351st Bomb Group

Polebrook, England

Group Mission #311

Credited Mission #303

 
DATE: 8 Apr. 1945
Target: Railroad Marshalling Yard, Halberstadt, Germany
 
BRIEFING OUTLINE

  1. Ask 508th, 509th and 510th Operations representatives if their crews are all present.

  2. Read Special briefing poop.

  3. TARGETS:
    1. The Visual Primary for today is: #1 Zerbst [Germany] Airfield
    2. PFF Primary: #2 Halberstadt [Germany]
    3. Visual Secondary: #3 Halle [Germany]
    4. PFF Secondary: ____
    5. Last Resort Target: 

  4. S-2 [Intelligence] Information:

  5. Weather:

  6. Time Schedule:
    Zero Hour: - 0800Stations: - 0520
    Start Engines: - 0530Taxi: - 0545
    Take Off: - 0600Last Take Off: - 0715
    Intercept Group atDungenessat 6,000 Ft.
    Target Time: - 1130ETR [Estimated Time
       of Return]:

    - 1600 approx.
    Depart English Coast at: ____at ____

    Time on oxygen: 2½ hours

    TIME TICK [Set your watches.]

  7. Loadings:
     Gasoline: Max Gallons
     Bombs:Lead & Low - 6 x 500# G.P. & 4 M-17 IB's [Incendiary Bomb]
    High Sqdn. 38 x 100# G.P.'s

  8. Intervalometer Settings: Visual - Salvo; H2X - Min. Train

  9. Chaff: Commence discharge of chaff at - IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run] for 18 minutes.
         Each A/C [Aircraft] will carry - 432 units.

  10. Disposition of Forces:

    3 Divisions will be dispatched.
    The 1st Air Division will depart England 1st preceded by ____ Division and followed by the 2nd & 3rd Division.
    1st Division will dispatch 4 CBW's of 3 Groups each.
    The order of attack in the 1st Division will be:
    Lead1st CBWAttackingDerben - Oil Storage
    2nd40th CBWAttackingStrasfurth - Oil Storage
    3rd94th CBWAttackingZerbst - A/D [Airdrome]
    4th41st CBWAttackingSchafstadt - A/D [Airdrome]
    2nd Division targets areFurth, Unterschlauersbach
    3rd Division targets arePlauen Area

  11. Fighter Cover: 2 Gps. of P-51's per Wing - 4 Free Lance in target area.

  12. Assembly:
    Lead at6,000feet on Kings Cliffe BuncherRed-GreenFlares
    High at7,000feet onKings CliffeBuncherGreen-GreenFlares
    Low at5,000feet onKings CliffeBuncherRed-RedFlares
    401st at6,000feet onCottesmoreBuncherRed-YellowFlares
    457th at6,000feet onGlattonBuncherRed-YellowFlares
    Combat Wing Assembly Line: Brandon to Lauenham
    Division Assembly Line: Dungeness to Coast
    2 minutes interval between Groups.
    Reference altitude: 20,000'
    Bombing altitude: 20,000'
    Point for instrument let-down Kings Cliffe magnetic heading of 30 degrees.

  13. Call Signs:
    351stWoodcraft Able
    401stWoodcraft Baker
    457thWoodcraft Charlie
    1st Div. Air Commander____
    94th CBW Air CommanderCol. Stewart

  14. The following ships will monitor [Radio Channels]- "B" - U-591, A-465, D-082; "C" - 8th A.F. - M-964; "C" - 67th Fighter Wing - Z-696.
    Other Communications information will be found on the flimsy.

  15. FLYING CONTROL: _____

  16. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:
     a. Type of Bombing Formation - Squadron for Visual; Group for Blind
     b. Bombardier and Navigator of the #3 A/C of Lead Sqdn. report to Photo Lab.
      The A/C is: R-156
     c. Ball Turret Gunners of the following A/C report to Photo Lab: M-964, B-349, C-020
     d. Camera A/C: C-640, G-862, H-412
      return at  ____
     e. Spares to turn back at Go In [to the Target]
     f. PFF A/C fly as Lead & Deputy of Lead Sqdn. & Lead of High & Low
     g. GH A/C fly as _____
     h. REMARKS: 
       Read Teletypes
       Russian Recognition Signals

  17. You are reminded not to discuss the target. EXERCISE ALL SECURITY MEASURES.


  BRIEFING OFFICER: HAVE YOU READ SPECIAL BRIEFING POOP??


