351st Bomb Group

Polebrook, England

Group Mission #317

Credited Mission #308

 
DATE: 16 Apr. 1945
Target: R.R. Marshalling Yard at Regensburg, Germany
 
BRIEFING OUTLINE

  1. Ask 508th, 509th and 510th Operations representatives if their crews are all present.

  2. Read Special briefing poop.

  3. TARGETS:
    1. The Visual Primary for today is: #1 Regensburg [Germany]
    2. PFF Primary: #3 Regensburg [Germany]
    3. Visual Secondary: #2 Any target assigned to another group.
    4. PFF Secondary: ____
    5. Last Resort Target: ____

  4. S-2 [Intelligence] Information:

  5. Weather:

  6. Time Schedule:
    Zero Hour: - 1300Stations: - 1100
    Start Engines: - 1110Taxi: - 1125
    Take Off: - 1140Last Take Off: - 1235
    Intercept Group atClactonat 5,000 Ft.
    Target Time: - 1548ETR [Estimated Time
       of Return]:

    - 2008
    Depart English Coast at: 1316at Clacton

    Time on oxygen: 2½ hours Total Time of Mission 8½

    TIME TICK [Set your watches.]

  7. Loadings:
     Gasoline: 2,780 Gallons
     Bombs:12 x 500 G.P. 1/10 x 1/40 [Fuses]

  8. Intervalometer Settings: Visual - Minimum, H2X - 50 Feet

  9. Chaff: Commence discharge of chaff at - 7 mins before Target - Continue for 12 minutes.
        Each A/C [Aircraft] will carry - 288 units.

  10. Disposition of Forces:

    3 Divisions will be dispatched.
    The 1st Air Division will depart England 2nd preceded by 2nd Division and followed by the ____ Division.
    1st Division will dispatch 3 CBW's of 4 Groups each.
    The order of attack in the 1st Division will be:
    Lead40th AAttackingPlattling
    2nd40th BAttackingPlattling
    3rd40th CAttackingStraubing
    4th41st AAttackingStraubing
    5th41st BAttackingRegensburg
    2nd Division targets areRosenheim, Traunstin
    3rd Division targets areRyrare, Flaknov

  11. Fighter Cover: 1 Gps. of P-51's

  12. Assembly:
    Lead at5,000feet on Kings Cliffe BuncherRed-GreenFlares
    High at6,000feet onKings CliffeBuncherGreen-GreenFlares
    Low at4,000feet onKings CliffeBuncherRed-RedFlares
    401st at5,000feet onCottesmoreBuncherRed-YellowFlares
    457th at5,000feet onGlattonBuncherRed-YellowFlares
    Combat Wing Assembly Line: Mendelesham - Clacton
    Division Assembly Line: Clacton to 51°13’N-02°55’E [Ostend, Belgium]
    2 minutes interval between Groups.
    Reference altitude: 15,000'
    Bombing altitude: 24,000'
    Point for instrument let-down Kings Cliffe magnetic heading of 030 degrees.

  13. Call Signs:
    351stWoodcraft Charlie
    401stWoodcraft Baker
    457thWoodcraft Able
    1st Div. Air CommanderMajor Kesling
    94th CBW Air CommanderLt. Col. Watson

  14. The following ships will monitor [Radio Channels]- "B" - Z-696, D-082, S-512; "C" - 8th A.F. - G-617; "C" - 67th Fighter Wing - R-156.
    Other Communications information will be found on the flimsy.

  15. FLYING CONTROL: _____

  16. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:
     a. Type of Bombing Formation - Normal
     b. Bombardier and Navigator of the #3 A/C of each sqdn. report to Photo Lab.
      The A/C are: D-193
     c. Ball Turret Gunners of the following A/C report to Photo Lab: B-592, B-610, G-954
     d. Camera A/C: A-428, N-676, A-410
      return at  Continental Coast
     e. Spares to turn back at ____
     f. PFF A/C fly as Lead of each Sqdn. - Deputy Lead of Lead Sqdn.
     g. GH A/C fly as ____
     h. REMARKS: ____

  17. You are reminded not to discuss the target. EXERCISE ALL SECURITY MEASURES.


  BRIEFING OFFICER: HAVE YOU READ SPECIAL BRIEFING POOP??


