351st Bomb Group

1. Ask 508th, 509th and 510th Operations representatives if their crews are all present.
   
   
2. Read Special briefing poop.
   
   
3. TARGETS:
   
   1. 1. The Visual Primary for today is: Zeitz [Germany] Flak guns
   2. 2. PFF Primary: Plauen [Germany] Cellulose Factory
   3. 3. Visual Secondary: Plauen [Germany] Cellulose Factory
   4. 4. PFF Secondary: Weimar [Germany] Marshalling Yard
   5. 5. Last Resort Target: ____
   
   
4. S-2 [Intelligence] Information: ____
   
   
5. Weather:
   
   
6. Time Schedule:

   Zero Hour:	- 1300		Stations:	- 0810
   Start Engines:	- 0820		Taxi:	- 0835
   Take Off:	- 0850		Last Take Off:	- 0920
   Intercept Group at	A-59 [Cormeilles-En-Vexin, France]	at	3,000 ft.
   Target Time:	- 1421		ETR [Estimated Time    of Return]:	- 1840
   Depart English Coast at:	____	at ____

   
   Time on oxygen: 4 hours
   
   TIME TICK [Set your watches.]
   
   
7. Loadings:

   Gasoline:	2,780 Gallons
   Bombs:	20 x 260 Frags [Fragmentation Bombs] Instantaneous Fusing - Nose and Tail

   
   
8. Intervalometer Settings: Visual - Min. - H2X - 50 Ft.
   
   
9. Chaff: Commence discharge of chaff at - 9 mins before Target - Continue for 12 minutes.
     Each A/C [Aircraft] will carry - 288 units.
   
   
10. Disposition of Forces:
    
    __ Divisions will be dispatched. The 1st Air Division will depart England ____ preceded by ____ Division and followed by the ____ Division.
    1st Division will dispatch __ CBW's of __ Groups each.
    The order of attack in the 1st Division will be:
    

    Lead	____	Attacking	____
    2nd	____	Attacking	____
    3rd	____	Attacking	____
    4th	____	Attacking	____

    2nd Division targets are	____
    3rd Division targets are	____

    
    
11. Fighter Cover: 1 Gps. of P-51's - per Group; 1 Group of P-51s Free Lance
    
    
12. Assembly:

    Lead at	3,000	feet on	A-59 [Cormeilles-En-Vexin, France]	Buncher	Red-Green	Flares
    High at	4,000	feet on	A-59 [Cormeilles-En-Vexin, France]	Buncher	Green-Green	Flares
    Low at	2,000	feet on	A-59 [Cormeilles-En-Vexin, France]	Buncher	Red-Red	Flares
    401st at	____	feet on	____	Buncher	____	Flares
    457th at	6,000	feet on	A-59 [Cormeilles-En-Vexin, France]	Buncher	Red-Yellow	Flares

    Combat Wing Assembly Line: at Buncher
    Division Assembly Line: C1 to C4
    1 minutes interval between Groups.
    Reference altitude: 18,000'
    Bombing altitude: 23,500'
    Point for instrument let-down Kings Cliffe magnetic heading of 30 degrees.
    
    
13. Call Signs:

    351st	Woodcraft Able
    401st	____
    457th	Woodcraft Baker
    1st Div. Air Commander	Lt. Col. Ball
    94th CBW Air Commander	Lt. Col. Ball

    
    
14. The following ships will monitor [Radio Channels]- "B" - D-082, V-070, B-610; "C" - 8th A.F. - C-753; "C" - 67th Fighter Wing - O-277.
    Other Communications information will be found on the flimsy.
    
    
15. FLYING CONTROL: _____
    
    
16. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:
     a. Type of Bombing Formation - By Squadrons
     b. Bombardier and Navigator of the #3 A/C of each sqdn. report to Photo Lab.
      The A/C are: U-813, M-964, P-038
     c. Ball Turret Gunners of the following A/C report to Photo Lab: Lead Ship - F-376, M-900, N-169, C-020
     d. Camera A/C: P-258, D-193, D-694
      return at  Coast
     e. Spares to turn back at Before Enemy Lines
     f. PFF A/C fly as - Lead and Deputy Lead of Lead Sqdn.
     g. GH A/C fly as Lead of Low Sqdn. and High Sqdn.
     h. REMARKS: 
       Land at B-53 [Merville, France] only.
       Russian recognition signals rock wing 3 - 5 times.
    