Operational Narrative.
  1. Date of Mission - 8 April, 1945.
    1. Target Attacked: The No. 2 Target at Halberstadt, Germany was attacked. H2X with Visual Assist.
    2. Force: 94th “A” Group. 38 A/C [Aircraft] dispatched.
    3. Position: The 94th “A” Group was scheduled to fly as the seventh group in the First Division Formation. Some difficulty was encountered in getting into position at Control Point #1, but the proper slot was finally reached inside of the French Coast.
    4. Lead Teams
      Wing Lead
      Air Commander: Lt Col James T. Stewart
      Pilot:Captain Norman A. Trapp
      Navigator:1st Lt. John C. Talbott
      Bombardier:1st Lt. Clarence L. Hunter

      Low Squadron
      Leader: 1st Lt. Frederick F. Horns
      Pilot:2nd Lt. Carl L. Blackford
      Navigator:1st Lt. Frank D. Fuller
      Bombardier:2nd Lt. Salvatore R. Cacace

      High Squadron
      Leader: 1st Lt. Joseph E. Parker
      Pilot:2nd Lt. Raymond J. Works
      Navigator:1st Lt. Edward J. LeFevre
      Bombardier:1st Lt. Edward H. Dengel
  2. Narrative.
    1.  Squadron and Group Assembly: The assembly was carried out satisfactorily over the Kings Cliffe buncher at the briefed altitude of 6,000 feet. The early take-off, however, necessitated a slow assembly.
    2.  Route Over England: Departure from the assembly area was made on time at the briefed altitude of 6,000 feet. The briefed route was followed to Point F with little divergency as to location, altitude, or times. Before reaching Control Point #1, however, several groups were observed crowding the departure point from the English coast. Departure from the coast was made one minute late (0813) at the briefed height of 6,000 feet.
    3.  Division Assembly Line: Due to the presence of so many other groups in the vicinity, it was necessary for the 94th “A” to shuffle through them as best it could in the hopes of finding its proper position. It was necessary to fly across the channel to the right of the briefed course in order to avoid the confusion as much as possible. The 94th “B” had made its departure from Control Point #1 ahead of the 94th “A” Group. The 94th “A” flew behind and to the right of this group. The French coast was crossed to the right of the briefed point at an altitude of 6,000 feet. The 94th “A” continued to fly in echelon on the 94th “B” until the end of the Division Assembly Line was reached. The 94th “B” made a double drift to the left in order to fall into position behind the 94th “A”. This put the 94th “A” in its proper position (seventh) in the Division Column.
    4.  Flight to Target: The 41st Combat Wing was observed abreast of the 94th “A” Group, while other groups of the Division Formation were observed ahead in their proper positions. It was hoped that the following groups would pass over the 94th “A” if it did not start its climb as soon as briefed, thus allowing it to increase the interval between itself and the preceding (40th) combat wing; but this was not the case. The formation started climbing in the vicinity of the Rhine River. The preceding groups were followed on the flight to Control Point #3. That point was reached at an altitude of 12,000 feet, 6,000 feet below the briefed height. The Weather Scouting Force at first reported that the No. 1 and No. 2 Targets were completely covered. A second report from the Weather Scouting Force indicated that a visual assist might be possible on the No. 1 Target. The Combat Wing Air Commander decided not to attempt to bomb the No. 1 Target. His decision was affirmed when the Weather Scouting Force reported that the No. 1 Target could not be seen until directly over it. An IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run] was set up on the leg to the briefed IP for the No. 1 Target (51°17’N - 10°40’E). This point was reached at an altitude of 20,000 feet, the briefed height for the No. 1 Target’s IP.
    5.  Description of Bombing Run: As there was no assurance that the No. 2 Target would be open, the Combat Wing Air Commander did not split the group into Squadrons. It was possible for the lead bombardier to make a visual assist sighting shortly before bombs were released. The MPI [Mean Point of Impact] was triangulated through the smoke and clouds. The C-1 Pilot [Autopilot] was used and functioned satisfactorily. Bombing results were reported as fair to good.
    6.  Flight From Target: The formation made a sharp left turn from the target and contacted the briefed route at Control Point #3. The briefed route was followed with little divergency behind the preceding formations. A gradual let-down was made. The French coast was crossed at the briefed point at an altitude of 8,000 feet. The briefed route was followed across the channel, and the English coast was crossed at an altitude of 6,000 feet. The briefed route was followed from the coast for the majority of the flight to base. The turn at Wisbech was cut off and the High and Low Squadrons were sent to their respective stand-off areas. Landings were made without difficulty. A normal let-down procedure had been followed.
    7.  Fighter Support: As briefed.
    8.  Comments: No aircraft were lost. No enemy aircraft was encountered. No flak was encountered. The Weather Scouting Force furnished adequate weather information.
    9.  Aircraft Not Attacking: One aircraft returned to base early. The two flying spares remained with the formation.