Operational Narrative.
  1. Date of Mission - 28 July, 1945.
    1. Target Attacked:  The No. 1 priority target at Regensburg, Germany, was attacked visually by squadrons.
    2. Force: 94th “C” Group. Thirty-eight aircraft, including three H2X ships, one combination H2X-GH ship, and two flying spares, were dispatched.
    3. Position: The 94th "C" Group was briefed to fly as the ninth group in the First Division Column. The 94th "A" Group, however, was late, and as a result, it is believed that the 94th "C" flew as the eighth group in the formation.
    4. Lead Teams
      Group Lead
      Air Commander: Major Mortimer L. Korges
      Pilot:Captain Jay H. Maish
      Navigator:1st Lt. Norman L. Gootee
      Bombardier:Captain John J. Schadegg

      Low Squadron
      Leader: Captain Edwin L. Olson
      Pilot:2nd Lt. Paul F. Drake
      Navigator:2nd Lt. Orvil J. Shirley
      Bombardier:2nd Lt. John H. Leavitt

      High Squadron
      Leader: Captain Julian C. Meadows
      Pilot:2nd Lt. Johnny E. Clark
      Navigator:Major William F. Bounds
      Bombardier:1st Lt. Robert F. Schneider
  2. Narrative.
    1.  Squadron and Group Assembly: The assembly was made over the Kings Cliffe buncher at an altitude of 10,000 feet, 5,000 feet above the briefed altitude. This increase in altitude was necessary because of the presence of clouds at and above the planned height.
    2.  Route Over England: Departure from the assembly area was made on time (1235) and on course. Crowland was reached one minute early (1239) and from that point the briefed route was followed slightly to the right of course. A double drift was necessary in order to permit the 94th “C” to fall into position behind the 94th “B” Group. The 94th “A” Group had not been seen. The briefed route was followed behind the 94th “B” to the departure point from the English coast. This point was reached three minutes early (1313) at an altitude of 10,000 feet, 5,000 feet above the briefed height.
    3.  Division Assembly Line: Departure from the English coast was made on course and three minutes early. When the formation was a short ways off England, the 94th “A” contacted both the “B” and “C” Groups and told them that they should start essing in order to permit the 94th “A” to catch up and take its position as the 94th Combat Wing Lead Group. As the 94th “A” was at that time approximately twelve minutes behind the 94th “C” and thus sixteen minutes behind its briefed spot in the Division Column, it was suggested by the 94th “C” Group Leader that the 94th “B” Group be permitted to take over the combat wing lead and continue without waiting for the 94th “A” Group. This suggestion was not approved by the Combat Wing Leader and so the two groups started essing. The 94 “B” Group was followed in the many variations from the briefed course which followed until the target was reached. Due to the absence of the 94th “A” Group, the 94th “C” was in the eighth position in the Division Column, rather than in ninth, as planned. The essing was started at mid-channel. The Belgian coast was crossed at the briefed point at an altitude of 10,000 feet, 5,000 feet above the briefed height, and eight minutes early (1340).
    4.  Flight to Target: The briefed route was not followed in the flight to the target. In accordance with the instructions of the Combat Wing Leader, the formations, both “B” and “C” Groups, continually essed across the briefed route. A steady climb was started at Control Point #2. After climbing, Control Point #3 was reached three minutes late (1526) at an altitude of 21,000 feet, 3,000 feet below the briefed height. The 94th "A" Group made its appearance shortly before Control Point #3 was reached, and flew on the left of the 94th “C” Group. Shortly afterwards, the 94th “B” Group made its departure from the Division Column on a northeasterly heading, apparently still essing. Due to the presence of the 94th “A” Group on the left, and an unidentified group on the right, the 94th “C” Group could not fly the briefed route from Control Point #3 to the target. It was forced to the right of the briefed course. An IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run] was set up south of the briefed point at an altitude of 24,000 feet, the briefed height. The 94th “C” was then seven minutes late (1547) for the briefed time at the planned IP. Further difficulty was encountered before reaching the IP when the 91st Group, flying a northerly heading across the briefed route, forced the 94th “C: south of course. The 94th “A” Group, flying to the left and on the briefed route, attacked ahead of the 94th “C”. It is believed that the 94th “B” returned to the briefed route after its disappearance and attacked immediately behind the 94th “C” Group.
    5.  Description of Bombing Run: The No. 1 priority target at Regensburg, Germany, was attacked visually by squadrons. Each squadron performed its own sighting operation. The briefed turn at the briefed IP was no made for reasons indicated previously. The Lead Squadron lead bombardier identified the MPI [Mean Point of Impact] when the formation was twenty miles from the target. Some difficulty was encountered from the prop wash of the 91st Group when it cut across the course of the 94th “C” Group. No other difficulty was encountered on the bomb run. The C-1 Pilot functioned satisfactorily.

