351st Bomb Group

Polebrook, England

Group Mission #294

Credited Mission #287

DATE: 15 Mar. 1945
Target: R.R. Station & Marshalling Yard at
Oranienberg, Germany

  1. Ask 508th, 509th and 510th Operations representatives if their crews are all present.

  2. Read Special briefing poop.

    1. The Visual Primary for today is: 1. RR Station & Marshalling Yard at Oranienberg [Germany] (Visual Only)
    2. PFF Primary: ____
    3. Visual Secondary: 2. Berlin - Steel Works
    4. PFF Secondary: 3. Berlin - Steel Works (PFF)
    5. Last Resort Target: 4. Wittenberg - Component Parts Factory
    6. Last Resort Target: 5. Wittenberg - Component Parts Factory

  4. S-2 [Intelligence] Information: The Primary target is a Marshalling Yard where at present there is a large amount of very important Military movement.

  5. Weather:

  6. Time Schedule:
    Zero Hour: - 1100 1130Stations: - 0945 1015
    Start Engines: - 0955 1025Taxi: - 1015 1045
    Take Off: - 1030 1100Last Take Off: - 1115 1145
    Intercept Group atCromerat10,000 ft.
    Target Time: - 1430 1500ETR [Estimated Time
       of Return]:

    - 1756
    Depart English Coast at:1205 1235at Cromer

    Time on oxygen: 4 hours

    TIME TICK [Set your watches.]

  7. Loadings:
     Gasoline: 2,780 Gallons
     Bombs: 5 x 500 G.P. 1/10 x 1/40 [Fuses] Plus 5 x M-17 IB [Incendiary Bomb]

  8. Intervalometer Settings: Visual or H2X - 160 Feet

  9. Chaff: Commence discharge of chaff at - IP - Continue for 15 minutes.
        Each A/C [Aircraft] will carry - 360 units.

  10. Disposition of Forces:

    3 Divisions will be dispatched. The 1st Air Division will depart England 2nd ("A" Force) preceded by 2nd Division and followed by the 3rd Division and 1 AD ("B" Force).
    1st Division will dispatch 4 CBW's of 3 Groups each.
    The order of attack in the 1st Division will be:
    Lead40th AAttackingZossen
    2nd40th BAttackingZossen
    3rd40th CAttackingZossen
    4th41st AAttackingZossen
    5th41st BAttackingZossen
    2nd Division targets areZossen
    3rd Division targets areOranienberg

  11. Fighter Cover: 4 Gps. of P-51's - Close Support

  12. Assembly:
    Lead at8,000feet on Kings Cliffe BuncherRed-GreenFlares
    High at9,000feet onKings CliffeBuncherGreen-GreenFlares
    Low at7,000feet onKings CliffeBuncherRed-RedFlares
    401st at9,500feet onCottesmoreBuncherRed-YellowFlares
    457th at8,000feet onGlattonBuncherRed-YellowFlares
    Combat Wing Assembly Line: ____
    Division Assembly Line: Cromer to 52°45’N-04°35’E [Leihoek, Netherlands]
    1 minutes interval between Groups.
    Reference altitude: 24,000'
    Bombing altitude: 22,000'
    Point for instrument let-down Kings Cliffe magnetic heading of 30 degrees.

  13. Call Signs:
    351stWoodcraft C - Charlie
    401stWoodcraft B - Baker
    457thWoodcraft A - Able
    1st Div. Air Commander"B" Force - Major Richardson
    94th CBW Air CommanderCapt. Dozier

  14. The following ships will monitor [Radio Channels]- "B" - M-964, O-435, G-954; "C" - 8th A.F. - Z-696; "C" - 67th Fighter Wing - U-591.
    Other Communications information will be found on the flimsy.

