351st Bomb Group

Polebrook, England

Group Mission #306

Credited Mission #299

 
DATE: 31 Mar. 1945
Target: R.R. Marshalling Yard, Halle, Germany
 
BRIEFING OUTLINE

  1. Ask 508th, 509th and 510th Operations representatives if their crews are all present.

  2. Read Special briefing poop.

  3. TARGETS:
    1. The Visual Primary for today is: #1 Merseburg [Germany] (Synthetic Oil) - #2 Halle [Germany] Marshalling Yard
    2. PFF Primary: #3 Halle [Germany] Marshalling Yard
    3. Visual Secondary: #4 Weimar Marshalling Yard
    4. PFF Secondary: #5 Weimar Marshalling Yard
    5. Last Resort Target: ____

  4. S-2 [Intelligence] Information:

  5. Weather:

  6. Time Schedule:
    Zero Hour: - 0700Stations: - 0440
    Start Engines: - 0450Taxi: - 0505
    Take Off: - 0520Last Take Off: - 0615
    Intercept Group atDungenessat 7,000 ft.
    Target Time: - 0929ETR [Estimated Time
       of Return]:

    - 1438
    Depart English Coast at: 0723at Dungeness

    Time on oxygen: 3½ hours

    TIME TICK [Set your watches.]

  7. Loadings:
     Gasoline: Max Gallons
     Bombs:6 x 1000 [Lb.] Mk XIII 1/100 x 1/100 [Fuses]

  8. Intervalometer Settings: Visual - Salvo; H2X - 75'

  9. Chaff: Commence discharge of chaff at - 6 mins before Target - Continue for 15 minutes.
        Each A/C [Aircraft] will carry - 360 units.

  10. Disposition of Forces:

    3 Divisions will be dispatched. The 1st Air Division will depart England 3rd preceded by 2nd Division and the 3rd Division.
    1st Division will dispatch 4 CBW's of 3 Groups each.
    The order of attack in the 1st Division will be:
    Lead41stAttackingLutzkendorf - Halle
    2nd40thAttackingLutzkendorf - Halle
    3rd1stAttackingMerseburg - Halle
    4th94thAttackingMerseburg - Halle
    2nd Division targets areBrunswick - Nienhagen - Hassel
    3rd Division targets areDerbon - Strabsturt - Leopoldshall - Zeitz

  11. Fighter Cover: 6 Gps. of P-51's

  12. Assembly:
    Lead at6,000feet on Kings Cliffe BuncherRed-GreenFlares
    High at7,000feet onKings CliffeBuncherGreen-GreenFlares
    Low at5,000feet onKings CliffeBuncherRed-RedFlares
    401st at6,000feet onCottesmoreBuncherRed-YellowFlares
    457th at6,000feet onGlattonBuncherRed-YellowFlares
    Combat Wing Assembly Line: By St. Edm [Bury St. Edmonds] - Dungeness
    Division Assembly Line: Dungeness - [50°38’N-04°00’E] [Graty, Belgium]
    2 minutes interval between Groups.
    Reference altitude: 20,000'
    Bombing altitude: 25,000'
    Point for instrument let-down Kings Cliffe magnetic heading of 30 degrees.

  13. Call Signs:
    351stWoodcraft Able
    401stWoodcraft Charlie
    457thWoodcraft Baker
    1st Div. Air CommanderLt. Col. Thacker
    94th CBW Air CommanderMaj. Hinkle

  14. The following ships will monitor [Radio Channels]- All [A/C Monitor] "A" except "B" - A-410, P-907, S-512; "C" - 8th A.F. - H-412; "C" - 67th Fighter Wing - O-277.
    Other Communications information will be found on the flimsy.

  15. FLYING CONTROL: _____

  16. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:
     a. Type of Bombing Formation - Normal
     b. Bombardier and Navigator of the #3 A/C of each sqdn. report to Photo Lab.
      The A/C are: U-813, G-617, Q-565
     c. Ball Turret Gunners of the following A/C report to Photo Lab: ____
     d. Camera A/C: O-277, U-591, D-694
      return at  Continental Coast
     e. Spares to turn back at Continental Coast
     f. PFF A/C fly as Gp & Gp Deputy & Hi & Lo Sqdn. Leads
     g. GH A/C fly as ____
     h. REMARKS: 
       Fly good formation - watch for jets
       Russian Recognition - 1st Rock wings 3-5 times, 2nd dip left wing 3-5 times.