      The lead bombardier of the Low Squadron picked up the marshalling yards when the squadron was five minutes from the BRL [Bomb Release Line]. No interference was encountered on the bomb run. The C-1 Pilot functioned satisfactorily.

      The MPI [Mean Point of Impact] was identified by the lead bombardier of the High Squadron at the start of the bomb run. No interference was encountered. The C-1 Pilot functioned satisfactorily. Smoke from previous bombings obscured the target just before bombs were released and last minute corrections could not be made.

      Photographs show very good results for the Lead and Low Squadrons. The bombs of the High Squadron fell into the smoke and cannot be plotted.
    6.  Flight From Target: After bombing, the formation turned right, inside of the briefed course, crossed over it, and again contacted it at a point south of Control Point #3. The Division Column was followed in the withdrawal. This took the formation on a gradually increasing divergency to the north of course to a point southeast of Brussels. A return towards the briefed route was then made, and the departure from the French coast was made slightly north of the briefed point nineteen minutes early (1835) at an altitude of 5,000 feet. The English coast was crossed at the briefed point at an altitude of 5,000 feet and the planned course was followed to base. The High and Low Squadron were sent to their respective stand-off areas before landing. A normal let-down procedure had been followed.
    7.  Fighter Support: Good. Appeared as briefed.
    8.  Comments: No aircraft were lost. No enemy aircraft ere encountered. Moderate and fairly accurate flak was encountered in the target area. The weather scouting force furnished accurate information on the weather in the target area.
    9.  Aircraft Not Attacking: One aircraft was hit by flak in the target area, lost its #3 engine and was forced to jettison its bombs on Regensburg. The two flying spares remained with the formation.