  15. FLYING CONTROL: _____

     a. Type of Bombing Formation - PFF Bombing will be done by Group Formation
     b. Bombardier and Navigator of the #3 A/C of each sqdn. report to Photo Lab.
      The A/C are: Lead - O-920, Low - V-705, High - P-258
     c. Ball Turret Gunners of the following A/C report to Photo Lab: Lead - B-592, C-640; Low - C-020, L-515; High - B-349, G-954
     d. Camera A/C: Lead - R-156, Low - S-512, High - Q-799
      return at  Continental Coast Out [Bound]
     e. Spares to turn back at 04° East.
     f. PFF A/C fly as Lead & Deputy Lead of Lead Sqdn., Lead of High & Low Sqdns.
     g. GH A/C fly as ____
     h. REMARKS: 
       Scouting Force - 4 P-51s - Buckeye Blue [Call Sign] arrive at target 20 minutes prior to W/C [Woodcraft Charlie (351st BG)]
       Russian Recognition Signals: Basic - Dip Right Wing 3 to 5 times
       Secondary - Dip Left Wing 3 to 5 times
       A/C [Aircraft] S-512 loaded with long delay fuses. Bombardier Use Caution.

  17. You are reminded not to discuss the target. EXERCISE ALL SECURITY MEASURES.


Operational Narrative.
  1. Date of Mission - 15 March, 1945.
    1. Target Attacked:  The 94th "C" Group attacked the primary target at Oranienburg, Germany.
    2. Force: 94th “C” Group. Thirty-eight aircraft, including four PFF ships and two flying spares were dispatched.
    3. Position: The 94th "C" Group flew in its briefed position as the lead group of the "B" Task Force of the First Air Division.
    4. Lead Teams
      Task Force Lead
      Air Commander: Major F.A. Richardson
      Pilot:Captain Duane S. Anderson
      Navigator:1st Lt. Milto J. Morrisette
      Bombardier:1st Lt. Gerald E. Traczewitz

      Low Squadron
      Leader: 1st Lt. Thomas G. Peterson
      Pilot:2nd Lt. Douglas W. Creek
      Navigator:2nd Lt. Robert G. Craig
      Bombardier:1st Lt. Robert L. Adams

      High Squadron
      Leader: 1st Lt. Henry R. Rossen
      Pilot:1st Lt. Vincent R. Cramer
      Navigator:F/O Paul A. Walker
      Bombardier:2nd Lt. Allen G. McDonald
  2. Narrative.
    1.  Squadron and Group Assembly: The formation made its assembly over the Kings Cliffe buncher without difficulty at the briefed altitude of 8,000 feet. Complete data on winds aloft was not available due to the fact that the weather ship could not be contacted.
    2.  Route Over England: Departure from the assembly area was made two minutes early (1232). The briefed route was followed to the right of course, as the formation departed from the English coast at the Wash [an inlet on the coast, NE of Polebrook] and proceeded to Control Point #1. As it was evident that the formation would be ahead of time at Control Point #1, the turn to the south to Cromer was made east of the briefed point. No difficulty was encountered in doing so, and the formation reached the briefed departure point from the English coast one minute early (1304) at the briefed altitude of 10,000 feet.
    3.  Division Assembly Line: Departure from the English coast was made one minute early from the briefed time. The First Combat Wing was observed approaching the departure point from the south and it experienced no difficulty in getting into position behind the 94th “C” Group. The route flown while crossing the channel was to the left of the briefed course. The formation, however, encountered no difficulty in doing so, and as a result was able to reach the coast of Holland at the briefed time (1344). Stronger winds than anticipated had been met. As a result, the formation was unable to climb as fast as briefed, and so crossed the Dutch coast at an altitude of 17,000 feet, 3,000 feet below the briefed height. The Third Air Division Formation was observed ahead when the coast was crossed, and the “B” Task Force fell into position behind it.
    4.  Flight to Target: The briefed route was followed while crossing the Zuider Zee, but the “B” Task Force gained on the Third Division and as a result was forced to go to the right of course. Flak opposition was encountered when this divergency was made, and so the formation pulled back to the briefed course as quickly as possible. The return to the briefed route was made at 08°00’E. It was followed with slight divergency to the IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run]. The IP was reached four minutes early (1514) at the briefed altitude of 22,000 feet.
    5.  Description of Bombing Run: The primary target at Oranienburg, Germany, was attacked visually by squadrons. The Weather Scouting Force had been contacted and had reported that visual bombing would be possible.