    
17. You are reminded not to discuss the target. EXERCISE ALL SECURITY MEASURES.
    
    

1. Date of Mission - 26 March, 1945.
   1. Target Attacked:  The No. 2 target at Plauen, Germany, was attacked visually.
   2. Force: 94th “A” Group. Thirty-eight aircraft, including three H2X aircraft, one combination H2X-GH ship, and two flying spares, were dispatched.
   3. Position: The 94th “A” Group flew as the lead group of the First Division Formation on the flight to the target. The withdrawal was made behind the "Cowboy Able Group.
   4. Lead Teams

      	Division Lead
      	Air Commander:	Lt Col Clinton F. Ball
      	Pilot:	Captain Duane S. Anderson
      	Navigator:	1st Lt. Milton J. Morrisette
      	Bombardier:	1st Lt. Gerald E. Traczewitz

      
      

      	Low Squadron
      	Leader:	1st Lt. Charles E. Daugherty
      	Pilot:	2nd Lt. Raymond J. Works, Jr
      	Navigator:	1st Lt. Joseph A. Glover, Jr
      	Bombardier:	Captain Wayne R. Smith

      
      

      	High Squadron
      	Leader:	Captain Jay H. Maish
      	Pilot:	1st Lt. Paschel M. Huff
      	Navigator:	1st Lt. Melvin L. Ouder
      	Bombardier:	1st Lt. Mart G. Smith

2. Narrative.
   1.  Flight from Base to Assembly Area: The aircraft took off and proceeded individually to the assembly point (Buncher A-59) on the continent. The briefed route was followed with little difficulty, but it was impossible to fly as high as the briefed altitude of 7,500 feet en route to the assembly area due to cloud cover and icing. The lead aircraft arrived at the assembly point one minute early (1028) at an altitude of 3,000 feet.
   2.  Squadron and Group Assembly: The assembly began at 3,500 feet due to building cumulus. Before the assembly was completed, the lead aircraft was forced to fly at 5,000 feet to avoid brushing off the Low Squadron on the rapidly building cumulus. The 457th Group was also having difficulty with clouds at their assembly altitude and were forced to hold their altitude. The assembly was completed before the planned departure time from the buncher.
   3.  Division Assembly Line: Departure from the assembly area was made eight minutes late at an altitude of 5,000 feet. VHF communication with the weather ship and with the Weather Scouting Force revealed that Point A could not be reached below the reference altitude (18,000 feet). Hence an additional 360° turn was made to lose time. The briefed route was followed for a short distance after leaving the buncher, but it was soon found necessary for the formation to turn to the right and fly to the south of course in order to avoid the worst of generally bad weather. It was necessary to ess continually in order to avoid the thicker parts of the cloud and a fast climb was made in the hope of getting above the weather. The briefed route was crossed and paralleled to the left of course in the Luxembourg area. It was then necessary for the formation to cross the briefed route again and fly to the right of and south of the planned route in order to avoid weather. The end of the Division Assembly Line was reached south of the briefed point two minutes late (1302) at an altitude of 22,000 feet, 12,000 feet above the briefed height. The 94th “B” Group and “Cowboy Baker” were seen behind the Division Lead Group. “Cowboy Able” was to the north, but managed to join the formation behind the 41st “B” Group south of Control Point #1 by cutting to the south. The 1st Combat Wing had reported that it was at least twelve minutes behind the Division schedule, and it was planned to take advantage of course deviations in order to allow the 1st “A” to fall in later.
   4.  Flight to Target: The formation closed into the briefed route and contacted it at Control Point #2, five minutes early (1310), at an altitude of 22,000 feet. From that point the briefed east-west leg was followed with little divergency. A double drift was necessary in order to permit the following groups to close up their intervals. Swordfish Able was contacted and reported that he was behind the formation, but about the same number of minutes ahead of the briefed time. He was able to join the formation a short time later. Two more double drifts were made in order to close up the formation once again. It had been necessary to climb to 23,500 feet, but difficulty from the weather and rough air was still encountered. The Weather Scouting Force was contacted and it reported that reference altitude plus five would be the best flying altitude. The formation decreased its altitude to that height and called the 94th “B” down also. The turn before the IP for target #1 was reached seventeen minutes early (1339) at the briefed altitude of 23,500 feet. Weather again forced the formation to the right of the briefed course on the flight to the IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run]. The Weather Scouting Force announced that weather at No. 1 was six-tenths, and that it could not pin point the No. 1 target. It was thus assumed that this target was not profitable. The decision was made to attack the No. 2 target. The heading of the formation at that time would not enable it to make a turn into the No. 2 target, and so a 360° turn to the right was executed. The 94th “B” and 41st “B” Groups followed the 94th “A” in this turn. The IP was set up at Karlsbad at an altitude of 23,000 feet. The Low Squadron had been on the inside of the 360° turn, and found that it was unable to stay with the Lead and High Squadrons. “Small Leak Blue” the Mosquito Screening Force, was very quick to react to the change in plan, and had no trouble preceding the 94th “A” in on its run on the #2 target.
   5.  Description of Bombing Run: In order to insure keeping the squadrons from becoming separated with such poor rally weather, the Division Leader had instructed them to remain in group formation. Also, the weather conditions in the area did not indicated that the target would be sufficiently open to permit visual bombing. A mickey run was made with the Lead and High Squadrons flying a tight formation, while the low Squadron followed behind in trail after having fallen behind as a result of the 360° turn. The Lead Squadron performed its own sighting operation and the High Squadron dropped on it. The MPI [Mean Point of Impact] was visually identified while the formation was still ten miles from the target. The target was partially obscured by clouds, and thus, sighting was somewhat hindered. The C-1 Pilot [Autopilot] was not used as the air was too rough to set it up.
      
