351st Bomb Group

Polebrook, England

Group Mission #310

Credited Mission #302

DATE: 7 Apr. 1945
Target: R.R. Marshalling Yard at Luneburg, Germany

  1. Ask 508th, 509th and 510th Operations representatives if their crews are all present.

  2. Read Special briefing poop.

    1. The Visual Primary for today is: #1 Reinsehlen [Germany]
    2. PFF Primary: #2 Luneburg [Germany] Marshalling Yards
    3. Visual Secondary: #3 Velzen [Germany] Marshalling Yards
    4. PFF Secondary: ____
    5. Last Resort Target: ____

  4. S-2 [Intelligence] Information:

  5. Weather:

  6. Time Schedule:
    Zero Hour: - 0810 1030Stations: - 0530
    Start Engines: - 0545 0945Taxi: - 0600 1000
    Take Off: - 0615 1015Last Take Off: - 0715 1115
    Intercept Group atClactonat 15,000 Ft.
    Target Time: - 1035 1435ETR [Estimated Time
       of Return]:

    - 1345 1745
    Depart English Coast at:0812 1217at Clacton

    Time on oxygen: 0530 hours

    TIME TICK [Set your watches.]

  7. Loadings:
     Gasoline: 2,400 Gallons
     Bombs:Lead & Low Sqdns - 38 x 150 G.P. 1/40 [Nose Fuse] x No Tail
    High Sqdn. 38 x 150 G.P.'s No Nose [Fuse] x 1/40 Tail [Fuse]

  8. Intervalometer Settings: 100 Feet for all Sqdns.

  9. Chaff: Commence discharge of chaff at - I.P. [Initial Point of Bomb Run] 15 minutes.
        Each A/C [Aircraft] will carry - 360 units.

  10. Disposition of Forces:

    3 Divisions will be dispatched.
    The 1st Air Division will depart England ____ preceded by 2nd & 3rd Division at Zero Hour.
    1st Division will dispatch 4 CBW's of 3 Groups each.
    The order of attack in the 1st Division will be:
    Lead94th AAttackingAir Field - Reinsehlen
    2nd41st AAttackingOil Storage - Hitzaker
    3rd1st AAttackingAir Field - Kohienbisson
    4th40th AAttackingAir Field - Wesendorf
    2nd Division targets areAirfields & Factories S.E. Hanover
    3rd Division targets areAirfields & Factories S.E. Hanover

  11. Fighter Cover: 6 Gps. of P-51's Area Support - 2 Gps. of P-51's Close Support

  12. Assembly:
    Lead at15,000feet on Kings Cliffe BuncherRed-GreenFlares
    High at16,000feet onKings CliffeBuncherGreen-GreenFlares
    Low at14,000feet onKings CliffeBuncherRed-RedFlares
    401st at15,000feet onCottesmoreBuncherRed-YellowFlares
    457th at15,000feet onGlattonBuncherRed-YellowFlares
    Combat Wing Assembly Line: Mendlesham to Clacton
    Division Assembly Line: Clacton to 51°38’N-04°37’E [Zevenbergen, Netherlands]
    2 minutes interval between Groups.
    Reference altitude: 15,000'
    Bombing altitude: 15,000'
    Point for instrument let-down Kings Cliffe magnetic heading of 30 degrees.

  13. Call Signs:
    351stWoodcraft Baker
    401stWoodcraft Charlie
    457thWoodcraft Able
    1st Div. Air CommanderCol. Rosner (457th)
    94th CBW Air CommanderCol. Stewart

  14. The following ships will monitor [Radio Channels]- "B" - H-412, B-592, A-465; "C" - 8th A.F. - D-082; "C" - 67th Fighter Wing - K-130.
    Other Communications information will be found on the flimsy.