      The lead Squadron performed its own sighting operation. The briefed turn was made at the IP. Cloud cover was nil, but visibility was limited to ten miles due to ground haze. It was necessary to use triangulation to locate the MPI [Mean Point of Impact]. Some interference was encountered on the bomb run from flak and from the prop wash of the Mosquito Screening Force, which passed in front of the 94th “C” Group. The C-1 Pilot [Autopilot] was used and functioned satisfactorily. Heavy smoke from previous bombing made sighting difficult.

      The High Squadron bombed ahead of the Low Squadron. As the interval was large between the Lead and Low Squadrons, the High Squadron had no difficulty in taking its position in trail of the Lead Squadron. The High Squadron performed its own sighting operation. The briefed turn was made at the IP. Visibility was poor due to smoke and haze. The MPI was located by the explosions of previous strikes. This Squadron reports no other difficulties on the bomb run. The C-1 pilot was used and functioned satisfactorily.

      The lead navigator of the Low Squadron was of the opinion that the Lead Squadron was off course to the left on the bomb run, and so flew to the right of the Lead Squadron. This disagreement between the Lead and Low Squadrons was responsible for the variance between them which permitted the High Squadron to proceed ahead of the Low Squadron on the bomb run. The Low Squadron performed its own sighting operation. Visibility was poor due to ground haze. It was necessary to triangulate to locate the MPI. No interference was encountered on the bomb run. The C-1 Pilot is reported as having functioned satisfactorily.
    6.  Flight From Target: The rally after bombing was carried out satisfactorily. The formation cut inside of the briefed turn after the target and then had to go to the north of the briefed course in order to avoid flak observed on the briefed course. After this divergency, the formation slowly closed into the briefed course, following two groups of the Third Division and flying as a wing. The briefed course was contacted north of Hanover. In following the preceding formations, the 94th “C” again went to the north of the briefed course, returning to it at the Dutch coast. Departure from the coast of Holland was made at the briefed point at an altitude of 16,000 feet. The briefed route was closely followed in the flight to the English coast and departure from the Third Division was made at mid-channel. The briefed point of entry at the English coast was reached at Cromer at an altitude of 9,000 feet. A direct route to base, slightly to the left of the planned course, was flown. The High and Low Squadrons were sent to their respective stand-off areas before landing. A normal let-down procedure had been followed.
    7.  Fighter Support: Good.
    8.  Comments: No aircraft were lost. No enemy aircraft were encountered. Flak at the target was moderate to intense and accurate for both height and deflection. The weather was clear over the target area, but there was a ground haze in this area. PFF units were employed as navigational aids, and all sets worked well. The information supplied by the Weather Scouting Force was satisfactory.
    9.  Aircraft Not Attacking: Two aircraft returned to base early. One flying spare returned as planned.