      The Low Squadron followed the Lead and High Squadrons on the bombing run. Before the bombardier could make a proper sighting, the formation was too close to the target. A 360° turn was executed by the squadron and a second run was made on the target. The Low Squadron performed its own sighting operation. Cloud cover and rough air presented some difficulty; smoke from previous bombing also hindered good bombing. The C-1 Pilot was not used satisfactorily due to the rough air.
   6.  Flight From Target: After bombing, the Lead and High Squadrons turned to the right and flew north to the briefed rally point, as the Division Leader felt that that would be the best way to contact the other groups of the Division Formation. Fighters were contacted and instructed to escort the Low Squadron to a pre-arranged meeting place with the Lead and High Squadrons. It was necessary for the formation to ess through the clouds after having contacted the briefed course northwest of the No. 1 target. The formation soon got behind Cowboy Baker which had cut across to the west, and followed it. The Low Squadron joined the formation at that time. The briefed route was no flown closely because of the weather difficulties. The planned course was contacted at Control Point #2 at an altitude of 17,000 feet, 3,000 feet below the briefed height. From that point to the French coast, the briefed route was followed with comparatively minor divergencies. The Weather Scouting Force recommended letting down to an altitude of 2,000 to 6,000 feet at the Rhine River. This recommendation was followed, and the formation descended to 4,000 feet. Cycle Relay then recommended flying above the Low cloud, but could not state the altitude of the low cloud. A message from the Weather Scouting Force, which at first recommended climbing to 10,000 feet, was received, but the ascent was not made. Shortly before reaching the French coast, the formation again veered to the south of course, where the weather looked better. The departure from the French coast was made to the left of the briefed point at an altitude of 3,500 feet. The formation was below the stratus at an altitude of 3,000 feet, and above cumulus which rose generally up into the bottom of the stratus, before it finally broke out through a small opening. Definite cloud layers which the formation could fly between were found from that point on back to base. The English coast was crossed to the left of the briefed point at an altitude of 2,000 feet. Cowboy Baker was seen crossing the English coast at the same time to the right of the division Lead Group. The formation returned to base at an altitude of 2,000 feet, flying to the left of the briefed route. The High and Low Squadrons were sent to their respective stand-off areas before landing.
   7.  Fighter Support: Good. Appeared as briefed.
   8.  Comments: No aircraft were lost. No enemy aircraft or flak was encountered. Weather conditions throughout the entire mission caused severe, turbulent air at altitude, making assembly and flying of the briefed course difficult. Large bulging cumulus forced the formation off course at several points. The Weather Scouting Force was contacted and furnished accurate and helpful information.
      
      Weather conditions were such that a set altitude or heading could not be maintained for more than ten minutes at one time. Large deviations from course were continually necessary, but not fatal, due to the fact that all units involved were together in column, including fighters, screening force, and scouting force.
   9.  Aircraft Not Attacking: There were no failures to attack. All aircraft returned to base. The two flying spares returned early as planned.