  15. FLYING CONTROL: _____

     a. Type of Bombing Formation - Visual - Sqdn.; PFF - Group
     b. Bombardier and Navigator of the #3 A/C of each sqdn. report to Photo Lab.
      The A/C are: Lead - G-954, G-617, S-512
     c. Ball Turret Gunners of the following A/C report to Photo Lab: _____
     d. Camera A/C: L-956, F-566, K-252
      return at  Continental Coast Out
     e. Spares to turn back at All The Way In
     f. PFF A/C fly as Sqdn., Group & Deputy Group Leads.
     g. GH A/C fly as ____
     h. REMARKS: 
       Jet Fighters in Area
       351st Buncher 9K9 off air.
       Division Assembly Over Diver Area
       Stay At Briefed Altitude.
       Join Any 1st Division Group
       Additions to Nav. Log. - C.P. 2 - Coast In; C.P. 3 - 08°00' E Out [Bound]

  17. You are reminded not to discuss the target. EXERCISE ALL SECURITY MEASURES.


Operational Narrative.
  1. Date of Mission - 7 April, 1945.
    1. Target Attacked:  The No. 2 Target, Luneburg, Germany, was attacked by H2X methods with a visual assist.
    2. Force: 94th “B” Group. Thirty-eight aircraft, including two H2X ships, two combination H2X-GH aircraft, and two flying spares, were dispatched.
    3. Position: The 94th "B" Group flew in its briefed position as the second group in the First Division Formation on the flight to the target.
    4. Lead Teams
      Group Lead
      Air Commander: Lt Col James T. Stewart
      Pilot:Captain Joseph C. Robinson
      Navigator:1st Lt. Albert W. Allen
      Bombardier:1st Lt. Raymond E. Hall

      Low Squadron
      Leader: Captain Julian C. Meadows
      Pilot:Captain Edwin L. Olson
      Navigator:Major William F. Bounds
      Bombardier:1st Lt. Robert F. Schneider

      High Squadron
      Leader: 1st Lt. Morris G. Turner
      Pilot:2nd Lt. Boleslau Lipski
      Navigator:2nd Lt. John H. Brandon
      Bombardier:2nd Lt. Patrick J. Finnegan
  2. Narrative.
    1.  Squadron and Group Assembly: The assembly was carried out at the briefed altitude of 15,000 feet over the Kings Cliffe buncher after the take off had been delayed four hours. Slight difficulty was encountered when the deputy ship could not locate the lead aircraft and so began to fire flares. The aircraft started forming on the deputy, and by the time the lead ship located it, the group was almost entirely formed. The lead ship took its position and completed the assembly without further difficulty.
    2.  Route Over England: Departure from the assembly area was made two minutes late. The 94th “B” Leader decided to cut inside of the briefed course in order to make up the lost time and also to gain on the 94th “A” Group which was ahead of it. As a result, the briefed route was contacted for only a short while between points B and D. However, no difficulty was encountered, and the formation got into position behind the 94th “A” Group, the Division Lead.
    3.  Division Assembly Line: Control Point #1 was reached one minute late at the briefed altitude of 15,000 feet. The briefed Division Assembly Line was flown behind the 94th “A” Group. The end of the Division Assembly Line was reached at the briefed point, at the planned altitude of 15,000 feet. The formation was nineteen minutes late at that point, however.
    4.  Flight to Target: The formation followed the Division Lead Group in the flight to the target. The route to the IP was flown without divergency. The IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run] was reached forty minutes late (1457) at the briefed altitude of 15,000 feet. The Weather Scouting Force had previously reported that there was a 50% chance of being able to bomb the No. 1 Target visually. The Division Leader reported that he would split the 94th “A” Group into squadrons and start the run on the No. 1 target. If that target was not found to be open, he would attack the No. 2 Target.
    5.  Description of Bombing Run: The run was made on the No. 1 Target after the formation took its interval. As the mickey set [Radar] in the lead ship of the Low Squadron was out of commission, it followed closely behind the Lead Squadron. The Division Leader passed back the information that the No. 1 Target could not be attacked visually. The 94th “B” Group passed over this target and used it as an IP for the run on the No. 2 Target, Luneburg, Germany. The No. 1 Target was seen through a break in the cloud cover as the formation passed over it, but it was then too late for the formation to make a sighting on it.

      The Lead Squadron made its own H2X sighting. The No. 1 Target was used as an IP for the No. 2 target. It was possible for the bombardier to make a visual assist a few seconds before the bombs were dropped. As the mickey set in the lead aircraft of the Low Squadron was inoperative, it dropped on the bombs of the Lead Squadron.

