direction - Metro 270°  Actual 295°  Velocity - Metro 75K  Actual 86K
Temp C. - Metro -36° C. Actual -32° C.

1. Type of Bombing (Visual, PFF or Combined)?  PFF
2. Did Squadron perform own sighting operation, bomb on smoke marker, or was bombing done in Group Formation? Squadron made own PFF sighting operation.
3. Was turn made at briefed I.P.? Yes
4. Cloud coverage and visibility. 10/10
5. If Visual, when was MPI identified? If not actually seen, how was it located? PFF
6. Any Interference on Bomb Run? None
7. Did C-1 [Autopilot] function satisfactory? Yes
8. Any other factors affecting accuracy? None

I certify that this 12E Form is complete and accurate.
[Signed] William B. Lyttle, Captain, Air Corps, Group Bombardier. Lead Squadron, 94th CBW "C" Group

Bombardier - 1st Lt. Miller, George M.
Pilot - Capt. Moulton, Richard B.
Navigator - 1st Lt. Irwin, Irl A.

Aircraft B-17G   079  Take-off - 0919 Landed - 1540
Objective - Paderborn, Germany
Aiming Point (MPI) [Mean Point of Impact] - PFF
Initial Point - As Briefed
Method of Attack - Squadron
No. of Attacking A/C in Group: - 12   Composite Group - ____
Number A/C Dropping Bombs by own Sighting Operation: ____
Deflection and Range Sighting, Group: One   Composite Group - ____
Range Sighting only, Group - __   Composite Group - ____
Bombs, Types and Sizes - 6 x 1000 Lb., AN-M44 G.P.[General Purpose] & Markers
Number of Bombs Loaded - As Above   Released - Same
Fusing, Nose - 1/10   Tail - 1/100
Synchronization - On

Information at Release Point:

Type of Release - Train
Point of Impact If Seen - Unobserved
Mean Temp. Metro -15 Actual -15
Winds - Altitude - 20,000 Ft.  Direction - Metro 270°  Actual 300°  Velocity - Metro 75K  Actual 72K
Temp C. - Metro -36° C. Actual -32° C.

1. No leaflets were carried on today's mission.
2. The three squadrons of this Group bombed by PFF methods the Secondary target at Paderborn, Germany. Each squadron bombed on its own Lead and the results were unobserved and unphotographed, due to 10/10 clouds. Mickey operators, however, stated that they had a good run on the target and estimated the results to be fair.
3. No E/A [Enemy Aircraft] were encountered and no claims [of enemy aircraft being shot down] are being submitted.
4. There was no flak at the target. Meager flak, accurate for altitude but very inaccurate for deflection, was encountered at Ymuiden, Minden, and Bielefeld.
5. There were 10/10 clouds in the target area.
6. There were no observations of military importance.
7. Three PFF A/C were employed by this Group and the equipment of each worked well. Fighter support was very good. The Scouting Force provided accurate information. Our A/C T-384 is missing due to unknown causes. This A/C was seen to lag behind just before the target; then it pulled away and the pilot called for fighter support.

    508th Squadron:
A/C 900-M I suggest that leaders circle to the left in stand-off areas. – Lt. Stahl.
A/C 705-F The route after bombs away was all messed up; everyone was cutting each other off. – Lt. Murray.

    509th Squadron:
A/C 078-G Poor formation en route but good at bombs away. – Lt. Maddux

    510th Squadron:
A/C 665-N Lead pilot, low element, lead squadron, did not fly in his proper position; we flew in his prop wash for five hours.
      Recommend that he move out to the left or drop down at least 30 feet. – Capt. Wilcox.
A/C 038-P Lead A/C should have fired more flares during assembly. – Lt. Gode.

1. Abortives and Flying Spares:
   1. Airplane No. 43-37595, 509th Squadron, returned early as planned.
   2. Airplane No. 43-38465, 510th Squadron, returned early as planned.

1. Last Four numbers and Call Letter of A/C in each Squadron:

   a. 94th Combat Wing "C" Group   Lead Squadron - 351st Group
   Sqdn 508th A/C: (A–8358 PFF),
   Sqdn 509th A/C: (b–7701 PFF), (F–6566 Spare),
   Sqdn 510th A/C: A–8465, B–6610, D–7957, G–7862, H–8280, L–7515, M–9001, N–7665, P–8038, S–7512, (T–8461 Spare
   Sqdn 511th A/C: None
   Sqdn 360th A/C: (Z–8439 GH Comb.) 303rd Group.

   
   

   b. 94th Combat Wing "C" Group   Low Squadron - 351st Group
   Sqdn 508th A/C: B–7349, C–8753, G–8954, L–7956, M–7900, Y–6108
   Sqdn 509th A/C: None
   Sqdn 510th A/C: (V–8079 PFF)
   Sqdn 511th A/C: A–8428, C–8694, F–7705, H–8435, N–8592

   
   

   c. 94th Combat Wing "C" Group   High Squadron - 351st Group
   Sqdn 508th A/C: None
   Sqdn 509th A/C: (B–7701 PFF), C–8640, F–6566, G–6078, L–7193, N–7169, P–7843, Q–8116, R–6156, T–1384, V–7854, Z–7696, (O–7595 Spare)
   Sqdn 510th A/C: None
   Sqdn 511th A/C: None

2. Target: GH-503 MPI 043023/2
   
3. W/T and R/T Operational Call Sign of each Squadron:

   Squadron	508 [Call Sign]	W/T NYG R/T CARLTON		Squadron	510 [Call Sign]	W/T UUR R/T TIPSTAFF
   Squadron	509 [Call Sign]	W/T SLM R/T HOTMINT		Squadron	511 [Call Sign]	W/T JHU R/T PARTNERSHIP