  [Signed] Robert B. Stratton, Captain, Air Corps, Statistical Officer


STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS
DIVISION FIELD ORDER NUMBER 682
351st Bombardment Group
Lead SquadronLow SquadronHigh SquadronTOTALS
Borrowed Aircraft0000
No. of Aircraft Failing to Take Off0000
No. of Aircraft Sorties13121338
No. of Aircraft Airborne Less Unused Spares13121338
No. of Aircraft Credit Sorties12121337
No. of Effective Sorties12121337
No. of Non-Effective Sorties1001
Name of Primary TargetZERBST, GERMANY
(A) No. of A/C Attacking Primary Target
(B) No., Size & Type Of Bombs
Name of Secondary TargetHALBERSTADT, GERMANY
(A) No. of A/C Attacking Secondary Target12121337
(B) No., Size & Type Of Bombs 72 x 500# GP 
48 x 500# IB
 72 x 500# GP 
48 x 500# IB
 6 x 500# GP 
4 x 500# IB
454 x 100# GP
 150 x 500# GP 
100 x 500# IB
454 x 100# GP
Name of Last Resort Target (LRT)
(A) No. of A/C Attacking LRT
(B) No., Size & Type Of Bombs
Name of Target of Opportunity (T.O.)The following No. of Pathfinder Aircraft were used as follows:
(A) No. of A/C Attacking T.O.2 B-17G SH1 B-17G SH1 B-17G SH4 B-17G SH
(B) No., Size & Type Of Bombs
No. of A/C MIA - Total0000
No. of A/C MIA - Flak
No. of A/C MIA - Flak and E/A
No. of A/C MIA - Enemy Aircraft
No. of A/C MIA - Accident over Enemy Terr.
No. of A/C MIA - Other and Unknown
Time of Take Off055706030559
Time of Attack11401140½1141
Total Time for Mission105:24118:18110:08323:50
Altitude of Release (Indicated)20,600’20,200’20,000’
Visual, H2X, Gee-H, M-H, Eagle, or CombinationH2X with Visual Assist
Enemy Resistance – AA Intensity & AccuracyNone
Enemy Resistance – Fighter0000
Enemy Resistance – Bombers0000
U.S. A/C Engaged by Enemy Aircraft0000
Number of Passes made by Enemy Aircraft0000
Degree of SuccessGood Results
Non-Effective Sorties1001
(A) Weather
(B) Personnel1001
(C) Enemy Action
(D) Other Non-Mechanical
(E) Mechanical and Equipment1001
Incidents of Mechanical & Equipment Failure:
(A) Engine43-38130001
(B) Oil System
(C) Fuel System
(D) Supercharger
(E) Propeller and Governor
(F) Communication System
(G) Guns and Turrets
(H) Bomb Release
(I) Bombay Doors
(J) Electric System
(K) Instruments
(L) Oxygen Equipment
(M) Bomb Sights
(N) A/C in General
Comments