  17. You are reminded not to discuss the target. EXERCISE ALL SECURITY MEASURES.

  BRIEFING OFFICER: HAVE YOU READ SPECIAL BRIEFING POOP??


Operational Narrative.
  1. Date of Mission - 31 March, 1945.
    1. Target Attacked:  The No. 3 Target, Halle, Germany, was attacked by H2X methods.
    2. Force: 94th “A” Group. Thirty-eight aircraft, including three H2X ships, one combination H2X-GH aircraft, and two flying spares, were dispatched.
    3. Position: The 94th "A" Group flew as the tenth group in the First Division Formation, its briefed position.
    4. Lead Teams
      Wing Lead
      Air Commander: Major Carl C. Hinkle
      Pilot:Captain Frank H. Wilcox
      Navigator:2nd Lt. Robert G. Craig
      Bombardier:1st Lt. Jack P. Austin

      Low Squadron
      Leader: 1st Lt. George A. Patterson
      Pilot:2nd Lt. Harold A. Schulte
      Navigator:F/O Leon R. Phelps
      Bombardier:2nd Lt. Leonard L. Lesch

      High Squadron
      Leader: 1st Lt. Henry R. Rossen
      Pilot:2nd Lt. Autrey L. Lowe
      Navigator:F/O Paul A. Walker
      Bombardier:2nd Lt. Allen G. McDonald
  2. Narrative.
    1.  Squadron and Group Assembly: It was found that the briefed assembly altitude of 6,000 feet over the Kings Cliffe buncher could not be made good due to the cloud cover at that altitude. It was necessary to make the assembly at an altitude of 10,000 feet. However, as the formation had taken off soon enough to permit some spare time for the assembly, it was possible to depart on time (0623 and on course from an altitude of 10,000 feet.
    2.  Route Over England: The briefed route was followed without variation to Point E. It became evident that the ground speed was faster than briefed, due to the fact that the formation had been forced to choose a higher altitude at which to fly. In order to insure arriving at Control Point #1 on time, the formation flew to the right of the briefed course between Point E and Control Point #1. This enabled the formation to pass over the briefed departure point from the English coast at the briefed time (0623) at an altitude of 12,000 feet, 5,000 feet above the planned height.
    3.  Division Assembly Line: The preceding formations had been forced to fly above the briefed altitude in approaching Control Point #1. The formation got into position in the Division Column without difficulty and followed the preceding formations. The Division Column went slightly to the right of the briefed point of entry at the French coast, crossing one minute early (0731) at an altitude of 12,000 feet, 5,000 feet above the briefed height. Inside of the French coast, the formation followed the Division Column in climbing and following to the right of the briefed course. It was necessary for it to ess in order to maintain the proper interval before reaching 04°00’E, the end of the Division Assembly Line. This point was reached to the right of the briefed point in Division Column.
    4.  Flight to Target: The formation remained to the right of the briefed course, and a double drift was necessary in order to maintain interval. The front lines were crossed at an altitude of 21,500 feet. The turn to the briefed IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run] was reached six minutes late (0910) at an altitude of 24,000 feet, 1,000 feet below the briefed height. Information was received from the Weather Scouting Force that the No. 1 Target at Merseburg could not be attacked. The decision was made to bomb the target at Halle, Germany, the No. 2 and No. 3 target. The IP was reached at an altitude of 25,000 feet. As outlined in the field order, the formation selected the IP for the No. 3 Target at 51°30’N - 10°48’E and flew to the left of the briefed course in order to make this point good.
    5.  Description of Bombing Run: The target was found to be completely overcast. The bomb run was made in group formation. No interference was encountered on the bomb run. The C-1 Pilot [Autopilot] was used satisfactorily.
    6.  Flight From Target: After bombing, the formation made a left turn back to the selected IP, and followed the Division Column on a flight to the briefed route on a southwesterly heading. The planned course was followed to the right on the withdrawal. A gradual let-down was made, the French coast being crossed to the right of the briefed point at an altitude of 8,000 feet. The formation remained to the right of course on the flight from the French coast to the English coast, and for the majority of the route over England. The High and Low Squadrons were sent to their respective stand-off areas before landing.
    7.  Fighter Support: Good. Appeared as briefed.
    8.  Comments: No aircraft were lost. No enemy aircraft were encountered. Meager and accurate flak was encountered in the target area. The Weather Scouting Force was contacted and furnished accurate reports on the weather in the target area.
    9.  Aircraft Not Attacking: There were four failures to attack. Three aircraft returned to base early. One aircraft failed to release its bombs over the target, and brought them back to base. The two flying spares remained with the formation.