1. Flight Plan and Log attached.
2. Track Chart attached.
3. Narrative.
   1. T/O at 0855 hours.
   2. Group formed at 1122 hours on A-39 [Châteaudun, France] buncher at 4,000 feet.
   3. Wing assembly was completed at 1122 hours at A-39.
   4. Route over England was (not) flown as briefed. 
   5. Methods of Navigation over England. Gee, DR [Dead Reckoning], Radio and Pilotage
   6. Division formation was joined at 1122 hours at A-39
   7. Flight to IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run] was (not) flown as briefed. 
   S'ing to avoid clouds and went direct to Pt B.
   8. Methods of Navigation to the I.P. Gee, DR [Dead Reckoning], pilotage, Mickey [Radar]
   9. BOMB RUN.
      1. Actual I.P. was not as briefed. 
      2. True heading over target. 265.
      3. Actual Drift 18° Right.
      4. Altitude over Target 23,500.
      5. Time Bombs Away 1407½.
      6. Wind used for bombing 220°/62 knots.
      7. Method of target identification. Mickey and Visual
      8. Difficulties on bomb run. Rough Air
      9. Weather over Target. Clear but surrounded by clouds 4-5/10 cover
      10. Axis of withdrawal 269° Mag. [Magnetic Compass Heading]
   10. Group rally was accomplished at 50°47'N 10°00'E at 1450 hours.
   11. Wing rally was accomplished at 50°47'N 10°00'E at 1450 hours.
   12. Division rally was accomplished at ____ at ____ hours.
   13. Flight home was was (not) as briefed. S'ing to avoid clouds
   14. Methods of navigation on return route. Gee, mickey, pilotage and radio.
   15. Winds aloft were (not) called out to the formation.
   16. Fighter rendezvous' were (not) as briefed.
   17. PERFORMANCE OF EQUIPMENT.
       1. Mickey [Radar]: ____
       2. Gee: ____
       3. Radio Compass: ____
       4. Fluxgate: ____
       5. Other Equipment ____

1. Type of Bombing (Visual, PFF or Combined)?  Visual
2. Did Squadron perform own sighting operation, bomb on smoke marker, or was bombing done in Group Formation? Lead Sqdn performed own sighting operation ans the High Sqdn dropped on the Lead at 1407 Hours on a M.H. [Magnetic Compass Heading] of 268°.
3. Was turn made at briefed I.P.? Yes
4. Cloud coverage and visibility. 7/10 at start of run.
5. If Visual, when was MPI [Mean Point of Impact] identified? If not actually seen, how was it located? MPI was identified 10 miles away.
6. Any Interference on Bomb Run? Clouds interfered [sic] on the two thirds of run.
7. Did C-1 [Autopilot] function satisfactory? C-1 was not used as the air was too rough to set it up.
8. Any other factors affecting accuracy? None

I certify that this 12E form is complete and correct.
Warren C. Steitz, Captain, Air Corps, Group Bombardier.
Lead Squadron, 94th CBW "A" Group
Bombardier - 1st Lt. Traczewitz, Gerald E.
Pilot - Lt. Col. Ball, C.F. & Capt. Anderson, D.S.
Navigator - 1st Lt. Morrisette, Milton J.

Aircraft B-17G   825-Q  Take-off - 0850 Landed - 1900
Objective - Vomag Machinenfabrik A.G. at Plauen, Germany
Aiming Point (MPI) [Mean Point of Impact] - As Briefed
Initial Point - As Briefed
Method of Attack - High Squadron dropped on Lead Squadron
No. of Attacking A/C in Group: - 24   Composite Group - ____
Number A/C Dropping Bombs by own Sighting Operation: ____
Deflection and Range Sighting, Group: One   Composite Group - ____
Range Sighting only, Group - __   Composite Group - ____
Bombs, Types and Sizes - 20 x 260 Lb. AN-M41 Frag. Clusters
Number of Bombs Loaded - As Above   Released - Same
Fusing, Nose - None   Tail - Instantenous
Synchronization - On

Information at Release Point:  High's M.H. [Magnetic Compass Heading] was 268° at 1407 Hours,

Type of Release - Minimum
Point of Impact If Seen - As Briefed
Mean Temp. Metro -5.5 Actual -5.5
Winds - Altitude - 23,000 Ft.  Direction - Metro 180°  Actual 225°  Velocity - Metro 27K  Actual 65K
Temp C. - Metro -18° C. Actual -30° C.