  [Signed] Carl C. Hinkle, Jr, Major, Air Corps, Operations Officer

351st Bombardment Group
Lead SquadronLow SquadronHigh SquadronTOTALS
Borrowed Aircraft0000
No. of Aircraft Failing to Take Off0000
No. of Aircraft Sorties13121338
No. of Aircraft Airborne Less Unused Spares12121337
No. of Aircraft Credit Sorties12121135
No. of Effective Sorties12121135
No. of Non-Effective Sorties0022
Name of Primary TargetORANIENBURG, GERMANY
(A) No. of A/C Attacking Primary Target13121237
(B) No., Size & Type Of Bombs 60 x 500# GP 
60 x 500 IB
 60 x 500# GP 
60 x 500 IB
 55 x 500# GP 
55 x 500 IB
 175 x 500# GP 
175 x 500 IB
Name of Secondary Target
(A) No. of A/C Attacking Secondary Target
(B) No., Size & Type Of Bombs
Name of Last Resort Target (LRT)
(A) No. of A/C Attacking LRT
(B) No., Size & Type Of Bombs
Name of Target of Opportunity (T.O.)
(A) No. of A/C Attacking T.O.
(B) No., Size & Type Of Bombs
No. of A/C MIA - Total0000
No. of A/C MIA - Flak
No. of A/C MIA - Flak and E/A
No. of A/C MIA - Enemy Aircraft
No. of A/C MIA - Accident over Enemy Terr.
No. of A/C MIA - Other and Unknown
Time of Take Off112611281127
Time of Attack152415251523
Total Time for Mission91:2190:5889:19271:38
Altitude of Release (Indicated)22,000’21,400’22,600’
Visual, H2X, Gee-H, M-H, Eagle, or CombinationVISUALVISUALVISUAL
Enemy Resistance – Fighter0000
Enemy Resistance – Bombers0000
U.S. A/C Engaged by Enemy Aircraft0000
Number of Passes made by Enemy Aircraft0000
Non-Effective Sorties
(A) Weather
(B) Personnel
(C) Enemy Action
(D) Other Non-Mechanical
(E) Mechanical and Equipment0022
Incidents of Mechanical & Equipment Failure:
(A) Engine00A/C 43-379561
(B) Oil System
(C) Fuel System
(D) Supercharger
(E) Propeller and Governor00A/C 43-382771
(F) Communication System
(G) Guns and Turrets
(H) Bomb Release
(I) Bombay Doors
(J) Electric System
(K) Instruments
(L) Oxygen Equipment
(M) Bomb Sights
(N) A/C in General

____ A/C borrowed as follows: None
____ A/C loaned as follows: None

Lead Bombardier’s Narrative:
Date - March 15, 1945
Field Order # 657
Squadron or Group - Lead Sqdn., 351st Group
Target - Oranienburg, [Germany] Marshalling Yards
  1. Type of Bombing (Visual, PFF or Combined)?  Visual
  2. Did Squadron perform own sighting operation, bomb on smoke marker, or was bombing done in Group Formation? Squadron performed own sighting Operation.
  3. Was turn made at briefed I.P.? Yes
  4. Cloud coverage and visibility. Clouds - Nil; Visibility 10 miles due to Haze.
  5. If Visual, when was MPI identified? If not actually seen, how was it located? Triangulated to locate MPI [Mean Point of Impact].
  6. Any Interference on Bomb Run? Prop Wash and Flak.
  7. Did C-1 [Autopilot] function satisfactory? Yes.
  8. Any other factors affecting accuracy? Heavy smoke from previous bombing.
  [Signed] Gerald E. Traczewitz, 1st Lt., Air Corps, Lead Bombardier

Combat Bombing Flight Record:

I certify that this 12E form is complete and correct.
Warren C. Steitz, Captain, Air Corps, Group Bombardier.
Lead Squadron, 351st Group
Bombardier - 1st Lt. Gerald E. Traczewitz
Pilot - Anderson, D. S.
Navigator - Morrisette, M. J.

Aircraft B-17G   D-684  Take-off - 1130 Landed - 1900
Objective - Oranienburg [Germany] Marshalling Yards
Aiming Point (MPI) [Mean Point of Impact] - As Briefed
Initial Point - As Briefed
Method of Attack - Squadron
No. of Attacking A/C in Group: - 12   Composite Group - ____
Number A/C Dropping Bombs by own Sighting Operation: ____
Deflection and Range Sighting, Group: One   Composite Group - ____
Range Sighting only, Group - __   Composite Group - ____
Bombs, Types and Sizes - 5 x 500# G.P.[General Purpose], 5 x 500# I.B.'s [Incendiary Bomb] & Markers
Number of Bombs Loaded - As Above   Released - Same
Fusing, Nose - 1/10   Tail - 1/40
Synchronization - On