      The High Squadron made its own H2X sighting. It was possible to make a visual assist shortly before the BRL [Bomb Release Line] was reached. The target area was identified, but the MPI [Mean Point of Impact] could not be seen.

      No interference was encountered on the bomb run. The C-1 Pilot [Autopilot] was used and functioned satisfactorily in all cases. Bombing results are believed to be good.
    6.  Flight From Target: After bombing the formation made a sharp turn in order to avoid any possible flak from the Hamburg area. The briefed route was not followed immediately after leaving the target. The Group Leader chose a course to the right of the briefed course which took the formation a safe distance from, and between, the Bremen and Hanover flak areas. The briefed route was contacted east of Osnabruck and was followed to the Dutch coast. The 94th “B” Group followed a “Swordfish” group on the withdrawal, flying third in the Division Column. The 94th “C” followed the 94th “B” on the withdrawal, while the 94th “A” is reported as having been farther back in the Division Column. The formation stayed above the clouds on the withdrawal. The Dutch coast was crossed at an altitude of 10,500 feet. The briefed route was followed with little divergency in the flight across the channel. The English coast was crossed at an altitude of 8,000 feet. A direct heading to the Kings Cliffe buncher was taken from the English coast. From that point an instrument let-down was made and the aircraft returned to base individually.
    7.  Fighter Support: Good.
    8.  Comments: No aircraft were lost. No enemy aircraft were encountered. No flak was encountered. The Weather Scouting Force was heard, and the information received was correct.
    9.  Aircraft Not Attacking: There were no failures to attack. The two flying spares remained with the group.

  [Signed] Robert B. Stratton, Captain, Air Corps, Statistical Officer

351st Bombardment Group
Lead SquadronLow SquadronHigh SquadronTOTALS
Borrowed Aircraft0000
No. of Aircraft Failing to Take Off0000
No. of Aircraft Sorties13121338
No. of Aircraft Airborne Less Unused Spares13121338
No. of Aircraft Credit Sorties13121338
No. of Effective Sorties13121338
No. of Non-Effective Sorties0000
Name of Primary Target #1REINSHALEN, GERMANY
(A) No. of A/C Attacking Primary Target
(B) No., Size & Type Of Bombs
Name of Secondary Target #2LUNEBERG, GERMANY
(A) No. of A/C Attacking Secondary Target13121338
(B) No., Size & Type Of Bombs 449 x 150# GP 
38 x 100# GP
 454 x 150# GP  492 x 100# GP  903 x 150# GP 
530 x 100# GP
Name of Last Resort Target (LRT)
(A) No. of A/C Attacking LRT
(B) No., Size & Type Of Bombs
Name of Target of Opportunity (T.O.)Includes following No. of Pathfinder Aircraft
(A) No. of A/C Attacking T.O.1 B-17G HO
1 B-17G SH
1 B-17G SH1 B-17G HO2 B-17G HO
2 B-17G SH
(B) No., Size & Type Of Bombs
No. of A/C MIA - Total0000
No. of A/C MIA - Flak
No. of A/C MIA - Flak and E/A
No. of A/C MIA - Enemy Aircraft
No. of A/C MIA - Accident over Enemy Terr.
No. of A/C MIA - Other and Unknown
Time of Take Off101010151013
Time of Attack1523½1523½1525
Total Time for Mission104:0897:28105:26307:02
Altitude of Release (Indicated)15,000’14,400’5,600’
Visual, H2X, Gee-H, M-H, Eagle, or CombinationH2X WITH A VISUAL ASSIST
Enemy Resistance – AA Intensity & AccuracyNONE
Enemy Resistance – Fighter0000
Enemy Resistance – Bombers0000
U.S. A/C Engaged by Enemy Aircraft0000
Number of Passes made by Enemy Aircraft0000