____ A/C borrowed as follows: None
____ A/C loaned as follows: None




Lead Bombardier’s Narrative:
Date - 8 April. 1945
Field Order # 681
Squadron or Group - Lead Sqdn., 94th "A" Group
Target - Priority #2, Railway center at Halberstadt, Germany
  1. Type of Bombing (Visual, PFF or Combined)?  PFF with Visual Assist
  2. Did Squadron perform own sighting operation, bomb on smoke marker, or was bombing done in Group Formation? Bombing was in Group Formation on the Lead. The lead squadron made own sighting operation.
  3. Was turn made at briefed I.P.? No (51°17’N - 10°40’E)
  4. Cloud coverage and visibility. 3/10 Clouds
  5. If Visual, when was MPI [Mean Point of Impact] identified? If not actually seen, how was it located? M.P.I. [Mean Point of Impact] was triangulated
  6. Any Interference on Bomb Run? Smoke and Clouds
  7. Did C-1 [Autopilot] function satisfactory? Yes
  8. Any other factors affecting accuracy? None
  [Signed] Clarence L. Hunter, 1st Lt., Air Corps, Lead Bombardier

Combat Bombing Flight Record:

I certify that this 12E form is complete and correct.
Warren C. Steitz, Captain, Air Corps, Group Bombardier.
Lead Squadron, 94th CBW "A" Group
Bombardier - 1st Lt. Hunter, Clarence L.
Pilot - Lt. Col. Stewart, J.T. & Capt. Trapp, N.A.
Navigator - 1st Lt. Talbott, John C.

Aircraft B-17G   D-664  Take-off - 0600 Landed - 1500
Objective - Priority #2, Railway Center at Halberstadt, Germany
Aiming Point (MPI) [Mean Point of Impact] - PFF with Visual Assist
Initial Point - 51°17’N - 10°40’E
Method of Attack - Bombing was in Group Formation on the Lead Squadron.
No. of Attacking A/C in Group: - 36   Composite Group - ____
Number A/C Dropping Bombs by own Sighting Operation: ____
Deflection and Range Sighting, Group: One   Composite Group - ____
Range Sighting only, Group - __   Composite Group - ____
Bombs, Types and Sizes - 6 x 500 Lb. M-43 G.P.[General Purpose] & 4 x 500 Lb. M17 I.B.'s [Incendiary Bomb]
Number of Bombs Loaded - As Above   Released - Same
Fusing, Nose - 1/10   Tail - 1/100
Synchronization - On

Information at Release Point:  High M.H. [Magnetic Compass Heading] 031° @ 1141, Low M.H. 030° @ 1140½

Altitude of Target - 256Magnetic Heading Ordered 044° Actual 031°
True Altitude Above Target - 20,400True Heading 026°
Indicated Altitude - 20,500Drift, Estimated 2° Left - Actual 5° Left
Pressure Altitude of Target +91True Track 021°
Altimeter Setting 29.92Actual Range 8,364'
Calculated Indicated Air Speed - 150KBomb Sight Type - M-9
True Air Speed - 206KTime of Release 1140
Ground Speed Est. 175 Actual 182Length of Bombing Run - 16 min.
Wind Direction Metro - 50° Actual - 75°Intervalometer Setting - 140'
Wind Velocity Metro 25 Actual 22 C-1 Pilot [Autopilot] - X [Used]
D.S. - 142.0  Trail - 51   ATF - 37.32A-5 Pilot _____
Tan. D.A, Est. .43 Actual .41 Manual Pilot ____