Information at Release Point:  Bombed in Squadron Formation

Altitude of Target - 125 FeetMagnetic Heading Ordered 085° Actual 101°
True Altitude Above Target - 22,308True Heading 098°
Indicated Altitude - 22,000Drift, Estimated 5° Right - Actual 8° Right
Pressure Altitude of Target -221True Track 106°
Altimeter Setting 29.92Actual Range 12,269.4'
Calculated Indicated Air Speed - 150KBomb Sight Type - M-9 Mercury
True Air Speed - 212KTime of Release 1524 Hours
Ground Speed Est. 250 Actual 244Length of Bombing Run - 37 N.M.
Wind Direction Metro - 305° Actual - 330°Intervalometer Setting - 160'
Wind Velocity Metro 23 Actual 40 C-1 Pilot [Autopilot] - O.K.
D.S. - 135.3  Trail - 53   ATF - 39.18A-5 Pilot _____
Tan. D.A, Est. .549 Actual .55 Manual Pilot ____

Type of Release - Train
Point of Impact If Seen - Unobserved
Mean Temp. Metro -6° Actual -5°
Winds - Altitude - 22,000 Ft.  Direction - Metro 305°  Actual 330°  Velocity - Metro 23  Actual 40
Temp C. - Metro -30° C. Actual -28° C.

Preliminary Damage Assessment:
  1. The three squadrons of this group attacked the primary target at Oranienburg, Germany. The target area was partially obscured by smoke and ground haze and the target was identified by triangulation of visual checkpoints. The assigned MPI [Mean Point of Impact] was completely covered by smoke. Photo cover is fair but accurate assessment cannot be made.
  2. The G.P. [General Purpose] bombs of the lead squadron can be seen falling on and around the MPI with the heaviest concentration slightly to the right. Later photos show the Incendiary bombs covering the M/Y [Marshalling Yard] in the vicinity of the MPI. Damage from GP and Incendiary bombs should be heavy.
  3. The bombs of the low squadron can be seen falling into the smoke of the target area but definite bursts cannot be plotted. From bombs away position and smoke markers these bombs will fall in the same approximate area as the lead squadron.
  4. The bombs of the high squadron fell 16,707 feet short of the target and just north of the main Heinkel Bomber Component Factory near Oranienburg. Approximately 15 GP bombs hit in the factory area and there are at least two direct hits on a large workshop building. Incendiary bombs are seen later covering the northern part of the factory area. The main concentration of the high squadron fell into a small residential section and damage in this section should be severe.
  [Signed:] Thomas L. Cooper, Captain, Air Corps, Group P.I. [Photo Intelligence]

Narrative Teletype Report:
  1. No leaflets were carried by this Group.
  2. Three squadrons of this Group bombed Oranienburg, Germany, railroad station and railroad sidings. Bombing was done by squadrons, using the triangulation methods of target identification. The target was partially obscured by ground haze, and smoke of previous bombing covered the assigned MPI [Mean Point of Impact]. Photos show that the bombs of the lead squadron fell into the target area and some bursts are seen adjacent to the M/Y [Marshalling Yard]. The bombs of the low squadron fell into the smoke and no definite bursts can be plotted. The high squadron bombs fell approximately three miles short of the target and damage is unknown.
  3. No E/A [Enemy Aircraft] were encountered and no claims [of enemy aircraft being shot down] are being submitted.
  4. Flak at the target was moderate to intense and accurate for both height and deflection. Meager fairly accurate flak was encountered in the Dummer Lake area and north of Magdeburg. There was moderate fairly accurate flak north of Brendenburg. Meager fairly accurate flak was encountered at Liebenwalde. Moderate flak was observed in the vicinity of Wittenberge, and meager flak was observed over Berssen.
  5. At 5300 N. – 1240 E., at 1540 hours, what appeared to be an oil refinery was observed, and 24 tank cars on a siding nearby were also spotted. A jet plane was observed at 5258-0305, at 1324 hours. Two balloon barrages were observed, one at 5245-1210 containing four balloons, and the other at 5232-0915 containing 19 balloons.
  6. PFF units were employed as navigational aids, and all four sets worked well. Fighter support was good. Scouting Force was Satisfactory. None of our aircraft is missing.