  [Signed] Robert B. Stratton, Captain, Air Corps, Statistical Officer


STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS
DIVISION FIELD ORDER NUMBER 689
351st Bombardment Group
Lead SquadronLow SquadronHigh SquadronTOTALS
Borrowed Aircraft0000
No. of Aircraft Failing to Take Off0000
No. of Aircraft Sorties12131338
No. of Aircraft Airborne Less Unused Spares12131338
No. of Aircraft Credit Sorties12131338
No. of Effective Sorties12131237
No. of Non-Effective Sorties0011
Name of Primary TargetREGENSBURG, GERMANY
(A) No. of A/C Attacking Primary Target12131237
(B) No., Size & Type Of Bombs 141 x 500# GP  154 x 500# GP  143 x 500# GP  438 x 500# GP 
Name of Secondary Target
(A) No. of A/C Attacking Secondary Target
(B) No., Size & Type Of Bombs
Name of Last Resort Target (LRT)Pathfinder aircraft flew and attacked as follows:
(A) No. of A/C Attacking LRT1 B-17G SH1 B-17G SH1 B-17G SH3 B-17G SH
(B) No., Size & Type Of Bombs1 B-17G HO1 B-17G HO
Name of Target of Opportunity (T.O.)
(A) No. of A/C Attacking T.O.
(B) No., Size & Type Of Bombs
No. of A/C MIA - Total0000
No. of A/C MIA - Flak
No. of A/C MIA - Flak and E/A
No. of A/C MIA - Enemy Aircraft
No. of A/C MIA - Accident over Enemy Terr.
No. of A/C MIA - Other and Unknown
Time of Take Off113611391137½
Time of Attack1555½1556½1557
Total Time for Mission94:50107:46106:58309:36
Altitude of Release (Indicated)24,000’23,000’24,300’
Visual, H2X, Gee-H, M-H, Eagle, or CombinationVisualVisualVisual
Enemy Resistance – AA Intensity & AccuracyMODERATE AND ACCURATE
Enemy Resistance – Fighter0000
Enemy Resistance – Bombers0000
U.S. A/C Engaged by Enemy Aircraft0000
Number of Passes made by Enemy Aircraft0000
Degree of SuccessVERY GOOD RESULTS
Non-Effective Sorties0011
(A) Weather
(B) Personnel
(C) Enemy Action0044-84101
(D) Other Non-Mechanical
(E) Mechanical and Equipment
Incidents of Mechanical & Equipment Failure:
(A) Engine
(B) Oil System
(C) Fuel System
(D) Supercharger
(E) Propeller and Governor
(F) Communication System
(G) Guns and Turrets
(H) Bomb Release
(I) Bombay Doors
(J) Electric System
(K) Instruments
(L) Oxygen Equipment
(M) Bomb Sights
(N) A/C in General
Comments

__0__ A/C borrowed as follows: 
__0__ A/C loaned as follows: 




Lead Bombardier’s Narrative:
Date - 16 April. 1945
Field Order # 689
Squadron or Group - Lead Sqdn., 94th CBW "C" Group
Target - Priority #1, M/Y [R.R. Marshalling Yard] and Repair Facilities at Regensburg, Germany
  1. Type of Bombing (Visual, PFF or Combined)?  Visual
  2. Did Squadron perform own sighting operation, bomb on smoke marker, or was bombing done in Group Formation? Squadron Performed Own Sighting Operation.
  3. Was turn made at briefed I.P.? Five Miles South of Briefed
  4. Cloud coverage and visibility. CAVU [Ceiling And Visibility Unlimited]
  5. If Visual, when was MPI [Mean Point of Impact] identified? If not actually seen, how was it located? MPI Identified While 20 Miles Away.
  6. Any Interference on Bomb Run? This Group Ran Into Prop-Wash From A Group That Bombed Ahead of Us and Then Turned into Us.
  7. Did C-1 [Autopilot] function satisfactory? Yes
  8. Any other factors affecting accuracy? None
  [Signed] John J. Schadegg, Captain, Air Corps, Lead Bombardier

Combat Bombing Flight Record:

I certify that this 12E form is complete and correct.
Warren C. Steitz, Captain, Air Corps, Group Bombardier.
Lead Squadron, 94th CBW "C" Group
Bombardier - Capt. Schadegg, John J.
Pilot - Maj. Korges, M.L. & Capt. Maish, J.H.
Navigator - 1st Lt. Gootee, Norman L.