____ A/C borrowed as follows: None
____ A/C loaned as follows: None

Lead Bombardier’s Narrative:
Date - 7 April, 1945
Field Order # 680
Squadron or Group - Lead Sqdn., 94th "B" Group
Target -Priority Target #2, M/Y at Luneburg, Germany
  1. Type of Bombing (Visual, PFF or Combined)?  PFF with Visual Assist.
  2. Did Squadron perform own sighting operation, bomb on smoke marker, or was bombing done in Group Formation? Lead Squadron performed own sighting operation with the Low dropping on the Lead on a M.H. of 085° at 15:23:30 Hours.
  3. Was turn made at briefed I.P.? Yes
  4. Cloud coverage and visibility. 5/10 - 6/10
  5. If Visual, when was MPI [Mean Point of Impact] identified? If not actually seen, how was it located? MPI [Mean Point of Impact] could not be seen, but parts of town and M/Y were seen.
  6. Any Interference on Bomb Run? No
  7. Did C-1 [Autopilot] function satisfactory? Yes
  8. Any other factors affecting accuracy? No
  [Signed] Raymond E. Hall, 1st Lt., Air Corps, Lead Bombardier

Combat Bombing Flight Record:

I certify that this 12E form is complete and correct.
Warren C. Steitz, Captain, Air Corps, Group Bombardier.
Lead Squadron, 94th "B" Group
Bombardier - 1st Lt. Hall, Raymond E.
Pilot - Lt. Col. Stewart, J.T. & Capt. Robinson, J.C.
Navigator - 1st Lt. Allen, Albert W.

Aircraft B-17G   D-664  Take-off - 10:10 Landed - 18:10
Objective - Priority Target #2, M/Y at Luneburg, Germany
Aiming Point (MPI) [Mean Point of Impact] - PFF with visual assist.
Initial Point - As Briefed
Method of Attack - Low Squadron bombed on the Lead Squadron
No. of Attacking A/C in Group: - 12 & 12   Composite Group - ____
Number A/C Dropping Bombs by own Sighting Operation: ____
Deflection and Range Sighting, Group: One   Composite Group - ____
Range Sighting only, Group - __   Composite Group - ____
Bombs, Types and Sizes - 38 x 150 Lb. G.P.[General Purpose] & Markers
Number of Bombs Loaded - As Above   Released - Same
Fusing, Nose - 1/40   Tail - ____
Synchronization - On

Information at Release Point:  Low's M.H. [Magnetic Compass Heading] was 085° at 15:23:30 Hours

Altitude of Target - 165Magnetic Heading Ordered __° Actual 084°
True Altitude Above Target - 14,900True Heading 079°
Indicated Altitude - 15,000Drift, Estimated 7° Right - Actual 7° Right
Pressure Altitude of Target -278True Track 86°
Altimeter Setting 29.92Actual Range 6,877'
Calculated Indicated Air Speed - 150KBomb Sight Type - M-9
True Air Speed - 188KTime of Release 15:23:30
Ground Speed Est. 169 Actual 135KLength of Bombing Run - 7 Minutes
Wind Direction Metro - 030° Actual - 060°Intervalometer Setting - 100 feet
Wind Velocity Metro 25 Actual 30 C-1 Pilot [Autopilot] - X [Used]
D.S. - 164  Trail - 85   ATF - 32.6A-5 Pilot _____
Tan. D.A, Est. .46 Actual .451 Manual Pilot ____

Preliminary Damage Assessment:
  1. Three squadrons of the Group attacked as a priority 2 target the M/Y [R.R. Marshalling Yard] at Luneburg, Germany. The target area is covered by clouds and photo cover shows no bursts on the ground.
  2. Bomb away can be plotted for all squadrons, and using information furnished by the Group Bombardier an estimated point of impact can be made. This would place the bombs of the lead and low squadrons on and around the assigned MPI [Mean Point of Impact], with the main concentration slightly short. The bombs of the high squadron are plotted one and a quarter miles SW of the assigned MPI. This area is a slightly built-up section.
  [Signed:] Thomas L. Cooper, Captain, Air Corps, Asst. Group S-2 P.I. [Photo Intelligence]