1. The three squadrons of this group attacked as the priority No. 2 target the Vomag Machinenfabrik A.G. at Plauen, Germany. Photo cover is complete for all squadrons.
2. The bombs of the lead squadron fell slightly left of the assigned MPI [Mean Point of Impact] with some hits in the target area. A fairly heavy concentration of bombs fell on the spinning mill of Sachsische Zellwolle A.G. just west of the target and later photos show the building to be burning. The pattern measures 1938 feet by 2230 feet with the center of the pattern 1000 feet left of the assigned MPI. Percentages are 42% for 1000 feet and 100% for 2000 feet.
3. The pattern of the high squadron fell to the right of the target area with some hits in the target area. Damage will be light. The pattern is 1710 feet by 3990 feet with the center 1000 feet right of the MPI. Percentage will be 33% for 1000 feet and 91% for 2000 feet.
4. The bombs of the low squadron fell into smoke and the entire pattern cannot be plotted. The partial pattern is 4320 feet short (East) of the target area and is in the southern part of the city. There will be possible damage to a small R.R. siding and residential area.

1. No leaflets were carried by this Group.
2. The three squadrons of this Group formed the 94th “A” CBW and led the 1st Air Division to the No. 2 target, Plauen, Germany. The target was the Vomag Machinenfabrik A.G. Bombing was done visually and photos show the bombing results to be fair. The bombs of the lead squadron fell slightly left of the assigned MPI [Mean Point of Impact] with some hits in the target area. There are some hits on the “C” target – the Spinning mill of Sachsische Zellwolle A.G. The high Squadron bombs fell slightly right of the assigned MPI with a few hits in the target area. The low squadron pattern fell approximately 1500 yards short of the target landing in the southern portion of the city. The lead and high squadrons bombed together and the low squadron made a separate run.
3. No E/A [Enemy Aircraft] were encountered and no claims [of enemy aircraft being shot down] are being submitted.
4. No flak was encountered en route or at the target but moderate flak was observed in the Zeitz area.
5. Weather conditions throughout the entire mission caused severe turbulent air at altitude, making assembly and flying of the briefed course difficult. Large bulging cumulus forced the formation off course at several points. Cloud coverage in the No. 1 target area prevented this Group from attacking it. Three to five tenths undercast was encountered at the No. 2 target.
6. A smoke screen covered a large area in the vicinity of 5032 N – 1142 E at approximately 1337 hours.
7. Four PFF A/C were used by this Group on today’s mission. All sets worked well and were used as navigational aids along the route and for setting a course into the target area. Fighter support was good and appeared as briefed. The Scouting Force was contacted and their information was accurate and helpful. None of our A/C is missing.
8. Weather conditions encountered by this group on the entire route in and out made it extremely difficult to make points or times en route good. The group was eight minutes early leaving its assembly point and was unable to make the next two points good. The first point made good after assembly was Control Point No. 2, at which point they were five minutes early. On the next leg the formation was forced several miles to the South of course toward Nurnburg but managed to make the next point, seventeen minutes early. The Scouting Force informed the Air Commander that they were unable to pick up the No. 1 target due to cloud coverage and a decision was made to make a run on No. 2 target. The No. 2 target was attacked after making a 360 degree right turn in the vicinity of the assigned I.P. [Initial Point of Bomb Run]. The lead squadron picked up the target and the high squadron followed through, bombing on the smoke markers of the Lead. The Low squadron had difficulty in making the 360 degree turn and was unable to pick up the target on the first run. A successful bomb run was made by the Low Squadron after another 360 degree turn. Due to the turbulent air encountered, crews were unable to use the C-1 equipment [Autopilot] and were forced to make the bomb run by PDI [Pilot Deviation Indicator]. The Lead and High squadrons cut North after bombing and were two minutes early at the first point after No. 1 target. They were unable to get on course until about half way down the leg leading into Control Point No. 2 where they were met by the Low Squadron which had cut straight West after bombing. The group crossed the front lines at 20,000 feet and left Control Point No. 2 at 4000 feet. Flying three to ten miles north of course until they reached 4 degrees East, where they cut to south of course about seven miles and paralleled their course on into the English coast. Let down was as per SOP [Standard Operating Procedure].