Aircraft B-17G   L-045  Take-off - 11:37 Landed - 19:35
Objective - Priority #1, Marshalling Yard and Repair Facilities at Regensburg, Germany
Aiming Point (MPI) [Mean Point of Impact] - As Briefed
Initial Point - Five Miles South of Briefed
Method of Attack - Squadron
No. of Attacking A/C in Group: - 12   Composite Group - ____
Number A/C Dropping Bombs by own Sighting Operation: ____
Deflection and Range Sighting, Group: One   Composite Group - ____
Range Sighting only, Group - __   Composite Group - ____
Bombs, Types and Sizes - 12 x 500 Lb. AN-M43 G.P. [General Purpose]
Number of Bombs Loaded - As Above   Released - Same
Fusing, Nose - 1/10   Tail - 1/100
Synchronization - On

Information at Release Point:  

Altitude of Target - 1,130'Magnetic Heading Ordered 115° Actual 079°
True Altitude Above Target - 23,184True Heading 075°
Indicated Altitude - 24,000Drift, Estimated 9° Right - Actual 10° Right
Pressure Altitude of Target +730True Track 085°
Altimeter Setting 29.92Actual Range 13,959'
Calculated Indicated Air Speed - 150KBomb Sight Type - M-9
True Air Speed - 219KTime of Release 15:55:30
Ground Speed Est. 259 Actual 240Length of Bombing Run - 12 Miles
Wind Direction Metro - 340° Actual - 335°Intervalometer Setting - Minimum
Wind Velocity Metro 45 Actual 35 C-1 Pilot [Autopilot] - X [Used]
D.S. - 132.2  Trail - 56   ATF - 40.08A-5 Pilot _____
Tan. D.A, Est. .60 Actual .46 Manual Pilot ____


Preliminary Damage Assessment:
  1. The three squadrons of this Group attacked the priority No. 1 target at Regensburg, Germany. The target was the railway M/Y [Marshalling Yard] and repair facilities. Photo cover is complete for all squadrons.
  2. The bombs of the lead squadron hit in the target area with a heavy concentration of bombs on the M/Y. A concentration of bombs covered the twin roundhouses and there are several direct hits on the large sheds next to the M/Y. There is a direct hit on a long shed (probably loading platform) and a possible direct hit on a viaduct that crosses the yards. Several bombs that were dropped late fell into the town. The pattern is 1896 feet by 1540 feet with approximate percentages of 78% for 1000 feet and 92% for 2000 feet.
  3. The low squadron bombs fell in a tight concentration on the M/Y. Direct hits cannot be plotted but round hoses and facilities are covered with bursts. Damage to rolling stock, M/Y. and buildings should be severe. The pattern is 1697 feet by 1170 feet. Percentages are 55% for 1000 feet and 100% for 2000 feet.
  4. The bombs of the high squadron fell into smoke and cannot be plotted. A few bursts can be plotted at the edge of the smoke and these indicate that the main pattern fell slightly short of the MPI [Mean Point of Impact].
  [Signed:] Thomas L. Cooper, Captain, Air Corps, Asst. Group S-2, P.I. [Photo Intelligence]