Track Chart:
Click on Chart to Enlarge

Abortive Report
Aircraft No. L-956 Squadron - 508 - High  Date - 15 Mar., 1945
    1. Reason for abortive #3 - cylinder head blew off.
    2. Place and altitude 52°50'N 4°20'E
    3. Time 1320
    4. Position in formation Lead Low Element - High Sqdn.
    5. Disposition of bombs Returned to Base
    6. Remarks Possible weak spot in cylinder - Low power settings - No excessive boost.
    7. Time & Date dispatched ____
      (Pilot's Signature) Charles E. Bennett

Abortive Report
Aircraft No. A-428 Squadron - 509  Date - 15 Mar., 1945
    1. Reason for abortive Spare
    2. Place and altitude 4° E at 14,000 Pressure Alt.
    3. Time 13:36
    4. Position in formation F/S [Flying Spare] (Lead)
    5. Disposition of bombs Brought Back
    6. Remarks Very good formation (full - 36 ships)
    7. Time & Date dispatched ____
      (Pilot's Signature) William A. Day

Abortive Report
Aircraft No. O-277 Squadron - 508 - High  Date - 14th Mar. 1945
    1. Reason for abortive #3 prop ran away beyond control.
    2. Place and altitude 0220E 5320N 7300'
    3. Time 1418
    4. Position in formation No. 2 of low in high sqdn.
    5. Disposition of bombs jettison at point 3.
    6. Remarks I personally checked no. 3 on the ground after returning and it checked O.K.
    7. Time & Date dispatched ____
      (Pilot's Signature) John H. Hart

“J” Form:
  1. Last Four numbers and Call Letter of A/C in each Squadron:
    a. 94th Combat Wing "C" Group   Lead Squadron - 351st Group
    Sqdn 508th A/C: None
    Sqdn 509th A/C: B–8592, C–8640, G–8617, M–7964, O–8920, P–6907, R–6156, U–8591, V–8070, Z–7696, (A–8428 Spare)
    Sqdn 510th A/C: None
    Sqdn 511th A/C: D–8664 PFF, L–8045 PFF

    b. 94th Combat Wing "C" Group   Low Squadron - 351st Group
    Sqdn 508th A/C: None
    Sqdn 509th A/C: None
    Sqdn 510th A/C: A–8465, C–9020, D–8694, H–8280, L–7515, M–9001, N–7665, O–8435, S–7512, T–9156, V–7705
    Sqdn 511th A/C: H–8780 PFF