Preliminary Damage Assessment:
  1. The three squadrons of this Group attacked as a priority 2 target the railway center at Halberstadt, Germany. Bombing was in group formation and the bombs of the low squadron fell into smoke.
  2. The bombs of the lead squadron fell into the target area with main concentration on and around the assigned MPI [Mean Point of Impact]. Bursts cover the end of the railway yards and the station. A heavy concentration fell along the east side of the yards in an industrial area. The pattern is 1,957 feet by 1,339 feet, with the center of the pattern 412 feet right of the assigned MPI. Percentage will be 76% for 1,000 feet and 100% for 2,000 feet.
  3. The pattern of the low squadron fell into smoke and only a few bursts can be plotted. These bursts indicate that the bombs fell to the target and approximately 1,500 feet short of the lead squadron. This area is well built up and is industrial and residential.
  4. The pattern of the high squadron fell to the left of the lead squadron and hit in the western part of the city. The pattern is 3,399 feet by 1,792 feet, with the center of the pattern 2,060 feet short of the MPI. Approximate percentage will be 0 for 1,000 feet and 42% for 2,000 feet.
  [Signed:] Thomas L. Cooper, Captain, Air Corps, Group S-2 [Intelligence] P.I. [Photo Intelligence]


Narrative Teletype Report:
  1. No leaflets were carried by this Group.
  2. The three Squadrons of this Group formed the94th “A” CBW and bombed by PFF methods with a visual assist the number 2 target, the M/Y [R.R. Marshalling Yard] at Halberstadt, Germany. This Group was the (7) in the Division column, and approximately the third Group to attack the number 2 target. Photos show the bombs of all Squadrons falling on and around the assigned target. The Lead Squadron bombs fell on the M/Y, that was the MPI, and the Low and High Squadron fell into the city.
  3. No E/A [Enemy Aircraft] were encountered and no claims [of enemy aircraft being shot down] are being submitted.
  4. Nil
  5. 3 to 5/10s cumulus cloud layer was encountered over the continent and at the target with tops from 4,000 to 6,000 feet, visibility being about 20 miles.
  6. Observations included a M/Y [R.R. Marshalling Yard] at 5135-1034, from 20,000 feet at about 1145 hours, well loaded with wagons; a M/Y at 5124-1020, from 20,000 feet, traffic very active; an A/F [Airfield] at Thamsbruck, 5108-1038, with 25 t/e [Twin engine] aircraft; an A/F at Wernigerode, 5152-1046, in excellent condition, no planes and no sign of activity; and an A/F at 5215-1115, with approx. 70 A/C [Aircraft], several taking off at 1202 hrs.
  7. Four PFF A/C were employed, with the equipment working satisfactorily for both bombing and navigational aids, on all except the set in the lead of the low squadron, which had a malfunction. Fighter support was as briefed, and the weather information received from the Scouting Force was adequate. None of our A/C is missing.
  8. This Group assembled and departed from King’s Cliffe on time and encountered slight difficulty in forming the Combat Wing over Brandon owing to the darkness. The Group arrived at Splasher 8 two minutes late, and Control Point 1 was reached one minute late as a result of “S”-ing because of a tail wind. The route into the target was flown as briefed, with the IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run] for the No. 2 target established at approx. 5125-1050. The No. 2 target was attacked by PFF methods with a visual assist, bombing by group formation with the lead and low squadrons dropping their bombs on the lead A/C from an altitude of 20,000 feet. All bombing equipment used worked satisfactorily. After bombs away a heading of approx. 270 degrees was flown and the route out was intercepted at approx. 5145-1030. Return and let-down to the base was as per SOP [Standard Operating Procedure].


Mission Summary Report:
  1. Abortives and Flying Spares:
    1. Airplane No. 43-38130, 508th, returned early because of internal failure of #1 engine. No. 4 cylinder piston failed - engine frozen.
  [Signed:] otto Vasak, Major, Air Corps, Station S-4 [Engineering] Officer


Abortive Report
Aircraft No. K-130 Squadron - 509  Date - 8 April, 1945
  1. PILOT'S STATEMENT:
    1. Reason for abortive Failure of number one engine.
    2. Place and altitude 20 miles from Control Point "E" 6,000 Ft.
    3. Time 0740
    4. Position in formation Not in formation yet. (Lead Sqdn. - Lead High Element)
    5. Disposition of bombs Brought Back
    6. Remarks (Engine Change #1 Eng.)
    7. Time & Date dispatched 1025 8 April '45
      (Pilot's Signature) Warren Y. Hampton
“J” Form:
  1. Last Four numbers and Call Letter of A/C in each Squadron:
    94th Combat Wing "A" Group
    1A - LEAD Squadron - 351st Group
     (A) Sqdn 508th A/C: None
     (B) Sqdn 509th A/C: A–8428, C–8640, D–7193, M–7964, O–8920, P–6907, R–6156, T–8666, U–8591, Z–7696, (F–6566 Spare)
     (C) Sqdn 510th A/C: None
     (D) Sqdn 511th A/C: (D–8664 PFF), (M–8846 PFF)