Narrative Teletype Report:
  1. No leaflets were carried by this Group.
  2. The three squadrons of this group formed the 94th “C” Group and visually bombed by squadrons our No. 1 target, the M/Y [Marshalling Yard] at Regensburg, Germany. Photos show bombing results to be very good. The strikes of all three squadrons hit in the target area. The M/Y is well covered by a heavy concentration and bursts cover the roundhouses and other facilities.
  3. No E/A [Enemy Aircraft] were encountered and no claims [of enemy aircraft being shot down] are being submitted.
  4. The only flak encountered throughout the mission was at the target, where it was moderate and fairly accurate for both height and deflection, apparently in the form of a predicted concentration followed by continuous following after bombs away.
  5. 2 to 3/10 clouds with bases at 2000 to 3000 feet and tops at 6000 feet occurred on the route in. CAVU [Ceiling And Visibility Unlimited] conditions existed in the target area with a 15 to 20 mile air to ground visability [sic].
  6. Numerous S/E [Single Engine] enemy aircraft were observed on Ottengen A/F [Air Field], 4855 N – 1035 E.
  7. The four PFF sets employed by this group worked efficiently and served as navigational aids. Fighter support was good and appeared as briefed. The Scouting Force radioed back an accurate picture of weather conditions existing in the target area. An unidentified A/C [Aircraft] was observed exploding over Straubing, Germany; no chutes were observed. None of our A/C are missing.
  8. 94th “B” and “C” groups made the Wing Assembly just at the time the Wing leader announced he was nine minutes late. Double drifts were used in a vain attempt to allow the 94th “A” group to take over the lead, which he never did. We reached Control Point One on time and began double drifting ten miles North and South of course along the entire route over the Channel awaiting the Wing leader to occupy his position. Both groups radioed the Wing Leader requesting that the 94th “B” Group take over in his position, but this was refused. From 0520 E we followed the bomber stream, which led us ten miles south of course. This was followed by continual double drifting 25 miles north of course to attempt once again to allow the “A” group to assume the Wing lead. Two groups north of our position forced this group to make good an I.P. at 4911 N – 1128 E, some five miles south of our briefed I.P. We bombed visually by individual squadrons the No. 1 target, the M/Y at Regensburg, Germany. PFF equipment worked efficiently, being employed as a navigational aid. From the target on, the route was flown as briefed up to 05 degrees East, at which point a sudden wind shift forced us 20 miles north of course. We retained this position until reaching the coast of France. From this point on, the route was flown without incident and let-down was per SOP [Standard Operating Procedure].


Track Chart:
Click on Chart to Enlarge



Mission Summary Report:
  1. Abortives and Flying Spares:
    1. None
  [Signed:] John W. Freeman, Captain, Air Corps, Group Engineering Officer


“J” Form:
  1. Last Four numbers and Call Letter of A/C in each Squadron:
    94th Combat Wing "C" Group
    1A - LEAD Squadron - 351st Group
     (A) Sqdn 508th A/C: None
     (B) Sqdn 509th A/C: A–8428, B–8592, C–8640, D–7193, F–6566, G–8617, H–6952, P–6907, R–6156, Z–7696
     (C) Sqdn 510th A/C: None
     (D) Sqdn 511th A/C: (L–8045 PFF), (H–8780 PFF)

    1B - LOW Squadron - 351st Group
     (A) Sqdn 508th A/C: None
     (B) Sqdn 509th A/C: None
     (C) Sqdn 510th A/C: A–8465, B–6610, C–9020, F–7124, H–8280, M–9001, N–2676, Q–6565, S–7512, T–9156, U–7216,
      (L–7515 Spare)
     (D) Sqdn 511th A/C: (Z–8774 PFF)

    1C - HIGH Squadron - 351st Group
     (A) Sqdn 508th A/C: A–8410, B–7349, D–6082, G–8954, H–8412, K–8130, L–7956, M–7957, Q–8799, U–8813, Y–6108,
      (J–7978 Spare)
     (B) Sqdn 509th A/C: None
     (C) Sqdn 510th A/C: None
     (D) Sqdn 511th A/C: (M–8846 PFF)
  2. Target: GH-638
  3. W/T and R/T Operational Call Sign of each Squadron:
    Squadron508 [Call Sign]W/T NDM R/T CARLTONSquadron510 [Call Sign]W/T TTX R/T TIPSTAFF
    Squadron509 [Call Sign]W/T JVN R/T HOTMINTSquadron511 [Call Sign]W/T WMH R/T PARTNERSHIP
  4. Taxi – 1125; Take-Off – 1140; E.T.D. Field – 1235
  5. Time:Height:Place of Crossing English Coast: (OUT)
    13165,000 FtClacton
  6. Time:Height:Place of Crossing Enemy Coast: (IN)
    13485,000 Ft51°13'N-02°55'E [Ostend, Belgium]
  7. Time:Height:Place of Crossing Enemy Coast: (Out)
    18545,000 Ft50°48'N-01°36'E [Ambleteuse, France]
  8. Time:Height:Place of Crossing English Coast: (IN)
    19065,000 FtDungeness
  9. E.T.R.(Estimated Time of Return) Base: 2008 Hours
  10. MF/DF [Medium Frequency/Direction Finder] Section: "H"
  11. Bomb load of Each A/C: "A" Lead Box
    Lead Squadron: 12 A/C - 12 x 500 Lb. G.P. - 1/10 x 1/40 [Fuses]
    Low Squadron: 13 A/C - 12 x 500 Lb. G.P. - 1/10 x 1/40
    High Squadron: 13 A/C - 12 x 500 Lb. G.P. - 1/10 x 1/40
    ___ Squadron:
  12. Fuel Load of each A/C: 2780 Gallons
  13. Leaders:
    Lead Sqdn: Rank & Name: Major Korges A/C No & Sqdn. L-8045 PFF (511)
    Low Sqdn: Rank & Name: Lt Drake A/C No & Sqdn. Z-8774 PFF (511)
    High Sqdn: Rank & Name: Capt. Meadows A/C No & Sqdn. M-8846 PFF (511)
  14. Passengers, if any: (Full Name, Rank, A/C and Squadron Passenger flying with)
    Edward L. Sterling Lt. Col. M-8846 511th PFF

