BRIEFING OFFICER: HAVE YOU READ SPECIAL BRIEFING POOP??
Ask 508th, 509th and 510th Operations representatives if their crews are all present.
Read Special briefing poop.
- The Visual Primary for today is: Soest [Germany]
- PFF Primary: Hamm [Germany]
- Visual Secondary: ____
- PFF Secondary: ____
- Last Resort Target: Koblenz - Giessen
S-2 [Intelligence] Information:
|Zero Hour:|| - 1200||Stations:|| - 1010|
|Start Engines:|| - 1020||Taxi:|| - 1040|
|Take Off:|| - 1055||Last Take Off:|| - 1210|
|Intercept Group at||North Foreland||at||14,000 ft.|
|Target Time:|| - 1503||ETR [Estimated Time|
|Depart English Coast at:|| 1245||at Felixstowe|
Time on oxygen: 4 hours
TIME TICK [Set your watches.]
| Gasoline:|| 2,500 Gallons|
18 x 250 G.P. 1/10 x 1/40 [Fuses] Plus M-17 IB [Incendiary Bomb] Chart 7 - Lead & Low
High Sqdn. 6 x 500 G.P.'s Plus 6 M-17 IB's
Intervalometer Settings: 30 feet if Visual, PFF or GH
Chaff: Commence discharge of chaff at - 8 mins before Target - Continue for 15 minutes.
Each A/C [Aircraft] will carry - 360 Plus 288 units.
Disposition of Forces:
3 Divisions will be dispatched. The 1st Air Division will depart England 2nd preceded by 3rd Division and followed by the 2nd Division.
1st Division will dispatch 10 CBW's of 36 Groups each.
The order of attack in the 1st Division will be:
|Lead||94th & 40th A||Attacking||Soest - Hamm|
|2nd||40th B||Attacking||Hagen - Hamm|
|3rd||41st||Attacking||Hagen - Hamm|
|4th||1st||Attacking||Schwerte - Hamm|
|2nd Division targets are||Siegen - Arnsberg - Bielefeld|
|3rd Division targets are||Kassel (1st in of 8th A.F.)|
Fighter Cover: 3 Gps. of P-51's - Balance 3 [Call Sign]
Combat Wing Assembly Line: Bodney - Felixstowe
|Lead at||9,000'||feet on|| Kings Cliffe ||Buncher||Red-Green||Flares|
|High at||10,000'||feet on||Kings Cliffe||Buncher||Green-Green||Flares|
|Low at||8,000'||feet on||Kings Cliffe||Buncher||Red-Red||Flares|
|401st at||9,000'||feet on||Cottesmore||Buncher||Red-Yellow||Flares|
|457th at||9,000'||feet on||Glatton||Buncher||Red-Yellow||Flares|
Division Assembly Line: Felixstowe to 51°15’N-02°55’E [Bredene, Belgium]
2 minutes interval between Groups.
Reference altitude: 22,000'
Bombing altitude: 25,000'
Point for instrument let-down Kings Cliffe magnetic heading of 30 degrees.
|351st||Woodcraft A - Able|
|401st||Woodcraft B - Baker|
|457th||Woodcraft C - Charlie|
|1st Div. Air Commander||Lt. Col. Ball|
|94th CBW Air Commander||Lt. Col. Ball|
The following ships will monitor [Radio Channels]- "B" - S-512, F-566, U-831; "C" - 8th A.F. - D-082; "C" - 67th Fighter Wing - N-665.
Other Communications information will be found on the flimsy.
- FLYING CONTROL: _____
a. Type of Bombing Formation - Normal
b. Bombardier and Navigator of the #3 A/C of each sqdn. report to Photo Lab.
The A/C are: Lead - P-038, Low - Y-108, High - O-920
c. Ball Turret Gunners of the following A/C report to Photo Lab: Z-198, C-020, G-862, B-349, B-610, T-666, C-640
d. Camera A/C: Lead - U-216, Low Q-565, High A-465
return at Discretion of Air Commander
e. Spares to turn back at 05° East.
f. PFF A/C fly as deputy lead - Lead Sqdn., Lead of Low Sqdn.
g. GH A/C fly as Lead of Lead and High Sqdns.
F-1667-D German Civilian Hospitals marked with Red Square on White Circle will not be bombed.
In event Hamm is attacked right turn off target will be made.
You are reminded not to discuss the target. EXERCISE ALL SECURITY MEASURES.
Date of Mission - 28 February, 1945.
- Target Attacked: The primary target at Seost, Germany, was attacked by Gee-H methods.