    1B - LOW Squadron - 351st Group
     (A) Sqdn 508th A/C: None
     (B) Sqdn 509th A/C: None
     (C) Sqdn 510th A/C: A–8465, B–6610, C–9020, D–8694, G–7862, H–8280, K–7252, M–9001, Q–6565, T–9156, V–7705
     (D) Sqdn 511th A/C: (Y–7651 PFF)

    1C - HIGH Squadron - 351st Group
     (A) Sqdn 508th A/C: A–8410, B–7349, C–8753, D–6082, G–8954, H–8412, K–8130, P–7258, U–8813, X–6579, Y–6108, (O–8277 Spare)
     (B) Sqdn 509th A/C: None
     (C) Sqdn 510th A/C: None
     (D) Sqdn 511th A/C: (Z–8774 PFF)
  2. Target: GU-4082
  3. W/T and R/T Operational Call Sign of each Squadron:
    Squadron508 [Call Sign]W/T NFA R/T CARLTONSquadron510 [Call Sign]W/T MRM R/T TIPSTAFF
    Squadron509 [Call Sign]W/T TCA R/T HOTMINTSquadron511 [Call Sign]W/T RJK R/T PARTNERSHIP
  4. Taxi – 0545; Take-Off – 0600; E.T.D. Field – 0700
  5. Time:Height:Place of Crossing English Coast: (OUT)
    08126,000 FtDungeness
  6. Time:Height:Place of Crossing Enemy Coast: (IN)
    08226,000 Ft50°52'N-01°35'E [Le Sodit, France]
  7. Time:Height:Place of Crossing Enemy Coast: (Out)
    14185,000 Ft50°52'N-01°35'E [Le Sodit, France]
  8. Time:Height:Place of Crossing English Coast: (IN)
    14285,000 FtDungeness
  9. E.T.R.(Estimated Time of Return) Base: 1526 Hours
  10. MF/DF [Medium Frequency/Direction Finder] Section: "H"
  11. Bomb load of Each A/C: "A" Lead Box
    Lead Squadron: 13 A/C - 6 x 500 G.P. 1/10 x 1/100 [Fuses] & 4 M-17 IB's [Incendiary Bombs]
    Low Squadron: 12 A/C - 6 x 500 G.P. 1/10 x 1/100 [Fuses] & 4 M-17 IB's [Incendiary Bombs]
    High Squadron: 13 A/C - 38 x 100 G.P. No Nose x 1/100 Tail [Fuse]
    ___ Squadron:
  12. Fuel Load of each A/C: 2780 Gallons
  13. Leaders:
    Lead Sqdn: Rank & Name: Lt. Col. Stewart A/C No & Sqdn. D-8664 PFF (511)
    Low Sqdn: Rank & Name: Lt Horns A/C No & Sqdn. Y-7651 PFF (511)
    High Sqdn: Rank & Name: Lt Parker A/C No & Sqdn. Z-8774 PFF (511)
  14. Passengers, if any: (Full Name, Rank, A/C and Squadron Passenger flying with)
    None

Report Compiled By D.W. Grasmehr, Sgt.