    c. 94th Combat Wing "C" Group   High Squadron - 351st Group
    Sqdn 508th A/C: A–8410, B–7349, G–8954, H–8412, K–8130, L–7956, O–8277, P–7258, Q–8799, U–8813, Y–6108, (M–7900 Spare)
    Sqdn 509th A/C: None
    Sqdn 510th A/C: None
    Sqdn 511th A/C: Y–7651 PFF
  2. Target: GN-5802
  3. W/T and R/T Operational Call Sign of each Squadron:
    Squadron508 [Call Sign]W/T UKA R/T CARLTONSquadron510 [Call Sign]W/T SVY R/T TIPSTAFF
    Squadron509 [Call Sign]W/T TBU R/T HOTMINTSquadron511 [Call Sign]W/T LFL R/T PARTNERSHIP
  4. Taxi – 1015; Take-Off – 1030; E.T.D. Field – 1134
  5. Time:Height:  Place of Crossing English Coast: (OUT)
    120510,000 Ft Cromer
  6. Time:Height:  Place of Crossing Enemy Coast: (IN)
    124420,000 Ft 52°45'N-04°37'E [Leihoek, Netherlands]
  7. Time:Height:  Place of Crossing Enemy Coast: (Out)
    163620,000 Ft 52°45'N-04°37'E [Leihoek, Netherlands]
  8. Time:Height:  Place of Crossing English Coast: (IN)
    17245,000 Ft Cromer
  9. E.T.R.(Estimated Time of Return) Base: 1756 Hours
  10. MF/DF [Medium Frequency/Direction Finder] Section: "G"
  11. Bomb load of Each A/C: "A" Lead Box
    Lead Squadron: 5 x 500 G.P. - 1/10 x 1/40 Plus 5 x M17 IB's [Incendiary Bomb]
    Low Squadron: 5 x 500 G.P. - 1/10 x 1/40 Plus 5 x M17 IB's
    High Squadron: 5 x 500 G.P. - 1/10 x 1/40 Plus 5 x M17 IB's
    ___ Squadron:
  12. Fuel Load of each A/C: 2780 Gallons
  13. Leaders:
    Lead Sqdn: Rank & Name: Maj. Richardson A/C No & Sqdn. D-8664 PFF (511)
    Low Sqdn: Rank & Name: Lt. Peterson A/C No & Sqdn. H-8780 PFF (511)
    High Sqdn: Rank & Name: Lt. Rossen A/C No & Sqdn. Y-7651 PFF (511)
  14. Passengers, if any: (Full Name, Rank, A/C and Squadron Passenger flying with)

Report Compiled By I.C. Muesing, S/Sgt.

Formation Chart:
94th "C" Combat Group - Lead Squadron Formation at Take–Off and Over Target
509th Squadron
Richardson–Anderson, D.S.
A/C 44-8664 D PFF
A/C 43-38920 O
A/C 44-8045 L PFF
A/C 44-6907 P
A/C 44-8617 G
A/C 43-37696 Z
A/C 43-38640 C
A/C 43-38591 U
A/C 43-37964 M
A/C 43-38592 B
A/C 43-38428 A Spare
A/C 43-38070 V
A/C 44-6156 R

[Lt Day, the flying spare, returned as planned.]

94th "C" Combat Group - High Squadron Formation at Take–Off
508th Squadron
A/C 42-97651 Y PFF
A/C 42-97258 P
A/C 44-6108 Y
A/C 44-8410 A
A/C 42-97349 B
A/C 43-38813 U
A/C 43-38277 O
A/C 44-8412 H
A/C 43-38954 G
A/C 43-37956 L
A/C 43-37900 M Spare
A/C 43-38130 K
A/C 43-38799 Q

94th "C" Combat Group - High Squadron Formation Over–Target
508th Squadron
A/C 42-97651 Y PFF
A/C 42-97258 P
A/C 44-6108 Y
A/C 44-8410 A
A/C 42-97349 B
A/C 43-38813 U
A/C 44-8412 H
A/C 43-38954 G
A/C 43-37956 L
A/C 43-38130 K
A/C 43-37900 M

[Lt Hart aborted. Lt. Barnard aborted. His position was filled by Lt. Ryan, the flying spare.]

94th "C" Combat Group - Low Squadron Formation at Take–Off and Over Target
510th Squadron
Peterson, T.G.
A/C 44-8780 H PFF
A/C 43-37705 V
A/C 42-97252 K
A/C 43-39020 C
A/C 43-39001 M
A/C 43-37665 N
A/C 43-38435 O
A/C 43-38465 A
A/C 44-8280 H
A/C 43-39156 T
Peterson, A.E.
A/C 43-37515 L
A/C 43-37512 S

Time Schedule:
Zero Hour: 1130 BST [British Standard Time]  Briefing: Enlisted Men 0700; Officers 0730 Stations: 1015 Start Engines: 1025 Taxi: 1045 Take-Off: 1100  Leave Base: 1100 [Breakfast: Enlisted Men 0600; Officers 0630]

[Wounded On Mission: 0]
The above records were obtained at the National Archives Records Administration and have been declassified by authority NND 745005
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