- Force: Thirty-eight aircraft, including two PFF ships and two GH aircraft and two flying spares were dispatched.
- Position: The 94th "A" Group flew in its briefed position as the lead group of the First Division Formation.
|Division Lead |
|Air Commander: ||Lt Col Clinton F. Ball|
|Pilot:||Captain James M. Gibbons|
|Navigator:||1st Lt. Benton F. Love Jr|
|Bombardier:||1st Lt. Frederick S. Ralph|
|Leader: ||1st Lt. Henry R. Rossen|
|Pilot:||2nd Lt. Morris G. Turner|
|Navigator:||2nd Lt. Allen G. McDonald|
|Bombardier:||F/O Lt. Paul A. Walker|
|Leader: ||1st Lt. Thomas G. Petersen|
|Pilot:||2nd Lt. Gustave A. Bochert|
|Navigator:||2nd Lt. Robert G. Craig|
|Bombardier:||2nd Lt. Robert L. Adams|
Squadron and Group Assembly: The assembly was carried out without difficulty at the briefed altitude of 9,000 feet over the Kings Cliffe buncher.
Route Over England: Departure from the assembly area was made on time (1207) from a point slightly east of the buncher. Before reaching Spaulding it became
evident that that point would not be reached on time. The formation turned to the right inside of the briefed course and reached the next check point, Bodney, on time.
It was necessary to cut inside of the leg between Bodney and Felixstowe in order to depart from the English coast on time. No difficulties were encountered in this slight
deviation. This point was reached at an altitude of 12,400 feet, 400 feet above the briefed altitude.
Division Assembly Line: The turn to the south was made after leaving Felixstowe and the briefed route was followed with slight divergency in crossing the channel.
The 94th “A” Group was in its briefed position as the lead group of the First Division. The Belgian coast was crossed to the left of the briefed point at an altitude of
17,000 feet, the briefed height, and on time (1318).
Flight to Target: Inside of the coast, the formation went to the left of the briefed course while over Belgium. The briefed route was contacted before reaching
the front lines and was followed with very little variance for the remainder of the flight to the target. The IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run] used was slightly to the east
of the briefed point. It was reached at an altitude of 25,000 feet, the briefed bombing altitude, at 1453, two minutes late. On the turn before the IP was reached, the
lead aircraft reported that its Gee-H equipment was inoperative, and directed that the High Squadron take the lead in order to make a Gee-H run. The high Squadron flew
directly to the Gee-H IP, the Lead Squadron filling in on the left, the Low Squadron, on the right.
Description of Bombing Run: The primary target at Soest, Germany, was attacked by Gee-H methods. Bombing was done in group formation. The briefed turn was
made at the IP. The target was found to be completely overcast. No interference was encountered on the bomb run. The C-1 Pilot [Autopilot] was not used.
Flight From Target: After bombing, the Lead Squadron again resumed the lead of the formation. The briefed route was followed with minor divergencies until,
in the vicinity of six degrees east, the 94th “A” was forced to the right of the briefed course by the 398th Group which was two minutes late at the Division rally. No
difficulty was encountered as a result. The formation slowly returned to the briefed route, contacted it in the vicinity of Brussels, and then swung to the right of
course once more. To avoid prop wash from the 1st Combat Wing, departure from the Belgian coast was made to the right of the briefed point at an altitude of 8,500 feet.
The formation gradually closed into the briefed route while crossing the channel. The two GH aircraft left the formation before the English coast was reached and returned
The deputy leaders took over the Group and High Squadron leads. The English coast was crossed at the briefed point, Felixstowe, at an altitude of 3,000 feet. The formation
returned direct to base above the overcast, omitting the dog-leg in the briefed course between Cambridge and base due to shortage of gasoline. The High and Low Squadrons
went to their respective stand-off areas before landing. An instrument let-down procedure was executed.
Fighter Support: Poor until 7°43’E. Fighters believed late.
Comments: No Aircraft were lost. No enemy aircraft were encountered. Flak at the target was meager and inaccurate, and trailed behind the formation. There
were ten-tenths low clouds in the target area.
The PFF-Gee-H equipment of the lead aircraft functioned poorly. The Gee-H equipment of the High Squadron Lead Aircraft functioned well enough for bombing purposes. The
Weather Scouting Force furnished adequate weather information. The High Squadron Leader’s VHF transmitter was inoperative; all communication with him was relayed by his
wing men and visual signals.
Aircraft Not Attacking: Nil. The two flying spares returned as planned.