Narrative Teletype Report:
  1. No leaflets were carried by this Group.
  2. The three Squadrons of this Group formed the 94th “B” CBW [Combat Wing] and was the first group to attack the No. 2 target, The M/Y [R.R. Marshalling Yard] at Luneburg, Germany. Bombing was done by PFF methods with a visual assist; the low squadron, flying in close trail with the lead, bombed at the same time, and the high attacked separately. Photos show the target area to be covered by clouds and no bursts are seen. Ground detail seen after bombing identifies the target as Luneburg. Mickey operators believe the bomb run to be very good, and estimate the bombs fell in the target area.
  3. No E/A [Enemy Aircraft] were encountered and no claims [of enemy aircraft being shot down] are being submitted.
  4. The only flak encountered or observed throughout the mission was approximately ten accurate bursts in the vicinity of Nienburg.
  5. 6-8/10ths cloud layers, with tops from 8 to 10,000 ft., obscured the No. 1 target, preventing visual bombing. Conditions remained the same at No. 2 target, with slight openings just prior to bombs away.
  6. 6 to 10 enemy aircraft were observed at Weitzenbruck A/F [Airfield], 5235-1001. Photos show several aircraft parked on the landing ground one-half mile SE of the Luneburg A/F.
  7. Four PFF A/C were employed; three of the PFF sets worked well and were used for both bombing and navigational aid. The PFF set in the lead of the low squadron went out somewhere over the continent, causing them to bomb on the smoke markers of the lead squadron. The Scouting Force was heard and the information received was correct. Fighter support was good. None of our A/C is missing.
  8. Failure to identify the lead A/C of this Group caused slight delay in the assembly over the buncher. Departure was made two minutes late, and the two points before Control Point 1 were cut short in an endeavor to fall behind the Combat Wing leader. Clacton was reached one minute late and Wing assembly and departure was as per SOP [Standard Operating Procedure]. The route over the continent was flown as briefed except for the delay caused by strong head winds, making this Group 11 minutes late at Control Point #2. A visual run was attempted on the No. 1 target, but half-way down it was deemed advisable to bomb the No. 2 target by PFF methods. An IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run] was established at Reinsehlen A/F and a Mag. [Magnetic Compass] heading of 84 degrees was flown to Luneburg, where the M/Y, the No. 2 target, was bombed by PFF methods with visual assist. The low squadron dropped on the smoke markers of the lead squadron, the high bombing alone. Bombing equipment worked well with the exception of the lead A/C of the low squadron. A sharp left turn was made to avoid flying close to Hamburg. Course flown on return was as briefed. Control Point 3 was reached 37 minutes late, and let-down was as per SOP. Bombing was done from an altitude of 15,000 feet.

Track Chart:
Click on Chart to Enlarge

Mission Summary Report:
  1. Abortives and Flying Spares:
    1. None
  [Signed:] John W. Freeman, Captain, Air Corps, Group Engineering Officer

“J” Form:
  1. Last Four numbers and Call Letter of A/C in each Squadron:
    94th Combat Wing "A" Group
    1A - LEAD Squadron - 351st Group
     (A) Sqdn 508th A/C: A–8410, C–8753, D–6082, G–8954, H–8412, K–8130, L–7956, P–7258, U–8813, Y–6108, (X–6579 Spare)
     (B) Sqdn 509th A/C: None
     (C) Sqdn 510th A/C: None
     (D) Sqdn 511th A/C: (D–8664 PFF, F–8376 PFF)

    1B - LOW Squadron - 351st Group
     (A) Sqdn 508th A/C: None
     (B) Sqdn 509th A/C: A–8428, B–8592, D–7193, F–6566, G–8617, M–7964, O–8920, R–6156, T–8666, U–8591, Z–7696
     (C) Sqdn 510th A/C: None
     (D) Sqdn 511th A/C: (B–7701 PFF)