4. Taxi – 0905; Take-Off – 0920; E.T.D. Field – 0920
   

5. Time:	Height:	Place of Crossing English Coast: (OUT)
   1104	15,000 Ft	Felixstowe

6. Time:	Height:	Place of Crossing Enemy Coast: (IN)
   1139	22,000 Ft	52°37'N-04°37'E [Egmond aan Zee, Netherlands]

7. Time:	Height:	Place of Crossing Enemy Coast: (Out)
   1414	22,000 Ft	52°37'N-04°37'E [Egmond aan Zee, Netherlands]

8. Time:	Height:	Place of Crossing English Coast: (IN)
   1511	5,000 Ft	Cromer

9. E.T.R.(Estimated Time of Return) Base: 1548 Hours
10. MF/DF [Medium Frequency/Direction Finder] Section: H
11. Bomb load of Each A/C: "A" Lead Box
    Lead Squadron: 6 x 1000 G.P. - 1/10 x 1/100
    Low Squadron: 6 x 1000 G.P. - 1/10 x 1/100
    High Squadron: 6 x 1000 G.P. - 1/10 x 1/100
    ___ Squadron:
    
12. Fuel Load of each A/C: 2600 Gallons
    
13. Leaders:
    Lead Sqdn: Rank & Name: Maj. Roper A/C No & Sqdn. A-8358 PFF (509)
    Low Sqdn: Rank & Name: Lt. Moulton A/C No & Sqdn. V-8079 (510)
    High Sqdn: Rank & Name: Lt. Knight A/C No & Sqdn. B-7701 (509)
14. Passengers, if any: (Full Name, Rank, A/C and Squadron Passenger flying with)
    None

Report Compiled By Shepard, M/Sgt.

 Lt. Della-Cioppa was piloting 42-31384, Buckeye Babe, on her 108th mission [on page 111, A/C 42-31384 is shown to have flown 103 missions]. However this was not to be an easy mission for the crew, as told by Lt. Clark, the navigator. “This was not a long or hazardous mission in our opinion and we were overjoyed that we would get another milk run under our belts. We were assigned as an element leader in the lower left squadron of the Group, and had joined up with the Group with no problems at all. As we passed over the English coast one of the engines began throwing oil, but continued to run. Still feeling that this was an easy mission, we foolishly continued on our merry way. By the time we had crossed the French coast, the engine gave out and the propeller could not be feathered. Almost simultaneously another engine began to throw oil. Still thinking that we could make the mission without difficulty, and not wishing to be chewed out for aborting, we continued. Soon however this second engine threw out all its oil and could not be feathered. We were now forced to relinquish our leadership of the element. Just before we arrived over the target, the third engine started to throw oil, and by the time we had dropped our bombs had ceased to function.
 At this point we had to drop out of formation and request fighter support. “We still had one engine running, but it simply was not enough to keep us flying on a level course. Particularly with the other three windmilling all the time. In spite of jettisoning everything we could she gradually lost height. We had P-51 fighter coverage until we lost them in a cloudbank at about 11,000 feet. We stayed in this cloud cover until we were down to about 5,000 feet. My calculations at this point were that we could make the Allied lines before we had to bail out or crash land, so we chose to ride her down. The crew concurred with this decision, and none bailed out despite being given the opportunity. Eventually it became obvious that we could not make it beyond the lines. The pilots did a beautiful job, setting her down with wheels up in a large field in Holland. Just before landing we were fired upon by flak batteries stationed in all four corners of the field. Fortunately none of them hit us. The plane bounced a few times but there was no fire and not one member of the crew received a scratch. Immediately after disembarking from the aircraft we were surrounded by the German soldiers from the flak batteries. This rendered any thought of escape useless.”

• A/C# 42-31384   RQ-T  "Buckeye Babe"  Pilot: Lt. Della Cioppa  A/C's 103rd Mission
    MACR # 12000

  Aircraft Loss Circumstances:

  According to a translated German Document in the Mission Air Crew Report the plane made a belly landing at 1355 hrs.east of Nienberg, Germany and was 40% destroyed. All nine men were captured and sent to Dulag-Luft West.

  Individual Accounts of Crewmen Fates:
  • Pilot - 2nd Lt Della-Cioppa, Marius N. - POW in Germany, Returned to Military Control, Liberated or Repatriated.
  • Co-pilot - 2nd Lt Harvey, Dell J. - POW at Dulag Luft Grosstychow Dulag 12, Returned to Military Control, Liberated or Repatriated.
  • Navigator - 2nd Lt Clark, Spurgeon W. Jr. - POW at Dulag Luft Grosstychow Dulag 12, Returned to Military Control, Liberated or Repatriated.
  • Nose Gunner - Sgt Soltys, Walter J. - POW in Germany, Returned to Military Control, Liberated or Repatriated.
  • Top Turret Gunner - Sgt Smith, Richard M. - POW in Germany, Returned to Military Control, Liberated or Repatriated.
  • Radio Operator - Sgt Venezia, Edward - POW in Germany, Returned to Military Control, Liberated or Repatriated.
  • Waist Gunner - Sgt Fancher, Herman R. - POW at Dulag Luft Grosstychow Dulag 12, Returned to Military Control, Liberated or Repatriated.
  • Ball Turret Gunner - S/Sgt Shearer, George F. Jr. - POW in Germany, Returned to Military Control, Liberated or Repatriated.
  • Tail Gunner - Sgt Fager, James E. - POW at Dulag Luft Grosstychow Dulag 12, Returned to Military Control, Liberated or Repatriated.