Formation Chart:
94th "A" Group - Lead Squadron Formation at Take–Off
509th Squadron
Col. Stewart–Trapp
A/C 44-8664 D PFF
Thomson
A/C 44-6156 R
Maish
A/C 44-8846 M PFF
Sexton
A/C 43-37696 Z
Hampton–Cole
A/C 43-38130 K
Krier
A/C 44-6907 P
Brennan
A/C 44-6952 H
Deal
A/C 43-38666 T
Brereton
A/C 42-97193 D
Bird–Day
A/C 43-38428 A
Ware
A/C 44-6566 F Spare
Weber
A/C 43-38920 O
Hauck
A/C 43-38640 C


94th "A" Group Lead Squadron Formation Over–Target
509th Squadron
Col. Stewart–Trapp
A/C 44-8664 D PFF
Thomson
A/C 44-6156 R
Maish
A/C 44-8846 M PFF
Sexton
A/C 43-37696 Z
Brereton
A/C 42-97193 D
Krier
A/C 44-6907 P
Deal
A/C 43-38666 T
Ware
A/C 44-6566 F
Bird–Day
A/C 43-38428 A
Weber
A/C 43-38920 O
Hauck
A/C 43-38640 C

[Lt Hampton aborted. Lt Brereton filled in Lt Hampton's position and Lt Ware, the flying spare, fill in Lt Brereton's position.]
[Lt Brennan flew with the Low Squadron.]


94th "A" Group - Low Squadron Formation at Take–Off
510th Squadron
Horns
A/C 42-97651 Y PFF
Mahnke
A/C 43-37705 V
Morasca
A/C 42-97252 K
Stamps
A/C 43-39020 C
Peterson–Dantzler
A/C 43-39001 M
Streetman
A/C 44-8280 H
Dahlborg
A/C 43-38465 A
Northrup
A/C 43-38694 D
Kirkland
A/C 44-6565 Q
Bone–Edwards
A/C 43-39156 T
Benedict
A/C 44-6610 B
Montross
A/C 43-37862 G


94th "A" Group - Low Squadron Formation at Over Target
510th Squadron
Horns
A/C 42-97651 Y PFF
Mahnke
A/C 43-37705 V
Morasca
A/C 42-97252 K
Stamps
A/C 43-39020 C
Peterson–Dantzler
A/C 43-39001 M
Streetman
A/C 44-8280 H
Dahlborg
A/C 43-38465 A
Northrup
A/C 43-38694 D
Kirkland
A/C 44-6565 Q
Bone–Edwards
A/C 43-39156 T
Benedict
A/C 44-6610 B
Montross
A/C 43-37862 G
Brennan
A/C 44-6952 H

[Lt Brennan, scheduled to fly with the Lead Squadron, flew with the Low Squadron.]


94th "A" Group - High Squadron Formation at Take–Off
508th Squadron
Parker
A/C 44-8774 Z PFF
Murray
A/C 43-38954 G
Drought
A/C 44-6579 X
Hanson
A/C 44-6108 Y
Mordecai
A/C 42-97349 B
Westercamp
A/C 44-8410 A
James
A/C 42-97258 P
Marschak
A/C 43-38872 G
Sandel
A/C 44-6082 D
Barnard
A/C 43-38813 U
Hart
A/C 43-38277 O Spare
Chapman
A/C 43-38753 C
Fromme
A/C 44-8412 H


94th "A" Group - High Squadron Formation at Over Target
508th Squadron
Parker
A/C 44-8774 Z PFF
Murray
A/C 43-38954 G
Drought
A/C 44-6579 X
Hanson
A/C 44-6108 Y
Mordecai
A/C 42-97349 B
Westercamp
A/C 44-8410 A
James
A/C 42-97258 P
Marschak
A/C 43-38872 G
Sandel
A/C 44-6082 D
Barnard
A/C 43-38813 U
Hart
A/C 43-38277 O Spare
Chapman
A/C 43-38753 C
Fromme
A/C 44-8412 H
Hart
A/C 43-38277 O

[Lt Hart, the flying spare, stayed with the formation and flew behind the Low Low Element]

Time Schedule:
Zero Hour: 0800 DBST [Double British Standard Time]  Briefing: Enlisted Men 0230; Officers 0300 Stations: 0520
Start Engines: 0530 Taxi: 0545 Take-Off: 0600 [Breakfast: Enlisted Men 0130; Officers 0200]

[Wounded On Mission: 0]
The above records were obtained at the National Archives Records Administration and have been declassified by authority NND 745005
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