    1C - HIGH Squadron - 351st Group
     (A) Sqdn 508th A/C: None
     (B) Sqdn 509th A/C: None
     (C) Sqdn 510th A/C: A–8465, B–6610, C–9020, D–8694, G–7862, K–7252, M–9001, Q–6565, S–7512, T–9156, V–7705, (H–8280 Spare)
     (D) Sqdn 511th A/C: (A–8358 PFF)
  2. Target: GU-4402
  3. W/T and R/T Operational Call Sign of each Squadron:
    Squadron508 [Call Sign]W/T LSX R/T CARLTONSquadron510 [Call Sign]W/T LGD R/T TIPSTAFF
    Squadron509 [Call Sign]W/T SWN R/T HOTMINTSquadron511 [Call Sign]W/T NSA R/T PARTNERSHIP
  4. Taxi – 0900 1000; Take-Off – 0915 1015; E.T.D. Field – 1037 1137
  5. Time:Height:Place of Crossing English Coast: (OUT)
    1112 121215,000 FtClacton
  6. Time:Height:Place of Crossing Enemy Coast: (IN)
    1153 125315,000 Ft51°38'N-04°37'E [Zevenbergen, Netherlands]
  7. Time:Height:Place of Crossing Enemy Coast: (Out)
    1509 160910,000 Ft51°38'N-04°37'E [Zevenbergen, Netherlands]
  8. Time:Height:Place of Crossing English Coast: (IN)
    1609 17098,000 FtClacton
  9. E.T.R.(Estimated Time of Return) Base: 1645 1745 Hours
  10. MF/DF [Medium Frequency/Direction Finder] Section: "H"
  11. Bomb load of Each A/C: "A" Lead Box
    Lead Squadron: 13 A/C - 38 x 150 G.P. 1/40 Nose [Fuse] x No Tail
    Low Squadron: 12 A/C - 38 x 150 G.P. 1/40 Nose [Fuse] x No Tail
    High Squadron: 13 A/C - 38 x 100 G.P. No Nose [Fuse] x 1/40 Tail
    ___ Squadron:
  12. Fuel Load of each A/C: 2400 Gallons
  13. Leaders:
    Lead Sqdn: Rank & Name: Lt Col Stewart A/C No & Sqdn. A-8664 PFF (511)
    Low Sqdn: Rank & Name: Capt. Meadows A/C No & Sqdn. B-7701 PFF (511)
    High Sqdn: Rank & Name: Lt Turner A/C No & Sqdn. A-8358 PFF (511)
  14. Passengers, if any: (Full Name, Rank, A/C and Squadron Passenger flying with)

Report Compiled By D.W. Grasmehr, Sgt.

Formation Chart:
94th "A" Combat Bomb Group - Lead Squadron Formation at Take–Off and Over Target
508th Squadron
Col Stewart–Robinson
A/C 44-8664 D PFF
A/C 43-38954 G
A/C 44-8376 F PFF
A/C 44-6108 Y
A/C 44-8410 A
A/C 43-38130 K
A/C 44-8412 H
A/C 43-38753 C
A/C 44-6082 D
A/C 43-38813 U
A/C 44-6579 X Spare
A/C 42-97258 P
A/C 43-37956 L

[Lt Chapman, the flying spare, stayed with the formation.]

94th "A" Combat Bomb Group - High Squadron Formation at Take–Off and Over Target
510th Squadron
A/C 44-8358 A PFF
A/C 43-37512 S
A/C 44-6610 B
A/C 43-39020 C
A/C 43-39001 M
A/C 43-37705 V
A/C 43-38465 A
A/C 43-38694 D
A/C 44-6565 Q
A/C 43-39156 T
A/C 44-8280 H Spare
A/C 42-97252 K
A/C 43-37862 G

[Lt Dantzler, the flying spare, stayed with the formation.]

94th "A" Combat Bomb Group - Low Squadron Formation at Take–Off and Over Target
509th Squadron
A/C 42-97701 B PFF
A/C 44-8617 G
A/C 44-6156 R
A/C 43-37696 Z
A/C 43-38591 U
A/C 43-38666 T
A/C 43-37964 M
A/C 43-38592 B
A/C 42-97193 D
A/C 43-38428 A
A/C 43-38920 O
A/C 44-6566 F

Time Schedule:
Zero Hour: 1030 DBST [Double British Standard Time]  Briefing: Enlisted Men 0230; Officers 0300 Stations: 0530
Start Engines: 0945 Taxi: 1000 Take-Off: 1015  [Breakfast: Enlisted Men 0130; Officers 0200]

[Wounded On Mission: 0]
The above records were obtained at the National Archives Records Administration and have been declassified by authority NND 745005
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