[Signed] Carl C. Hinkle, Jr, Major, Air Corps, Operations Officer
STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS
DIVISION FIELD ORDER NUMBER 642
|351st Bombardment Group|
|Lead Squadron||High Squadron||Low Squadron||TOTALS|
|No. of Aircraft Failing to Take Off||0||0||0||0|
|No. of Aircraft Sorties||13||12||13||38|
|No. of Aircraft Airborne Less Unused Spares||12||12||12||36|
|No. of Aircraft Credit Sorties||12||12||12||36|
|No. of Effective Sorties||12||12||12||36|
|No. of Non-Effective Sorties||0||0||0||0|
|Name of Primary Target||SOEST, GERMANY|
|(A) No. of A/C Attacking Primary Target||12||12||12||36|
|(B) No., Size & Type Of Bombs|| 210 x 250# GP |
24 x 500 M-17
| 71 x 250# GP |
72 x 500 M-17
| 214 x 250# GP |
24 x 500 M-17
| 424 x 250# GP |
120 x 500 M-17
71 x 500 GP
|Name of Secondary Target|
|(A) No. of A/C Attacking Secondary Target|
|(B) No., Size & Type Of Bombs|
|Name of Last Resort Target (LRT)|
|(A) No. of A/C Attacking LRT|
|(B) No., Size & Type Of Bombs|
|Name of Target of Opportunity (T.O.)|
|(A) No. of A/C Attacking T.O.|
|(B) No., Size & Type Of Bombs|
|No. of A/C MIA - Total||0||0||0||0|
|No. of A/C MIA - Flak|
|No. of A/C MIA - Flak and E/A|
|No. of A/C MIA - Enemy Aircraft|
|No. of A/C MIA - Accident over Enemy Terr.|
|No. of A/C MIA - Other and Unknown|
|Time of Take Off||1050||1051||1052|
|Time of Attack||1504½||1504½||1504½|
|Total Time for Mission||95:36||92:44||96:59||285:19|
|Altitude of Release (Indicated)||25,000’||25,600’||23,200’|
|Visual, H2X, Gee-H, M-H, Eagle, or Combination||GH||GH||GH|
|Enemy Resistance – AA Intensity & Accuracy||MEAGER AND INACCURATE|
|Enemy Resistance – Fighter||0||0||0||0|
|Enemy Resistance – Bombers||0||0||0||0|
|U.S. A/C Engaged by Enemy Aircraft||0||0||0||0|
|Number of Passes made by Enemy Aircraft||0||0||0||0|
|Degree of Success||RESULTS UNOBSERVED|
2 A/C borrowed as follows: 2 GH Aircraft borrowed from 379th Group. 351st Group furnished crews.
____ A/C loaned as follows: ____
Lead Bombardier’s Narrative:
Date - 28 February, 1945
Field Order # 643
Squadron or Group - High Sqdn., 94th CBW "A" Group
Target - M/Y [R.R. Marshalling Yard] at Soest, Germany
Type of Bombing (Visual, PFF or Combined)? "G.H."
Did Squadron perform own sighting operation, bomb on smoke marker, or was bombing done in Group Formation? Bombing was in Group Formation on the High Sqdn; M.H.
[Magnetic Compass Heading] of the High, Lead, and Low Sqdn was 300° and Bombs were released at 15:04:30.
Was turn made at briefed I.P.? As Briefed
Cloud coverage and visibility. 10/10
If Visual, when was MPI identified? If not actually seen, how was it located? MPI [Mean Point of Impact] was located by "G.H."
Any Interference on Bomb Run? None
Did C-1 [Autopilot] function satisfactory? The C-1 Pilot was not used.
Any other factors affecting accuracy? None
[Signed] Allen G. McDonald, 2nd Lt., Air Corps, Lead Bombardier
Combat Bombing Flight Record:
I certify that this 12E Form is complete and accurate.
[Signed] Warren C Steitz, Captain, Air Corps, Group Bombardier.
High Squadron, 94th CBW "A" Group
Bombardier - 2nd Lt. McDonald, Allen G.
Pilot - 1st Lt. Rossen, Henry B.
Navigator - F/O Walker, Paul A.
Aircraft B-17G Z-469 Take-off - 1050 Landed - 1820
Objective - Soest, Germany
Aiming Point (MPI) [Mean Point of Impact] - M/Y [R.R. Marshalling Yard] By "G.H."
Initial Point - As Briefed
Method of Attack - Bombing was in Group Formation on the Lead of High.