  [Signed] Robert B. Stratton, Captain, Air Corps, Statistical Officer


STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS
DIVISION FIELD ORDER NUMBER
351st Bombardment Group
Lead SquadronLow SquadronHigh SquadronTOTALS
Borrowed Aircraft0000
No. of Aircraft Failing to Take Off0000
No. of Aircraft Sorties13121338
No. of Aircraft Airborne Less Unused Spares13121338
No. of Aircraft Credit Sorties12121135
No. of Effective Sorties12121034
No. of Non-Effective Sorties1034
Name of Primary Target #1MERSEBURG, GERMANY
(A) No. of A/C Attacking Primary Target13121338
(B) No., Size & Type Of Bombs
Name of Secondary Target
(A) No. of A/C Attacking Secondary Target #2HALLE, GERMANY
(B) No., Size & Type Of Bombs
Name of Last Resort Target (LRT) #3HALLE, GERMANY
(A) No. of A/C Attacking LRT11121033
(B) No., Size & Type Of Bombs 66 x 1000# GP  71 x 1000# GP  60 x 1000# GP  197 x 1000# GP 
Name of Target of Opportunity (T.O.)(A/C Bombed with 3rd Air Division)
(A) No. of A/C Attacking T.O.11
(B) No., Size & Type Of Bombs6 x 1000# GP6 x 1000# GP
Includes following number of Pathfinder aircraft:
1 B-17G SH1 B-17G SH1 B-17G SH3 B-17G SH
1 B-17G HO(All Attacked)1 B-17G HO
No. of A/C MIA - Total0000
No. of A/C MIA - Flak
No. of A/C MIA - Flak and E/A
No. of A/C MIA - Enemy Aircraft
No. of A/C MIA - Accident over Enemy Terr.
No. of A/C MIA - Other and Unknown
Time of Take Off051505170518
Time of Attack0944½
Total Time for Mission103:59104:09101:25309:33
Altitude of Release (Indicated)25,000’
Visual, H2X, Gee-H, M-H, Eagle, or CombinationH2XH2XH2X
Enemy Resistance – AA Intensity & AccuracyMEAGER AND ACCURATE
Enemy Resistance – Fighter0000
Enemy Resistance – Bombers0000
U.S. A/C Engaged by Enemy Aircraft0000
Number of Passes made by Enemy Aircraft0000
Degree of SuccessRESULTS UNOBSERVED
Non-Effective Sorties1034
(A) Weather
(B) Personnel1023
(C) Enemy Action
(D) Other Non-Mechanical
(E) Mechanical and Equipment0011
Incidents of Mechanical & Equipment Failure:
(A) Engine0011
(B) Oil System
(C) Fuel System
(D) Supercharger
(E) Propeller and Governor
(F) Communication System
(G) Guns and Turrets
(H) Bomb Release
(I) Bombay Doors
(J) Electric System
(K) Instruments
(L) Oxygen Equipment
(M) Bomb Sights
(N) A/C in General
Comments

0 A/C borrowed as follows: None
0 A/C loaned as follows: None




Lead Bombardier’s Narrative:
Date - 31 March, 1945
Field Order # 535
Squadron or Group - Lead Sqdn., 94th CBW "B" Group
Target - Halle, Germany
  1. Type of Bombing (Visual, PFF or Combined)?  PFF
  2. Did Squadron perform own sighting operation, bomb on smoke marker, or was bombing done in Group Formation? Bombing was in Group Formation on the Lead Sqdn. High's M.H. [Magnetic Compass Heading] was 083° @ 0945 hours and Low's was 079° @ 0945 hours.
  3. Was turn made at briefed I.P.? Yes
  4. Cloud coverage and visibility. 10/10
  5. If Visual, when was MPI [Mean Point of Impact] identified? If not actually seen, how was it located? PFF
  6. Any Interference on Bomb Run? None
  7. Did C-1 [Autopilot] function satisfactory? Yes
  8. Any other factors affecting accuracy? None
  [Signed] Jack P. Austin, 1st Lt., Air Corps, Lead Bombardier

Combat Bombing Flight Record:

I certify that this 12E form is complete and correct.
Warren C. Steitz, Captain, Air Corps, Group Bombardier.
Lead Squadron, 94th "B Group
Bombardier - 1st Lt. Austin, Jack P.
Pilot - Major hinkle, C.C., Jr. & Capt. Wilcox, F.H.
Navigator - 2nd Lt. Craig, Robert C.