Report Compiled By Rocky Civizzio, T/Sgt.



Formation Chart:
94th "C" Combat Bomb Group - Lead Squadron Formation at Take–Off and Over Target
509th Squadron
Maj. Korges–Capt. Maish
A/C 44-8045 L PFF
Cole
A/C 42-97193 D
Lewis
A/C 44-8780 H PFF
Potter–Bird
A/C 44-6907 P
Workman
A/C 44-6952 H
Hammett
A/C 43-37696 Z
Wefel
A/C 44-8617 G
Thomson
A/C 44-6156 R
Deal
A/C 44-6566 F
Day
A/C 43-38592 B
Hauck
A/C 43-38753 C
Redmann
A/C 43-38428 A


94th "C" Combat Bomb Group - Low Squadron Formation at Take–Off and Over Target
510th Squadron
Drake–Olson
A/C 44-8774 Z PFF
Garner–Avison
A/C 42-107124 F
Bacon–Ketelson
A/C 44-8280 H
Rebo–Edwards
A/C 43-39020 C
Dantzler–Dahlborg
A/C 43-39001 M
Schweiger
A/C 42-97216 U
Bone
A/C 43-38465 A
Oen
A/C 43-37512 S
Brown
A/C 44-6610 B
Northrup
A/C 43-39156 T
Owre
A/C 43-37515 L Spare
Ransom
A/C 44-6565 Q
Hollister
A/C 42-102676 P

[The spare A/C stayed with the formation.]

94th "C" Combat Bomb Group - High Squadron Formation at Take–Off and Over Target
508th Squadron
Meadows
A/C 44-8846 M PFF
Murray
A/C 43-38954 G
Boucher
A/C 43-38130 K
Hansen
A/C 44-6108 Y
Drought–Hart
A/C 42-97349 B
Sprecher
A/C 43-38799 Q
Cook
A/C 43-38813 U
Mika
A/C 44-8412 H
Sandel
A/C 44-6082 D
Ryan
A/C 43-37957 M
Warth
A/C 43-37978 J Spare
Nairn
A/C 43-37956 L
Banda
A/C 44-8410 A

[Lt Banda fell behind on bomb run. Lost #3 engine (Flak)]
[The spare A/C stayed with the formation.]


Time Schedule:
Zero Hour: 1300 DBST [Double British Standard Time]  Briefing: Enlisted Men 0800; Officers 0830 Stations: 1100 
Start Engines: 1110 Taxi:1125 Take-Off: 1140  [Breakfast: Enlisted Men 0700; Officers 0730]

[Wounded On Mission: 0]
The above records were obtained at the National Archives Records Administration and have been declassified by authority NND 745005
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