1. Abortives and Flying Spares:
   1. Airplane No. 44-8412, 508th Squadron, returned early as planned.
   2. Airplane No. 42-97252, 510th Squadron, returned early as planned.

1. PILOT'S STATEMENT:
   1. Reason for abortive F/S [Flying Spare]
   2. Place and altitude 49°35' - 08°00' 19,000'
   3. Time 1250
   4. Position in formation Diamond in High Element
   5. Disposition of bombs BB [Brought Back]
   6. Remarks ____
   7. Time & Date dispatched ____
     (Pilot's Signature) Charles J. Harkins

1. PILOT'S STATEMENT:
   1. Reason for abortive Flying Spare
   2. Place and altitude Rhine River at 18,000'
   3. Time 1250
   4. Position in formation ____
   5. Disposition of bombs Returned to Base
   6. Remarks ____
   7. Time & Date dispatched ____
     (Pilot's Signature) George M. Stamps

1. Last Four numbers and Call Letter of A/C in each Squadron:

   a. 94th Combat Wing "A" Group   Lead Squadron - 351st Group
   Sqdn 508th A/C: A–8410, C–8753, D–6082, K–8130, L–7956, M–7900, O–8277, P–7258, U–8813, Y–6108, (H–8412 Spare)
   Sqdn 509th A/C: None
   Sqdn 510th A/C: None
   Sqdn 511th A/C: (F–8376 PFF), (Z–8774 PFF),

   
   

   b. 94th Combat Wing "A" Group   Low Squadron - 351st Group
   Sqdn 508th A/C: None
   Sqdn 509th A/C: A–8428, D–7193, F–6566, M–7964, N–7169, O–8920, P–6907, R–6156, U–8591, V–8070, Z–7696
   Sqdn 510th A/C: None
   Sqdn 511th A/C: (L–8045 PFF)

   
   

   c. 94th Combat Wing "A" Group   High Squadron - 351st Group
   Sqdn 508th A/C: None
   Sqdn 509th A/C: None
   Sqdn 510th A/C: A–8465, B–6610, C–9020, D–8694, G–7862, H–8280, L–7515, M–9001, P–8038, S–7512, V–7705
   Sqdn 511th A/C: (Y–7651 PFF)

2. Target: GQ-1525
   
3. W/T and R/T Operational Call Sign of each Squadron:

   Squadron	508 [Call Sign]	W/T MOB R/T CARLTON		Squadron	510 [Call Sign]	W/T UMF R/T TIPSTAFF
   Squadron	509 [Call Sign]	W/T TGC R/T HOTMINT		Squadron	511 [Call Sign]	W/T ROX R/T PARTNERSHIP

4. Taxi – 0835; Take-Off – 0850; E.T.D. Field– 1114
   

5. Time:	Height:	Place of Crossing English Coast: (OUT)
   0937	7,500 Ft	Bexhill

6. Time:	Height:	Place of Crossing Enemy Coast: (IN)
   ____	____ Ft	Not Applicable

7. Time:	Height:	Place of Crossing Enemy Coast: (Out)
   1721	10,000 Ft	52°32'N-01°38'E

8. Time:	Height:	Place of Crossing English Coast: (IN)
   1737	10,000 Ft	Dungeness

9. E.T.R.(Estimated Time of Return) Base: 1839 Hours
10. MF/DF [Medium Frequency/Direction Finder] Section: "H"
11. Bomb load of Each A/C: "A" Lead Box
    Lead Squadron: 20 x 260 Frag. - Inst. Nose and Tail
    Low Squadron: 20 x 260 Frag. - Inst. Nose and Tail
    High Squadron: 20 x 260 Frag. - Inst. Nose and Tail
    ___ Squadron:
    
12. Fuel Load of each A/C: 2780 Gallons
    
13. Leaders:
    Lead Sqdn: Rank & Name: Lt. Col. Ball A/C No & Sqdn. F-8376 PFF (511)
    Low Sqdn: Rank & Name: Lt. Peterson A/C No & Sqdn. L-8045 PFF (511)
    High Sqdn: Rank & Name: Capt. Maish A/C No & Sqdn. Y-7651 PFF (511)
14. Passengers, if any: (Full Name, Rank, A/C and Squadron Passenger flying with)
    None

Report Compiled By M.C. Spivey, M/Sgt.