No. of Attacking A/C in Group: - 36 Composite Group - ____
Number A/C Dropping Bombs by own Sighting Operation: ____
Deflection and Range Sighting, Group: One Composite Group - ____
Range Sighting only, Group - __ Composite Group - ____
Bombs, Types and Sizes - 5 x 500 Lb. G.P.[General Purpose] & 6 x M17 I.B's & Markers
Number of Bombs Loaded - As Above Released - Same
Fusing, Nose - 1/10 Tail - 1/40
Synchronization - On
Information at Release Point: Lead's M.H. [Magnetic Compass Heading] was 300° and Low's was 300°
|Altitude of Target - 330||Magnetic Heading Ordered 318° Actual 300°|
|True Altitude Above Target - 25,900||True Heading 294°|
|Indicated Altitude - 25,600||Drift, Estimated 9° Right - Actual 2° Right|
|Pressure Altitude of Target -310||True Track 296°|
|Altimeter Setting 29.92||Actual Range 11,039'|
|Calculated Indicated Air Speed - 150K||Bomb Sight Type - M-9|
|True Air Speed - 194K||Time of Release 15:04:30|
|Ground Speed Est. 190 Actual 200||Length of Bombing Run - 12 miles|
|Wind Direction Metro - 270° Actual - 280°||Intervalometer Setting - 30 Feet|
|Wind Velocity Metro 40 Actual 36|| C-1 Pilot [Autopilot] _____|
|D.S. - 121 Trail - 91 ATF - 43.6||A-5 Pilot _____|
|Tan. D.A, Est. .37 Actual .32 ||Manual Pilot - X [Used]|
Type of Release - Train 30'
Point of Impact If Seen - Unobserved
Mean Temp. Metro -10.5 Actual -10
Winds - Altitude - 26,000 Ft. Direction - Metro 270° Actual 280° Velocity - Metro 40 Actual 36
Temp C. - Metro -38° C. Actual -36° C.
Narrative Teletype Report:
- No leaflets were carried on today's mission.
The three squadrons of this group bombed the M/Y [RR Marshalling Yard] at Soest, Germany, through 10/10 clouds by Gee-H methods. The Gee-H equipment of the lead A/C
malfunctioned and bombing was done in Group formation on the lead A/C of the high squadron. Mickey [Radar] Operators estimate that bombs fell slightly to the right, North, of the briefed MPI [Mean Point of Impact]. Photographs show only 10/10 clouds and no ground detail.
No E/A [Enemy Aircraft] were encountered and no claims [of enemy aircraft being shot down] are being submitted.
Flak at the target was meager and inaccurate and trailed behind this formation. No other flak was encountered along the route.
There were 10/10 clouds in the target area but weather in general did not hinder formation flying on the bomb run.
There were no observations of military importance.
The equipment of the four PFF A/C provided by this group worked well but that of the combination PFF-Gee H A/C from Kimbolton [379th Bomb Group] functioned poorly. The
Gee H equipment of the high leader operated well enough for bombing purposes but both the PFF and Gee H of the lead A/C malfunctioned. The Scouting Force furnished adequate
weather information. Fighter support was good. Because no flak was encountered at the front lines this group had no occasion to observe the effectiveness of the fire
control relay A/C. None of our A/C are missing.