Aircraft B-17G   V-079  Take-off - 05:15 Landed - 14:00
Objective - Halle, Germany
Aiming Point (MPI) [Mean Point of Impact] - As Briefed - PFF
Initial Point - As Briefed
Method of Attack - Bombing was in Group Formation on the Lead Sqdn.
No. of Attacking A/C in Group: - 36   Composite Group - ____
Number A/C Dropping Bombs by own Sighting Operation: ____
Deflection and Range Sighting, Group: One   Composite Group - ____
Range Sighting only, Group - __   Composite Group - ____
Bombs, Types and Sizes - 6 x 1000 Lb. G.P.[General Purpose] & Markers
Number of Bombs Loaded - As Above   Released - Same
Fusing, Nose - 1/100   Tail - 1/100
Synchronization - On

Information at Release Point:   High's M.H. [Magnetic Compass Heading] was 083° @ 0945 and Low's was 079° @ 0945.

Altitude of Target - 340Magnetic Heading Ordered 090° Actual 079°
True Altitude Above Target - 24,300True Heading 075°
Indicated Altitude - 25,000Drift, Estimated 8° Right - Actual 9° Right
Pressure Altitude of Target +237True Track 084°
Altimeter Setting 29.92Actual Range 14,701.50'
Calculated Indicated Air Speed - 150KBomb Sight Type - M-9
True Air Speed - 221KTime of Release 09:44:30
Ground Speed Est. 290 Actual 265Length of Bombing Run - 40 N.M. [Nautical Miles]
Wind Direction Metro - 270° Actual - 302°Intervalometer Setting - 75 Feet
Wind Velocity Metro 65K Actual 50 C-1 Pilot [Autopilot] - X [Used]
D.S. - 130.4  Trail - 47   ATF - 40.63A-5 Pilot _____
Tan. D.A, Est. .61 Actual .605 Manual Pilot ____

Type of Release - Train 75'
Point of Impact If Seen - 10/10
Mean Temp. Metro -15 Actual -14
Winds - Altitude - 25,000 Ft.  Direction - Metro 270°  Actual 302°  Velocity - Metro 65K  Actual 50
Temp C. - Metro -40° C. Actual -34° C.