Click on Chart to Enlarge
Last Four numbers and Call Letter of A/C in each Squadron:
|a. 94th Combat Wing "A" Group Lead Squadron - 351st Group|
|Sqdn 508th A/C: D–6082|
|Sqdn 509th A/C: G–8617, P–6907|
|Sqdn 510th A/C: C–9020, G–7862, M–9001, N–7665, P–8038, S–7512, U–7216, (T–9156 Spare)|
|Sqdn 511th A/C: (D–8664 PFF)|
|Sqdn 524th A/C: (Z–8198 GH & PFF)|
|b. 94th Combat Wing "A" Group Low Squadron - 351st Group|
|Sqdn 508th A/C: B–7349, C–8753, G–8954, H–8412, K–8130, L–7956, U–8813, Y–6108, (X–6579 Spare)|
|Sqdn 509th A/C: None|
|Sqdn 510th A/C: None|
|Sqdn 511th A/C: (L–8045 PFF), C–6952, G–8872, Q–6565|
|c. 94th Combat Wing "A" Group High Squadron - 351st Group|
|Sqdn 508th A/C: None|
|Sqdn 509th A/C: C–8640, F–6565, L–2955, M–7964, O–8920, Q–8166, R–6156, T–8666, U–8591|
|Sqdn 510th A/C: A–8465, B–6610|
|Sqdn 511th A/C: None|
|Sqdn 527th A/C: (GH & PFF Z-8469) |
- Target: GH 444
W/T and R/T Operational Call Sign of each Squadron:
|Squadron||508 [Call Sign]||W/T LOH R/T CARLTON||Squadron||510 [Call Sign]||W/T UWM R/T TIPSTAFF|
|Squadron||509 [Call Sign]||W/T PDM R/T HOTMINT||Squadron||511 [Call Sign]||W/T TSQ R/T PARTNERSHIP|
Taxi – 1040; Take-Off – 1055; E.T.D. Field – 1055
|Time:||Height: ||Place of Crossing English Coast: (OUT)|
|1300||14,000 Ft ||North Foreland|
|Time:||Height: ||Place of Crossing Enemy Coast: (IN)|
|1418||17,000 Ft ||51°15'N-02°55'E [Bredene, Belgium]|
|Time:||Height: ||Place of Crossing Enemy Coast: (Out)|
|1709||10,000 Ft ||51°15'N-02°55'E [Bredene, Belgium]|
|Time:||Height: ||Place of Crossing English Coast: (IN)|
|1740||5,000 Ft ||Felixstowe|
- E.T.R.(Estimated Time of Return) Base: 1821 Hours
- MF/DF [Medium Frequency/Direction Finder] Section: "G"
Bomb load of Each A/C: "A" Lead Box
Lead Squadron: 18 x 250 G.P. - 1/10 x 1/40 Plus 2 M17 I.B's [Incendiary Bomb]
Low Squadron: 18 x 250 G.P. - 1/10 x 1/40 Plus 2 M17 I.B's
High Squadron: 6 x 500 G.P. - 1/10 x 1/40 Plus 6 M17 I.B's
Fuel Load of each A/C: 2500 Gallons
Lead Sqdn: Rank & Name: Lt. Col. Ball A/C No & Sqdn. Z-8198 GH (524)
Low Sqdn: Rank & Name: Lt Peterson A/C No & Sqdn. L-8045 PFF (511)
High Sqdn: Rank & Name: Lt. Rossen A/C No & Sqdn. Z-8469 GH (527)
Passengers, if any: (Full Name, Rank, A/C and Squadron Passenger flying with)
Report Compiled By Maksimik, John, S/Sgt.
|94th "A" Group - Lead Squadron Formation at Take–Off and Over Target|
Lt Col Ball–GibbonsA/C 44-8198 Z GH & PFF [379th BG]
HaskinsA/C 42-38038 P
Stewart–RedmanA/C 44-8664 D PFF
OakesA/C 44-8617 G
BrooksA/C 43-39001 M
DahlborgA/C 43-37512 S
GonskeA/C 44-6082 D
AdamsA/C 43-37665 N
Peterson, A.E.A/C 43-39020 C
ReboA/C 43-37862 G
BoneA/C 43-39156 T Spare
OenA/C 44-6907 P
HaftA/C 42-97216 U
[Lt Bone, the Flying Spare, returned as planned.]
|94th "A" Group - High Squadron Formation at Take–Off and Over Target|
Rossen–TurnerA/C 44-8469 Z GH & PFF [379th BG]
NowakowskiA/C 43-38920 O
MadduxA/C 42-102955 L
TaylorA/C 43-38116 Q
QuinnA/C 44-6610 B
BrennanA/C 43-38666 T
MuellerA/C 44-6566 F
WefelA/C 43-38640 C
ThomsonA/C 44-6156 R
GattensA/C 43-38591 U
SextonA/C 43-37964 M
HamtonA/C 43-38465 A
|94th "A" Group - Low Squadron Formation at Take–Off and Over Target|
Bennett–Peterson, T.G.A/C 44-8045 L PFF
KaleA/C 44-6108 Y
RohrA/C 43-38954 G
HansenA/C 44-6952 C
BeringerA/C 43-97349 B
StewardA/C 44-8412 H
AndersonA/C 43-38813 U
RussellA/C 43-37956 L
RyanA/C 43-38130 K
HornsA/C 43-38753 C
DunnA/C 44-6579 X Spare
JamesA/C 43-38872 G
HartA/C 44-6565 Q
[Lt Dunn, the Flying Spare, returned as planned.]
1200 BST [British Standard Time] Briefing:
Enlisted Men 0730; Officers 0800 Stations:
1010 Start Engines:
Enlisted Men 0630; Officers 0700]
[Wounded On Mission:
The above records were obtained at the National Archives Records Administration and have been
declassified by authority NND 745005