Narrative Teletype Report:
  1. No leaflets were carried by this Group.
  2. The three Squadrons of this Group formed the 94th “A” CBW, the tenth group of the 1st Air Division, and attacked by PFF methods number (3) target, the Marshalling Yards at Halle, Germany. Photos at bombs away show the ground covered with haze, and no ground details is [sic] visible. M/O [Mickey [Radar] Operators] estimate that the bombs fell in the target area.
  3. No E/A [Enemy Aircraft] were encountered and no claims [of enemy aircraft being shot down] are being submitted.
  4. Meager fairly accurate continuous following flak was encountered at the target. On the way in there was meager flak, good for height and fair for deflection, at Creuzburg. On the way out from the target there was meager flak, good for height and fair for deflection at Rotenburg.
  5. 6-8/10ths clouds were encountered en route and 10/10ths clouds at the target. These weather conditions caused some deviations from the briefed course and will be explained in paragraph (8).
  6. At Erfurt (5100N – 1100 E) a large explosion was seen at 0922 hours from an altitude of 24,300 feet. Smoke rose into the air to a height of 2000 feet and flames shot up to 1000 feet.
  7. Four PFF A/C [Aircraft] were used by this group on today’s mission. They proved to be very effective both as a navigational aid and for the actual bombing. Operators report that their sets performed efficiently. Fighter support was good and appeared as briefed. The Scouting Force was contacted by this group and their report was accurate concerning weather conditions existing in the target area. None of our A/C are missing. Our A/C H-412 due to adverse weather conditions was unable to find out formation and flew with and unknown group of the Third Division.
  8. Due to adverse weather conditions it was necessary for this group to assemble at 11000 feet, instead of the 7000 feet as briefed. It was necessary to make “S” turns on the route over England in order to make good their time at the different points. The difference in assembly altitude caused an increased ground speed and therefore, put the group ahead of schedule. Control Point No. 1 was reached on time at a point three miles North of the briefed route. The route in across France was flown five to ten miles to the South of the prescribed course. At Control Point No. 2 they were on curse but one minute late. From this point the mission was flown as briefed to a new I.P. [Initial Point of Bomb Run] which was necessitated by weather conditions in the target area. This I.P. was located three miles to the South of Nordhausen. The bomb run was flown without incident and after bombs away a sharp turn was made to the North to avoid as much flak as possible. The No. 3 target, the M/Y [R.R. Marshalling Yard] at Halle, was bombed by PFF methods in group formation. All PFF equipment worked well and bombing was from the briefed altitude of 25,000 feet. After the sharp turn to the North from the target they continued around to the I.P. used on the route in and then took a southwesterly route back to the briefed course which they intersected 20 miles to the West of the briefed point of intersection. The route was flown as briefed from this point to Control Point 3 which was reached 11 minutes early. This was caused by the difference in route after the target. From this point to the French coast the course was 10-15 miles to the north and parallel to the briefed course. From the French coast to base the briefed course was followed and the let down was as per SOP [Standard Operating Procedure].


Mission Summary Report:
  1. Abortives and Flying Spares:
    1. Airplane No. 44-8410, 508th Squadron, returned early because the Pilot was unable to locate the formation.
    2. Airplane No. 43-37705, 510th Squadron, returned early because the Pilot was unable to locate the formation.
    3. Airplane No. 44-6610, 510th Squadron, returned early. The Pilot stated #3 engine caught fire, and he had to pull fire extinguisher and feather engine. Engine instruments were normal. Investigation revealed a blown exhaust stack, #1 cylinder, #3 engine. No indication of previous crack was evident.
  [Signed:] John W. Freeman, Captain, Air Corps, Group Engineering Officer


Failure to Attack Target of Airplane No. 42-107124 on Mission of 31 March, 1945.
  1. Aircraft No. 42-107124 (Mechanical Bombing System) failed to attack target on operational mission of 31 March, 1945.
  2. Bombardier states there was no train release and salvo lever could not be moved forward.
  3. The bombing system was examined by the Group Armament Officer and found to be in good operating condition. The L-21 release handle (Bomb-Salvo) travels freely forward to full salvo position.
  4. It is believed that the Bombardier may not have rotated the lock on the L-21 release handle, in which case bombs could not be salvoed.
  5. Recommend the failure to attack be classified as PERSONNEL.
  [Signed:] Clemert E. Hayes, Captain, Air Corps, Group Armament Officer


Abortive Report
Aircraft No. 44-6610 Squadron - 510 - Hi Date - 31 Mar. 1945
  1. PILOT'S STATEMENT:
    1. Reason for abortive Fire in #3 Engine
    2. Place and altitude N/E Buncher 4,000 Ft.
    3. Time 6:05
    4. Position in formation Lead Low section of High Sqdn.
    5. Disposition of bombs Returned
    6. Remarks Exhaust broken heating up carb & cylinders.
    7. Time & Date dispatched ____
      (Pilot's Signature) Joseph P. Adams Jr.


Abortive Report
Aircraft No. V-705 Squadron - 510  Date - 31 Mar. 1945
  1. PILOT'S STATEMENT:
    1. Reason for abortive Lost Formation
    2. Place and altitude 13,000 5215 0020
    3. Time 6:35
    4. Position in formation No 3 of High flight High Sqdn.
    5. Disposition of bombs Returned
    6. Remarks Due to clouds
    7. Time & Date dispatched ____
      (Pilot's Signature) Joseph P. Garner


Abortive Report
Aircraft No. A-410 Squadron - 508  Date - 31 March 1945
  1. PILOT'S STATEMENT:
    1. Reason for abortive Lost formation - Proceeded to Control Point #1 - Missed formation by 19 Min.
    2. Place and altitude Control Point #1 - 12,000 ft.
    3. Time 0741
    4. Position in formation Lead Sqd. No. 3 - Low section.
    5. Disposition of bombs Returned to Field
    6. Remarks 100% Pilot Error
    7. Time & Date dispatched ____
      (Pilot's Signature) Gordon A. Sprecher, 2nd Lt., Air Corps


“J” Form:
  1. Last Four numbers and Call Letter of A/C in each Squadron:
    94th Combat Wing "A" Group
    1A - LEAD Squadron - 351st Group
     (A) Sqdn 508th A/C: A–8410, C–8753, D–6082, H–8412, L–7956, O–8277, Q–8799, U–8813, X–6579, Y–6108, (G–8954 Spare)
     (B) Sqdn 509th A/C: None
     (C) Sqdn 510th A/C: None
     (D) Sqdn 511th A/C: (V–8079 PFF), (F–8376 PFF)

    1B - LOW Squadron - 351st Group
     (A) Sqdn 508th A/C: None
     (B) Sqdn 509th A/C: B–8592, C–8640, G–8617, H–6952, L–2955, M–7964, P–6907, T–8666, U–8591, V–8070, Z–7696
     (C) Sqdn 510th A/C: None
     (D) Sqdn 511th A/C: (H–8780 PFF)

    1C - HIGH Squadron - 351st Group
     (A) Sqdn 508th A/C: None
     (B) Sqdn 509th A/C: None
     (C) Sqdn 510th A/C: B–6610, D–8694, F–7124, G–7862, K–7252, M–9001, Q–6565, S–7512, T–9156, U–7216, V–7705, (P–8038 Spare)
     (D) Sqdn 511th A/C: (L–8045 PFF)
  2. Target: GQ-1515
  3. W/T and R/T Operational Call Sign of each Squadron:
    Squadron508 [Call Sign]W/T MFB R/T CARLTONSquadron510 [Call Sign]W/T KQS R/T TIPSTAFF
    Squadron509 [Call Sign]W/T NBZ R/T HOTMINTSquadron511 [Call Sign]W/T MRK R/T PARTNERSHIP
  4. Taxi – 0505; Take-Off – 0520; E.T.D. Field – 0623
  5. Time:Height:Place of Crossing English Coast: (OUT)
    07237,000 ftDungeness
  6. Time:Height:Place of Crossing Enemy Coast: (IN)
    07327,000 ft50°52'N-01°35'E [Le Sodit, France]
  7. Time:Height:Place of Crossing Enemy Coast: (Out)
    13218,000 ft50°52'N-01°35'E [Le Sodit, France]
  8. Time:Height:Place of Crossing English Coast: (IN)
    13358,000 ftDungeness
  9. E.T.R.(Estimated Time of Return) Base: 1438 Hours
  10. MF/DF [Medium Frequency/Direction Finder] Section: "H"
  11. Bomb load of Each A/C: "A" Lead Box
    Lead Squadron: 13 A/C - 6 x 1000 G.P. Mark 13 - 1/100 x 1/100 [Fuses]
    Low Squadron: 12 A/C - 6 x 1000 G.P. Mark 13 - 1/100 x 1/100
    High Squadron: 13 A/C - 6 x 1000 G.P. Mark 13 - 1/100 x 1/100
    ___ Squadron:
  12. Fuel Load of each A/C: 2780 Gallons
  13. Leaders:
    Lead Sqdn: Rank & Name: Major Hinkle A/C No & Sqdn. V-8079 PFF (511)
    Low Sqdn: Rank & Name: Lt Patterson A/C No & Sqdn. H-8780 PFF (511)
    High Sqdn: Rank & Name: Lt Rossen A/C No & Sqdn. L-8045 PFF (511)
  14. Passengers, if any: (Full Name, Rank, A/C and Squadron Passenger flying with)
    None

Report Compiled By _____



Formation Chart:
94th "A" Combat Bomb Group - Lead Squadron Formation at Take–Off
508th Squadron
Hinkle–Wilcox
A/C 44-8079 V PFF
Wisdom
A/C 43-38813 U
Powell–Frank
A/C 44-8376 F PFF
Hansen
A/C 44-6108 Y
Sugg
A/C 43-38799 Q
Sprecher
A/C 44-8410 A
Fromme
A/C 44-6082 D
Westercamp
A/C 44-8412 H
Mordecai
A/C 43-38753 C
Bennett
A/C 43-37956 L
Barnard
A/C 43-38954 G Spare
Russell
A/C 43-38277 O
Hart, G.
A/C 44-6579 X


94th "A" Group Lead Squadron Formation Over–Target
508th Squadron
Hinkle–Wilcox
A/C 44-8079 V PFF
Wisdom
A/C 43-38813 U
Powell–Frank
A/C 44-8376 F PFF
Hansen
A/C 44-6108 Y
Sugg
A/C 43-38799 Q
Barnard
A/C 43-38954 G
Fromme
A/C 44-6082 D
Mordecai
A/C 43-38753 C
Bennett
A/C 43-37956 L
Russell
A/C 43-38277
Hart, G.
A/C 44-6579 X

[Lt Sprecher Aborted. Lt Barnard, the flying spare, flew in Lt Sprecher's position.]
[Lt Westercamp flew with the 3rd Division. Lt Hart flew with the Low Squadron.]


94th "A" Combat Bomb Group - High Squadron Formation at Take–Off
510th Squadron
Rossen–Lowe
A/C 44-8045 L PFF
Benedict–Ransom
A/C 44-6565 Q
Thomas–Brown
A/C 42-107124 F
Adams
A/C 44-6610 B
Peterson–Grissom
A/C 43-39001 M
Dantzler
A/C 42-97216 U
Dahlborg
A/C 43-37512 S
Garner
A/C 43-37705 V
Phillips
A/C 43-37862 G
Brooks–Bone
A/C 43-39156 T
Northrup
A/C 42-38038 P Spare
Hollister
A/C 42-97252 K
Gottschalk
A/C 43-38694 D


94th "A" Group High Squadron Formation Over–Target
510th Squadron
Rossen–Lowe
A/C 44-8045 L PFF
Benedict–Ransom
A/C 44-6565 Q
Thomas–Brown
A/C 42-107124 F
Adams
A/C 44-6610 B
Peterson–Grissom
A/C 43-39001 M
Dantzler
A/C 42-97216 U
Dahlborg
A/C 43-37512 S
Northrup
A/C 42-38038 P
Phillips
A/C 43-37862 G
Brooks–Bone
A/C 43-39156 T
Hollister
A/C 42-97252 K
Gottschalk
A/C 43-38694 D

[Lt Garner Aborted. Lt Northrup, the flying spare, flew in Lt Garner's position.]
[Lt Adams Aborted.]


94th "A" Combat Bomb Group - Low Squadron Formation at Take–Off
509th Squadron
Patterson–Schulte
A/C 44-8780 H PFF
Sanford
A/C 44-8617 G
Brennan
A/C 43-37964 M
Gattens–Sexton
A/C 43-38592 B
Workman–Hampton
A/C 44-6952 H
Brereton
A/C 42-102955 L
Thomson
A/C 44-6907 P
Day
A/C 43-38070 V
Bird
A/C 43-37696 Z
Wefel
A/C 43-38666 T
Barnard
A/C 43-38954 G Spare
Ware
A/C 43-38591 U
Weber
A/C 43-38640 C


94th "A" Group Low Squadron Formation Over–Target
509th Squadron
Patterson–Schulte
A/C 44-8780 H PFF
Sanford
A/C 44-8617 G
Brennan
A/C 43-37964 M
Gattens–Sexton
A/C 43-38592 B
Workman–Hampton
A/C 44-6952 H
Brereton
A/C 42-102955 L
Thomson
A/C 44-6907 P
Hart, G.
A/C 44-6579 X
Day
A/C 43-38070 V
Bird
A/C 43-37696 Z
Wefel
A/C 43-38666 T
Barnard
A/C 43-38954 G Spare
Ware
A/C 43-38591 U
Weber
A/C 43-38640 C

[Lt G. Hart scheduled to fly in the Lead Squadron, flew in the Low Squadron.]


Time Schedule:
Zero Hour: 0700 BST [British Standard Time]  Briefing: Enlisted Men 0200; Officers 0230 Stations: 0440 Start Engines: 0450 Taxi: 0505 Take-Off: 0520  [Breakfast: Enlisted Men 0110; Officers 0130]

[Wounded On Mission: 0]


The above records were obtained at the National Archives Records Administration and have been declassified by authority NND 745005
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